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REFRAMING COMPLEXITY: HEDGE FUND




In the wake of the global financial crisis, the need for systemic risk
mitigation in the shadow banking system is resoundingly evident. The task
at hand is incomplete, leaving grey areas such as hedge funds obfuscated. I
contend it is both timely and relevant to revisit hedge fund regulatory
reform. The relationship between the banking and non-banking sectors
requires continuous monitoring and further regulation, particularly in
market conditions likely to shift banking functions outside the realms of
prudential regulation. In addition, as complacency is a likely companion to
normalcy, the window of opportunity for meaningful reforms is rapidly
closing. This Article proposes an elucidating and flexible policy paradigm
in support of an understandable stance on hedge fund regulation. Such
approach is crucial to continue the discourse on post-crisis reforms. By
conceptualizing degrees of regulatory intensity and prescriptiveness as
points on a continuum, the proposed matrix of continuums provides
contextual adaptability. It also reframes the complexities of hedge fund
regulation using basic regulatory trade-offs. In doing so, this proposal
supports ongoing evaluations and open dialogue of relevant issues.
Accordingly, such policy paradigm for a targeted and balanced formula of
hedge fund regulation reflects pivotal lessons from the recent crisis and
offers a simplified perspective to facilitate analysis of reforms in the context
of the international soft law system.
* Visiting Scholar, University of Washington School of Law (2013-14). I am grateful to the
University of Washington School of Law for the privilege of participating in its excellent Visiting
Scholars Program and for its generous support which made this research project possible. I owe
special thanks to my faculty advisor, Anita K. Krug, for her unfailing guidance and insightful
comments.
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INTRODUCTION
The turbulent backdrop of the global financial crisis (GFC) has
generated extensive scholarship on its causes and remedies, propelled wide-
ranging financial reforms, and fostered solidarity among nations to
safeguard financial stability in a “common and coherent international
framework”.1 Post-crisis literature, policy recommendations and regulations
continue to grow at a dizzying pace. Notwithstanding these efforts for the
past six years, numerous challenges remain for systemic risk2 mitigation in
the deeply interconnected global capital markets. Understandably, this has
precipitated a sense of exhaustion within the financial markets, which have
already been overwhelmed by the Herculean task of post-GFC reforms.
However, now is a critical juncture to sustain momentum for completion of
the necessary reforms.
With transforming changes taking shape across the financial markets,
one might be tempted to conclude that fundamental fault lines revealed by
the GFC have been repaired by new regulations. The hedge fund3 industry
is one such example. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act)4 reshaped the
hedge fund regulatory landscape that had been in play since the near failure
of Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) in 1998.5 Although the
hedge fund industry is arguably now within the perimeters of regulation,
this exercise is incomplete. The relationship between banking and non-
banking sectors requires constant monitoring, particularly in market
conditions conducive to shifting core banking functions outside the realms
of prudential regulation.6
1. G20 WORKING GROUP 1, ENHANCING SOUND REGULATION AND STRENGTHENING
TRANSPARENCY ii–iii (2009), available at
http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/2932.
2. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing systemic risk and associated implications).
3. See infra note 20 and accompany text on the definition of hedge funds, and Part I.A
generally on the makeup and characteristics of the hedge fund industry.
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
5. LTCM was a large, highly leveraged hedge fund with trading strategies that made it
critically vulnerable to the extraordinary market conditions following the default of Russian
government debt that depressed credit spread and liquidity. See Andrea Aguilar et al., A Map of
Funding Durability and Risk 20 (Off. of Fin. Research, Working Paper Series 14-03, 2014),
available at http://financialresearch.gov/working-papers/files/OFRwp2014-
03_AguiarBookstaberWipf_MapofFundingDurabilityandRisk.pdf (describing the development of
the LTCM crisis). See also infra note 109 and accompanying text.
6. Recently, the IMF found a shift in the locus of risks resulting from an increase in risk
appetite in the search for yield, noting that “[c]oncerns have shifted to the shadow banking
system” and cautioning that “current stability risks call for increased vigilance”). IMF, GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RISK TAKING, LIQUIDITY, AND SHADOW BANKING: CURBING
EXCESS WHILE PROMOTING GROWTH 1 (2014) [hereinafter IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT]. The
same report also discusses key factors that contribute to shadow banking growth, including “a
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As the financial markets find their post-crisis groove, the altered terrain
will generate trend changes and opportunities, including for hedge funds.
As such, systemic risk concerns in the shadow banking sector7 and the
rising importance of asset fund management8 have increasingly captured
regulatory focus of late.9 Hedge funds are prominent participants in both
search for yield, regulatory arbitrage, and complementarities with the rest of the financial system .
. . .” Id. at 74–81.
7. For an analysis of shadow banking and its implications for financial stability, see infra Part
I.C.3.
8. See Letter from Mark Carney, Chairman, FSB, to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors: Financial Reforms—Finishing the Post-Crisis Agenda and Moving Forward 4 (Feb. 4,
2015) [hereinafter FSB 2015 Agenda Letter], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Chair-letter-to-G20-February-
2015.pdf (setting out FSB work programs during the Turkish G20 Presidency in 2015, which
includes addressing concerns relating to potential “liquidity illusion” in the capital markets and
asset management activities). “Strengthening Asset Managers” is also identified as one of SEC’s
core policy areas in 2015. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Chairman's Address at SEC Speaks
2015 (Feb. 20, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-
spch022015mjw.html#.VPn_njh0y71.
9. Potential threats to financial stability from the asset management industry are under review
by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the United States and the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) and IOSCO internationally. See US OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, ASSET
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL STABILITY (2013) [hereinafter OFR ASSET
MANAGEMENT REPORT], available at
http://financialresearch.gov/reports/files/ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.pdf; FSB
& IOSCO, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING NON-
BANK NON-INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2014)
[hereinafter FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140108.pdf. Consideration of these
proposals, among others, are ongoing and subject to further developments. As a general
qualification, such state of flux renders it impracticable for this Article to remain current with the
constantly evolving reform process regarding systemic risks in the shadow banking system,
including NBNI G-SIFI categorization of investment funds and asset managers. The intended
purpose here is to present a thought experiment on a regulatory policy paradigm for hedge funds
going forward and not a comprehensive review of their regulatory landscape. Hence, certain
recent developments in documents and data may not be captured, but may supersede reform
initiatives referenced herein. For example, FSB and IOSCO recently issued the 2nd Consultative
Document regarding identification of NBNI G-SIFIs on March 4, 2015. See FSB & IOSCO,
CONSULTATIVEDOCUMENT (2ND): ASSESSMENTMETHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING NON-BANK
NON-INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2015), available
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2nd-Con-Doc-on-NBNI-G-SIFI-
methodologies.pdf. This second consultation process is currently underway and the revised
methodologies are expected to be completed by the end of 2015. Similarly, subsequent to the OFR
Asset Management Report in the US, the FSOC is seeking public comments regarding potential
risks posed by asset management products and activities; the comment period was extended to
close on March 25, 2015. See Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products and
Activities, FSOC (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/rulemaking/Documents/Notice%20Seeking%20Comment
%20on%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf; Notice Seeking
Comment on Asset Management Products and Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 77488 (Dec. 24, 2014).
The SEC is also currently working on regulatory initiatives regarding the asset management
industry. These recent developments are not incorporated in the analysis herein.
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arenas. It is, therefore, timely and relevant to revisit potential systemic risks
presented by the hedge funds through their multiple roles in the shadow
banking system. The challenge lies in maintaining focus on potential
outstanding risks despite waning public support.
This Article aims to fill a gap in the existing regulatory discourse by
synthesizing select topics miring the voluminous literature on the GFC (and
the resulting regulatory reforms) and reframing these complexities in a
simplified regulatory policy paradigm for hedge funds. This is achieved by
reducing the events from the GFC to the consequences associated with
trade-offs, at the root of which is the pivotal balance between free market
and government intervention. In the period preceding the crisis, regulatory
decisions were filtered through the lens of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis.10 Consequently, ensuring competitive financial markets became
a priority in the policy agenda. The growth of market-based finance that
improved market efficiency also brought new risks to global financial
stability. However, such trade-offs—or at least the extent of the trade-
offs—were blurred by the complexity of the financial system at the run-up
to the crisis. Furthermore, choices were often made with reckless disregard
by parties with the most to gain. In the end, binging on the feast of financial
innovations brought the global economy to face a banquet of
consequences.11
The GFC underscored vulnerabilities in the global financial system
from greed, fear and panic, which set in motion the irrational exuberance
for the asset bubble and the subsequent downward spiral of the financial
markets. In its wake, it highlighted the need to address competitive,
practical and political realities as support for regulation waxes and wanes in
the reform process. This Article’s proposed policy paradigm follows a
targeted and balanced formula for reforms that reflects critical lessons from
10. Limited regulatory intervention is needed in efficient markets as the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) states “security prices fully reflect all available information.” See Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991). Accordingly, the regulators’ over-
reliance on the assumptions of the EMH has been attributed as one of the causes of the GFC. See
UK FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL
BANKING CRISIS 39 (2009) [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW], available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf (“The predominant assumption behind
financial market regulation—in the US, the UK and increasingly across the world—has been that
financial markets are capable of being both efficient and rational and that a key goal of financial
market regulation is to remove the impediments which might produce inefficient and illiquid
markets”). Note, however, a less critical view on EMH’s role in the GFC: “the claim that [EMH]
is responsible for the current worldwide crisis seems wildly exaggerated.” See Ray Ball, The
Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What Have We Learned, 21 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2009).
11. Paraphrasing the quote by Robert Louis Stevenson: “Everybody, soon or late, sits down to
a banquet of consequences.”
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the GFC and builds on developments in the international soft law system.12
As such, this Article offers a conceptual experiment for an adaptive
regulatory mechanism to navigate evolving hedge fund industry specific
issues and trends. It envisions the analysis of a spectrum of potential risks
and regulatory responses along continuums using the Regulatory
Continuum Matrix (RCM)13.
The RCM can serve as a tool for ongoing monitoring of hedge funds’
potential systemic risk. This process reframes the multi-layered and
complex issues of hedge fund regulation into basic regulatory trade-offs in
need of rebalancing, while bridging the intangible human foibles involved
in such decision-making. Considering these issues as combinations of trade-
offs allows for a comprehensive, adaptable, and comparable view to assess
and rebalance policy choices across regulatory continuums of intensity and
prescriptiveness. It also takes into account the practical and political
limitations of regulation. This simplified approach to systemic risk
mitigation is more accessible to the general public and can help cultivate
vigilance through thriving market periods and combat a natural tendency for
complacency. In doing so, the proposed regulatory mechanism originates a
distinctive contribution to the ever-growing scholarship of post-crisis
regulatory reforms.14
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with an introduction on
the hedge fund industry, followed by a brief reflection on the GFC and a
high-level overview of post-crisis financial reforms. It further examines the
role of systemic risk and shadow banking in the GFC, and their implications
for hedge fund regulation, concluding with the regulatory objective and
agenda for the proposal herein. Part II addresses the normative basis for the
hedge fund policy paradigm as a synthesis of post-crisis lessons,
international soft law system, principles-based regulation (PBR) and
inclusive capitalism. It then sets forth the four steps of the paradigm in
meeting the stated regulatory objective. Part III proposes the regulatory
mechanisms in implementing such policy paradigm for on-going
monitoring and assessment of hedge funds’ potential contribution to
systemic risks via the shadow banking system. It illustrates the application
of the RCM to evaluate recommendations for the mitigation of bank-like
12. See, e.g., Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at AIMA Global Policy &
Regulatory Forum (Mar. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540888843#.VKg8Hmo5DX5 (discussing
the critical role of international engagement).
13. For description, analysis and application of the RCM, see infra Parts II.B and III.D.
14. Admittedly, the underpinnings for this proposal are well-established notions and
discernible from the events of the GFC, but I submit that their synthesis here is novel and
necessary to meet hedge funds’ regulatory challenges ahead.
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“runs” presented by collective investment vehicles (CIVs)15 in the shadow
banking system. Finally, Part IV posits the prospects and challenges of the
RCM.
I. REGULATORY REFORM ANALYSIS: HEDGE FUNDS AND
SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM
A. HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
The makeup and characteristics of hedge funds are significant to
understand the analysis of their regulation. To begin, as commonly
acknowledged, there is no universal definition of “hedge funds.”16
Discussions are generally based on a set of shared characteristics, most
notably by their previously unregulated status. Since the introduction of
hedge fund regulations, the term has been defined for specific statutory
purposes. For example, in the United States, Form PF defines “hedge fund”
to include “any private fund having any one of these three common
characteristics: (a) a performance fee that takes into account market value
(instead of only realized gains); (b) high leverage; or (c) short selling.”17 On
the international level, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) developed identification guidelines for hedge
funds18 to cover funds that (i) are considered hedge funds under local law,
(ii) declare themselves to be one, or (iii) display a combination of some of
the following characteristics: “(a) use of leverage; (b) performance fees
15. FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW
BANKING: POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF
SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES 6 n.11 and accompanying text (2013) [hereinafter FSB 2013
RECOMMENDATIONS: SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829c.pdf (defining CIVs to “include
investment vehicles/funds/accounts established for pooling client assets for one or more than one
investors”).
16. See BD. OF IOSCO, REPORT ON THE SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY 4 (2013)
[hereinafter SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY], available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD427.pdf (reiterating the lack of a globally
agreed upon definition of a “hedge fund”). See also TECHNICAL COMM., IOSCO, HEDGE FUNDS
OVERSIGHT: FINAL REPORT 4 (2009) [hereinafter IOSCO HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT FINAL
REPORT], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf.
17. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3308, 2011 WL 5130051, at *22–23, (Oct. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308.pdf (note that such definition is limited to the
purposes of Form PF, and also adopted for Form ADV). For the full definition of “hedge fund”,
see SEC, OMB NO. 3235-0679, FORM PF: REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO
PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS AND COMMODITY TRADING
ADVISORS Glossary of Terms 4 (2011) [hereinafter FORM PF], available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf.
18. See SECOND IOSCOHEDGE FUND SURVEY, supra note 16, at 4.
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based on unrealized gains;19 (c) complex strategies, which may include use
of derivatives, short selling, high frequency trading and/or the search for
absolute returns; and (d) tendency to invest in financial rather than physical
assets.”20 These distinguishing features have regulatory implications for the
industry as discussed in Part III.21 For purposes of this Article, references to
“hedge funds” encompass the broader group as described in the foregoing
IOSCO guidelines.
Hedge funds began as funds that sought absolute return by taking risks
that others would pay a premium for and hedging those risks that were not
compensated. Characteristically, a wide range of strategies is utilized to find
such risk-return relationships. While there are general categorizations of
hedge funds by their trading strategies, data consistency is difficult to
obtain due to their heterogeneity.22 Since the use of leverage differs with the
investment strategy, this highlights one data challenge to effective
regulation.23 The active trading style and use of complex derivatives in
hedge fund investment strategies further expand and deepen hedge funds’
footprint in the financial markets.24 For example, hedge funds held an
19. Their typical compensation is 2% annual and 20% of the increase in the value of assets
under management.
20. FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9, at 28 n.35 (adopting IOSCO’s
guidelines to define collective investment schemes with a combination of such characteristics as
hedge funds).
21. For an analysis of their implications for the SBRC and RIC evaluation, see infra Part III.A,
B. See also infra note 116 (describing hedge fund characteristics with risk amplifying effects).
22. Findings vary depending on the source. For different classifications of hedge fund
segments, see Hedge Fund Strategies: An Overview of the Various Investment Strategies Offered
by Hedge Funds in the Marketplace Today, HEDGEFUNDFUNDAMENTALS.COM,
http://www.hedgefundfundamentals.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/HFF_HedgeFund_Strategies_11-2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015);
ALEXANDER INEICHEN, AIMA’S ROADMAP TO HEDGE FUNDS—2012 EDITION 97–98 (2012)
[hereinafter AIMA ROADMAP], available at http://www.altervest.ca/french/pdf/AIMA2012.pdf;
THECITYUK, FINANCIAL MARKETS SERIES: HEDGE FUNDS 4–5, 4 Chart 9 (2013), available at
http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/hedge-funds-2013 [hereinafter
THECITYUK]. Note, however, that despite such different hedge fund classifications, long/short
equity funds composed the largest category, between 44% and 30%, depending upon its definition
among these sources.
23. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 85 (2014),
available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOC%202014%20Annual%20Report.pdf
[hereinafter FSOC 2014 ANNUAL REPORT] (noting financial leverage differences among
investment strategies). See also OFR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 114 (2014), available at
http://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report-
2014.pdf (noting data challenges in considering the relative use of leverage across different hedge
fund strategies based on data reported through Form PF as of May 2014).
24. See, e.g., Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 34 (2009) (statement of Andrew J. Donohue), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg54883/pdf/CHRG-111shrg54883.pdf (noting
that hedge funds “reportedly account for 18-22% of all trading on the New York Stock
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estimated 60% of the positions in credit derivatives preceding the crisis,25
providing channels for the transmission of systemic risk.
Due to application of different measures and time frames, estimates of
hedge fund industry size are inexact and difficult to compare. Nevertheless,
by all accounts, the industry is rebounding from the crisis.26 According to
HFR Global Hedge Fund Industry Report, global hedge fund capital
experienced “the highest calendar year of inflows since 2007” to reach a
record of $2.85 trillion at the end of 2014.27 In comparison, data from the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) measures hedge funds’
“regulatory assets under management” (RAUM), which accounts for
financial leverage used and results in a higher industry total.28 As of May 7,
2014, total RAUM for all U.S. hedge fund filers was $5.006 trillion and was
$4.046 trillion for the “qualifying hedge funds,”29 both up from the previous
Exchange”). See also MCKINSEY & CO., THE NEW POWER BROKERS: HOW OIL, ASIA, HEDGE
FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY ARE SHAPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 110 Exhibit 4.10
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 MCKINSEY REPORT], available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/global_capital_markets/how_the_new_power_brokers_are_sh
aping_global_capital_markets (citing estimates of 35-50% of share of trading on NYSE and LSE).
25. 2007MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 24, at 109–11.
26. See e.g., THECITYUK, UK FUNDMANAGEMENT 2014: ANATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FOR
INTERNATIONAL FUNDS 16, 16 fig.15 [hereinafter THECITYUK 2014], available at
http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/uk-fund-management-2014/ (stating that
hedge funds’ assets under management at 2013 year end totaled $2.3 trillion, “surpassing for the
first time the pre-crisis peak in 2007”); IOSCO, SECURITIES MARKETS RISK OUTLOOK: 2013-14
45 (2013) [hereinafter IOSCO, SECURITIES MARKETS RISK OUTLOOK], available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD426.pdf (noting suggestions of growing
demand for hedge funds based on market intelligence); FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 96 (2013) [hereinafter FSOC 2013 ANNUAL REPORT],
available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOC%202013%20Annual%20Report.pdf;
FSOC 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 85.
27. Press Release, Hedge Fund Research, Inc., Hedge Funds Conclude 2014 with Inflows as
Investors Position for Volatility (Jan. 20, 2015) [hereinafter HFR January 2015], available at
https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20150120.pdf. Previously, global hedge fund assets
under management exhibited seven consecutive quarterly records to close at $2.70 trillion in the
first quarter of 2014. Press Release, Hedge Fund Research, Inc., Strong Inflows Drive Hedge Fund
Capital to New Record in 1Q14 (Apr. 21, 2014) [hereinafter HFR April 2014], available at
https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20140421.pdf. The estimated global industry is
smaller according to IOSCO, at $2.2 trillion in the first quarter of 2014. IOSCO, SECURITIES
MARKETS RISK OUTLOOK 2014-2015 25, 26 fig.18 (2014) [hereinafter IOSCO, 2014-15 RISK
OUTLOOK], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD453.pdf. See also
SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY, supra note 16, at 4, 12 n.22, 14 (reporting results for
“qualifying funds” of approximately $1.94 trillion total assets under management (AUM) as of
September 2012, which is limited to funds with total global net asset value above US $500
million).
28. RAUM is calculated pursuant to Form PF, part of hedge funds’ new disclosure
requirements. See generally Form PF, supra note 17, Glossary of Terms at 8 (prescribing
calculation of hedge funds’ RAUM in accordance with Part 1A, Instruction 5.b of Form ADV).
29. SEC, ANNUAL STAFF REPORT RELATING TO THE USE OF DATA COLLECTED
FROM PRIVATE FUND SYSTEMIC RISK REPORTS app. A at 2–3 (2014) [hereinafter SEC
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year.30 The United States and United Kingdom remain the top two hedge
fund centers, with the United States representing approximately 76% of the
global total according to IOSCO’s 2013 Hedge Fund Survey.31
In general, the global hedge fund industry has increased more than three
fold over the past decade.32 Based on the UK FCA 2014 Hedge Fund
Survey, managers of hedge fund assets comprised the third largest type
(behind real estate and private equity) among the global top 100 managers
of alternative investments in early 2013,33 even though the hedge fund
industry is small compared to the conventional fund industries.34 Further,
the number of hedge funds has continued to recover with new hedge funds
outpacing fund closures from 2010.35 Estimates on the number of funds also
vary depending on the survey’s parameters.36 According to the May 2013
hedge funds report by TheCityUK, global hedge funds totaled around
STAFF REPORT ON FORM PF DATA 2014], available at http://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/special-
studies/im-private-fund-annual-report-081514.pdf (covering funds over $150 million in the first
instance and those over $500 million, classified as “qualifying hedge funds”).
30. SEC, ANNUAL STAFF REPORT RELATING TO THE USE OF DATA COLLECTED
FROM PRIVATE FUND SYSTEMIC RISK REPORTS 6 (2013) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT
ON FORM PF DATA 2013], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/im-annualreport-
072513.pdf (reporting on corresponding data as of May 15, 2013).
31. SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY, supra note 16, at 4, 13 n.22, 14. See also
THECITYUK 2014, supra note 26, at 16 (noting New York as the first, followed by London as the
second largest global center for hedge fund managers with an 18% share in 2013).
32. See THECITYUK, supra note 22, at 2 Chart 1 (charting the global hedge fund assets under
management between 2002 and 2012, which totaled over $2,050 billion as of the end of 2012);
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (FCA), HEDGE FUND SURVEY 10, 10 fig.3 (2014) [hereinafter FCA HEDGE
FUND SURVEY 2014], available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/hedge-fund-survey.pdf;
IOSCO, 2014-15 RISK OUTLOOK. supra note 27, at 25, 26 fig.18 (finding that “[t]he global assets
under management of hedge funds grew from $825 billion in 2003 to $2.2 trillion in the first
quarter of 2014”).
33. See FCAHEDGE FUND SURVEY 2014, supra note 32, at 11, 11 fig.4.
34. See Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating
Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 285 tbl.1 (2009) (finding
that “hedge funds represent only 1.5% of the total funds and assets of other financial institutions,
rising to 2.2% when applying market estimates of average gross market exposures of 150%”—
based on data comparison for size of hedge funds relative to pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies and banks from 1998 to 2007). See also THECITYUK 2014, supra note 26, at
14 (estimating global assets of hedge funds at year end 2013 at $2.3 trillion compared to the $97.2
trillion in global assets represented by pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies).
35. See THECITYUK, supra note 22, at 2 Chart 4, 2–3. Note, however, that new hedge fund
launches have slowed in the third quarter of 2014, falling to 240, against 200 hedge fund
liquidations in the same period. See Press Release, Hedge Fund Research, Inc., Hedge Fund
Launches Slow as Assets, Global Equities Reach Record Levels (Dec. 11, 2014), at 1, available at
https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20141211.pdf.
36. E.g., IOSCO’s hedge fund survey comprises “qualifying hedge funds” of AUM over $500
million, whereas the Form PF filings use a number of materiality thresholds, with the lowest set at
$150 million RAUM. See SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY, supra note 16, at 12, 14; SEC
STAFF REPORT ON FORM PF DATA 2014, supra note 29, app. A at 2–3.
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10,100 at the end of 2012,37 with a slight increase to 10,300 at 2013 year
end.38 In the United States, the SEC reports of filings from 7,790 hedge
funds as of May 7, 2014,39 up from 6,683 hedge funds as of May 15,
2013.40
The industry growth trend also suggests that it is becoming more
concentrated.41 The composition of the hedge fund sector is dominated by
large funds, with the 100 largest hedge funds controlling 61% of assets
under management (AUM) in 2012, while the majority of the funds are
small, with 76% of funds managing less than $200 million as of January
2013.42 In addition, there is vast disparity between the AUM of the largest
hedge funds and the majority of the funds.43 Data comparison between 2008
and 2013 year end shows a continuing trend for growth concentration in
large funds, with firms of greater than $5 billion AUM exhibiting asset
growth of 127% compared to 15% for firms with less than $1 billion
AUM.44 A one-size-fits-all regulatory approach is ill-suited in light of these
characteristics. Instead, a flexible and risk-based approach is necessary for
problem detection, prevention, and regulatory resource allocation.
Proportionate regulation of hedge funds may also be appropriate given its
37. Compare THECITYUK, supra note 22, at 3, with SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY,
supra note 16, at 13 (with a global estimate of 1,044 “qualifying hedge funds” of AUM over $500
million).
38. THECITYUK 2014, supra note 26, at 16.
39. SEC STAFF REPORT ON FORM PF DATA 2014, supra note 29, app. A at 2–3, 3 n.4
(representing hedge fund filers with at least $150 million in RAUM, compared to the 1,326
“Qualifying Hedge Funds” with net asset value of at least $500 million).
40. SEC STAFF REPORT ON FORM PF DATA 2013, supra note 30, at 6 (representing hedge fund
filers with at least $150 million in RAUM, compared to the 1,169 “Qualifying Hedge Funds” with
net asset value of at least $500 million).
41. See id. at 6.
42. THECITYUK, supra note 22, at 5 Chart 13, 6 (illustrating the growth in concentration of
funds with AUM greater than $200 million between 2007 and 2013). See also FCA HEDGE FUND
SURVEY 2014, supra note 32, at 14 (indicating a high concentration ratio, with the “20 largest
firms control[ling] 82% of the sample’s NAV (net AUM)”, which ratio increases to 94% when
considered at the fund level, based on the 2014 survey sample of 49 UK firms); id. at 9
(parameters of the survey).
43. See THECITYUK, supra note 22, at 6, tbl.2 (finding the 2012 top 10 hedge funds by size of
AUM range from $76.1 billion to $23.2 billion, creating a large gap between the largest fund and
the majority of the industry at AUM of less than 200 million).
44. CITI INVESTOR SERVS., OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR HEDGE FUNDS IN THE
COMING ERA OF OPTIMIZATION—PART 1: CHANGES DRIVEN BY THE INVESTOR AUDIENCE 19
(2014) [hereinafter CITI REPORT, PART 1], available at
http://www.citibank.com/icg/global_markets/prime_finance/docs/Opportunities_and_Challenges_
for_Hedge_Funds_in_the_Coming_Era_of_Optimization.pdf (citing data from Hedge Fund
Research, Inc.). For data on the distribution of capital inflow in 2014, see HFR April 2014, supra
note 27, at 3 (noting that approximately half of the capital inflow in the first quarter of 2014 was
allocated to hedge fund firms with greater than $5 billion in AUM). This trend continued in
respect of net capital inflows at 2014 year end, with $38.7 billion of the total $76.3 billion net
inflow received by firms with greater than $5 billion. See HFR January 2015, supra note 27, at 2–
3.
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industry makeup, which would help alleviate compliance hardships for the
smaller funds.
The preceding overview of the hedge fund industry illustrates
informational impediments to assess its growth and trends, as well as
regulatory challenges resulting from the industry makeup and the complex
and diverse investment strategies involved. These aspects will be further
considered in the context of hedge fund and shadow banking trends to
determine the appropriate regulatory policy. In order to do so, an
understanding of issues meriting government intervention is needed, which
is achieved by revisiting the GFC.
B. RETROSPECTIVE ON THEGFC: CAUSES AND LESSONS
The speed, breadth, and severity of the GFC’s impact left the world
stunned. The GFC began in the United States with concerns about subprime
loans in 2006, which grew into a credit crisis by 2007. With massive loss of
confidence sparked by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, it
morphed into a financial crisis that spread globally and transmitted financial
system problems into the real economy.45 In the end, unprecedented
government intervention was undertaken to stabilize the markets, prevent
the collapse of major banks, and rescue troubled institutions, notably AIG.46
The magnitude of the GFC’s economic costs, which one estimate placed at
approximately $12.8 trillion47 in the United States, is a powerful reminder
of the critical importance for the completion of financial reforms.48
45. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 27; Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Getting up to
Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader’s Guide, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 128
(2012). See also ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED 168 (2013) (describing
how the Lehman bankruptcy triggered panic in the United States, crossing borders by October
2008).
46. For example, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of $700 billion and the
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP).
47. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks at the SEC Open Meeting: Working to Increase
Transparency and Reduce Systemic Risks Caused by the Global Derivatives Market n.3 (May 1,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370542573918
(citing to the September 15, 2012 report from Better Markets). See also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: FINANCIAL CRISIS
LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 15–-16 (2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651322.pdf (noting a range of losses stemming from the GFC
between a few trillion to over $10 trillion dollars).
48. For further discussion on the severity of the crisis and the evolution of the financial crisis
into an economic recession, see HAL S. SCOTT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 2–9
(2009). See also INT’LMONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: CRISIS AND RECOVERY
63–71 (2009) (on the effects of the GFC on the U.S.), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf; World Economic Outlook Update,
INT’L MONETARY FUND (Jan. 26, 2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/update/01/pdf/0110.pdf (updating the earlier IMF
report).
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The ever-growing volumes of research, commentaries and analyses
conducted on the GFC provide ample examination of the causes and
ramifications of this 21st Century style financial crisis.49 The purpose here
is not to reiterate or evaluate the rich body of work in this area. Instead, it is
to discern certain relevance to hedge funds and the implications for their
reform. Accordingly, the following overview of the financial crisis is
focused on systemic risk dangers that underlie the basis of the proposed
policy paradigm.
Although hedge funds have generally not been named as a cause of the
GFC,50 their presence is evident throughout its major events. The failure of
two hedge funds sponsored by Bear Stearns in July 2007 sounded the first
alarm of trouble. The subsequent run on Bear Stearns in March 2008 also
involved its hedge fund customers and derivative counterparties.51 The
fragilities of market-based finance were exposed under stressed conditions,
with a string of market failures seen in bank-like runs on non-banks, such as
the run on money market funds (MMFs)52 triggered by the Reserve Primary
Fund “breaking the buck.”53 Hedge funds found themselves on both sides of
the runs. The Lehman failure exposed hedge funds’ vulnerability to prime
brokers54 as their re-hypothecated collateral became frozen or lost in the
bankruptcy proceedings. This realization triggered a hedge fund run on the
prime brokers.55 Hedge funds also faced unprecedented runs by their own
49. See generally THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (FCIC), THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT—FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10;
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL—AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY 17 (2010) (finding the role of agency and externalities as two main reasons for the
market failures); Stijn Claessens et. al., Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global
Financial Crisis 9 (IMF, Working Paper WP/10/44, 2010) [hereinafter IMF, Lessons and Policy
Implications], available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1044.pdf; BLINDER,
supra note 45.
50. E.g., Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis, MERCATUS ON POLICY,
Jan. 2009, at 1, available at
http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Publications/RSP_MOP34_Hedge_Funds_and_the_Fi
nancial_Crisis.pdf. See also infra note 111 and accompanying text on hedge funds’ role in the
GFC.
51. FCIC REPORT, supra note 49, at 280.
52. Money market mutual funds are “open-ended mutual funds that invest in short-term
securities . . . .” See TOBIAS ADRIAN & ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, SHADOW BANKING: A REVIEW OF
LITERATURE 9 (2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr580.pdf.
53. See id. (explaining that the term “breaking the buck” refers to a situation where a MMF’s
net asset value (NAV) drops below $1.00, the level of stable NAV it seeks to maintain).
54. See Jón Danielsson et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds Be Regulated? A
Survey, 1 J. FIN. STABILITY 522, 525 (2005) (explaining that hedge funds use prime brokers
(generally major investment banks) to deal with most aspects of their transactions, including
execution, settlements, clearing, leverage and risk management).
55. With the loss of confidence, hedge funds pulled their assets out of prime brokers in a flight
to safety, such as FDIC-insured banks. Morgan Stanley became the target of a hedge fund run. See
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investors, with 20% average redemption requests in the fourth quarter of
2008.56 Forced asset sales were made to meet such high level of
redemptions, which had further downward effects on stressed market prices.
The recent financial crisis illustrated that interconnections in the secured
financing markets greatly exacerbated market turmoil.
The events of the GFC have exposed risks embedded in our financial
markets threatening financial system stability. For the purposes of
regulatory analysis herein, the key sources of these risks can be summarized
in a non-exhaustive list below:
(1) non-transparency57 and complexity:58
(2) cross-market and cross-border spillovers from the global
interconnected capital markets;59
(3) unregulated or under-regulated entities, activities and products in
the shadow banking system;60
(4) outdated financial regulatory regime and resulting lack of effective
oversight;61 and
(5) leverage62 and unchecked incentives for excessive risk taking.63
Systemic risk is the common thread that runs through the GFC. The
above factors contributed to risk build-up and the resulting contagion that
imperil the stability of the entire financial system. As seen from hedge
FCIC REPORT, supra note 49, at 360–361 (finding that on September 15, 2008, hedge funds
requested about $10 billion from Morgan Stanley, eventually growing to $32 billion by the day
after the AIG bailout).
56. Id. at 361.
57. See, e.g., The Future of Financial Services Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Services, 110th Cong. 5 (2008) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Oct. 2008 Testimony], available at
http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/stiglitz102108.pdf (statement of Joseph
Stiglitz) (naming non-transparency as a key cause of the crisis).
58. See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 28 (referencing the complexity and opacity of
the structured credit and derivatives system based on a misguided reliance on sophisticated
mathematics).
59. Id. at 18 (identifying the increase of systemic risks that led to “an explosion of claims
within the financial system, between banks and investment banks and hedge funds”).
60. Joseph Stiglitz, Government Failure v. Market Failure, in GOVERNMENT AND
MARKETS—TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 15–16 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A.
Moss eds., 2010) (noting that the general trend of deregulation preceding the GFC coupled with
the lack of new regulation to capture the expanding realms of the financial world formed one of
the causes of the GFC).
61. See BLINDER, supra note 45, at 132 (citing observation by Ben Bernanke that AIG was
operating a hedge fund but regulated as an insurance company); see also HOWARD DAVIES &
DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE 231–232, 3 (2008)
(arguing that the international regulatory system is out of date in keeping up with globalization
and innovations of the capital markets).
62. IMF, Lessons and Policy Implications, supra note 49, at 9, 36 fig.11 (charting sharp
increase in leverage from 2000 to 2008).
63. Stiglitz, Oct. 2008 Testimony, supra note 57, at 10 (arguing that the current system
“encourages excessive risk taking, a focus on the short term, and bad accounting practices,” all of
which contributed to the failure in the markets).
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funds’ footprints along many of these fault lines, this Article’s position is
that the primary post-crisis regulatory objective for the industry is to
address how systemic risk may be generated or transmitted through its
multi-dimensional role in the financial system.
Beyond identifying causes of the GFC, the regulatory design of reforms
must also incorporate the revelations imparted to prevent another “credit
tsunami”64 down the road.65 Guiding principles deduced from the lessons of
the GFC provide a necessary overview and direction to develop a policy
paradigm for financial reform generally, and in respect of hedge funds
specifically herein. The following overarching lessons support regulatory
intervention and guide the normative goals for the proposed hedge fund
policy paradigm.
Lesson 1: A macroprudential approach66 is required to monitor
and manage the sources, channels, and effects of systemic risks in the
financial system as a whole.
Regulation needs to go beyond the individual risks of the market
participants to guard against threats to the stability of the financial system.
This is because systemic risks may not necessarily be part of such market
actors’ risk management process.67
Lesson 2: The regulatory approach needs to reflect what we have
learned are false theoretical assumptions about financial markets being
both efficient and self-correcting, and market participants being
rational.
Market fundamentalism68 and assumptions of rationality proved to be
flawed in light of the GFC.69 Contrary to long held views on the merits of
64. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) [hereinafter Greenspan,
October 2008 Testimony], available at https://house.resource.org/110/org.c-span.281958-1.pdf
(written testimony of Alan Greenspan, Former Federal Reserve Chairman) (referring to the GFC
as a “once-in-a century credit tsunami”).
65. See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 92 (identifying GFC lessons that underscore
the need to change prior regulatory philosophy).
66. See GENEVA REPORTS ON THEWORLD ECONOMY 11: THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION xvi (2009) [hereinafter GENEVA REPORTS, THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf
(differentiating microprudential regulation, focused on institutional safety, from macroprudential
regulation, aimed to ensure system-wide stability). See also Luis I. Jácome & Eriend W. Nier,
Macroprudential Policy: Protecting the Whole, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2012, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/macropru.htm (explaining macroprudential
regulation as a more systemic approach to financial regulation); IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT,
supra note 6, at 90 (advocating for a macroprudential approach to financial sector regulation).
67. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (analogizing to the
“tragedy of the commons” regarding the insufficient incentive that individual market participants
have, absent regulation, to limit risk taking in the interests of systemic financial stability).
68. See GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM xx (1998) (referring to the
ideology that common interest is best served by the pursuit of individual self-interest in the self-
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financial innovation and liquidity, more is not always better. The GFC
demonstrated that “[i]ndividual behaviour is not entirely rational,”70 and
even if individual actors behave rationally, it does not ensure collective
rationality.71
Lesson 3: Market discipline needs appropriate incentives and
effective oversight.
Market discipline is impaired by human fragilities and misaligned
incentives.72 It has been suggested that the inability to anticipate shifts in
collective human behavior of “unbridled optimism on the upside and fear
on the downside,” as exacerbated by an environment of intense market
competition, is the root cause of financial market excesses.73
Lesson 4: The effectiveness of regulation is limited by regulatory
resources and regulatory capture.
Limited resources necessitate trade-offs in regulation and reliance on
market discipline, which is bolstered by an effective regulatory relationship.
Trust is essential to efficient market operation and in the regulatory
relationship. The dangers of an out-matched regulator are heightened by
regulatory capture. This can take many forms, including the “revolving
door”74 effect, or a “capture of ideas and mindsets.”75 The varied
perspectives in a robust “interpretive community”76 can provide a useful
correcting markets, without resorting to regulatory intervention, which may distort market
mechanisms).
69. See Greenspan, October 2008 Testimony, supra note 64, at 9 (“Those of us who have
looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity (myself
especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.”).
70. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 41.
71. See id. at 40–41.
72. See John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 781–82 (2009) (stating that two lessons learned from the GFC
are that “the incentives for financial institutions to increase leverage in order to enhance
profitability are strong” and that “in a bubbly market, it is easy to rationalize economizing on due
diligence and professional standards”). See also IMF, Lessons and Policy Implications, supra note
49, at 20 (listing principles of regulatory design, including that “market discipline and supervision
should complement each other”).
73. COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK:
THE ROAD TO REFORM 7 (2008) [hereinafter CRMPG III REPORT], available at
http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-III.pdf. See also AIMA ROADMAP, supra note 22,
at 65 n.4 (citation omitted) (describing human nature as the main cause of the GFC).
74. Referring to the situation where regulatory staff is motivated by employment opportunities
at the regulated entities.
75. See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, COMM. OF EXPERTS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UN GEN.
ASSEMBLY ON REFORMS OF THE INT’L MONETARY & FIN. SYS., PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE pt. II.B.11 (2009), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/newfinancialarchitecture.pdf (“If those who are
supposed to regulate the financial markets approach the problem from financial markets’
perspectives, they will not provide an adequate check and balance.”).
76. For a discussion of the role of “interpretive community” in PBR, see infra note 404 and
accompanying text.
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counterbalance to the development of groupthink between the regulator and
industry.
Lesson 5: The structure and scope of financial regulation must
address the dynamic nature of the markets and the political realities of
swings between pro- and anti-regulation sentiments.
Financial innovations are a certainty, and regulation must adapt and
evolve with future developments.77 Safeguards against the inevitable ebb of
support for regulation are also needed to withstand shifts in political
economy. In particular, increased opposition to market restraints from
parties with vested interest and strong lobbying power can be expected as
time passes.78
Lesson 6: The national regulatory regime needs to address the
global nature of financial markets and an international regulatory
network will be critical to ensuring coordination and cooperation on
such systemic issues.
The globalized financial markets underscore the incongruity of
regulatory cooperation and competition, yet another area in need of balance.
Globalization has intensified competitive pressures for national financial
markets and heightened potential for regulatory arbitrage as downsides to
regulatory competition.79 At the same time, international regulatory
coordination and cooperation are essential for market integrity and stability
of the interconnected global capital markets. An important lesson from the
GFC is that international cooperation should be part of the domestic
policies and global financial stability should be an objective on the national
regulatory agenda. The role of soft law in the regulation of the global
financial system is ascending and will present challenges given competing
national interests and varying regulatory philosophy and approaches.
As noted above, the vulnerabilities exposed by the GFC demonstrate a
requisite for addressing inherent limitations of regulation, including the lag
behind financial innovations and susceptibility to industry capture and
political influence.80 Foibles of human nature and the impact of “animal
spirits”81 on previous assumptions about rational behavior cannot be
77. See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins, Investment Banks Try to Cushion Rule Changes, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b6e57828-4588-11df-9e46-00144feab49a.html
(noting development of new products to circumvent regulatory changes).
78. See IMF, Lessons and Policy Implications, supra note 49, at 28–29, 29 n.15 (raising
caution of intense efforts by the financial industry to protect their interests against reform).
79. See generally Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access
to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31, 36, 52 (2007)
(discussing the effects of regulatory competition and proposing a state of healthy regulatory
competition).
80. IMF, Lessons and Policy Implications, supra note 49, at 20.
81. For a discussion on “animal spirits” and their part in the GFC, see Robert J. Shiller, Animal
Spirits Depend on Trust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123302080925418107.html.
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ignored. As well, after the massive government bailouts, inappropriate
incentives for risk-taking arising from moral hazard are greater than ever.
An effective policy paradigm to monitor and manage systemic risks must
address both tangible and intangible sources identified in the guiding
principles.
C. FINANCIALREFORMS AND THEROADAHEAD: HEDGE FUNDS,
SYSTEMICRISK AND SHADOW BANKING
This Part I.C. examines the post-GFC concerns in safeguarding global
financial stability, specifically, potential systemic risks that may arise from
hedge funds’ activities in the shadow banking system. The following
analysis further contributes to the development of hedge fund regulatory
objective and agenda established later in Part I.D.3. To be sure, the
international soft law system is a prominent feature of the post-crisis reform
efforts and will continue to be a key component of future financial
regulatory policy to address systemic risk threats in the shadow banking
sector.82
1. Post-GFC Financial Reforms
Given the severity of the GFC, extensive regulatory reforms have been
introduced and continue to be in progress to address the fault lines exposed,
primarily focused on systemic risk dangers.83 This reformed regulatory
landscape includes hedge fund specific changes,84 such as those outlined by
the Group of Twenty (G20).85 In alignment with G20’s overarching reform
82. See infra Part II.A.2 for discussion of the role of soft law in the post-crisis financial
system.
83. From the start of the G20 summits on financial reforms, identification and mitigation of
systemic risks has been an overarching goal. See G20 LEADERS, DECLARATION—SUMMIT
ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (2008) [hereinafter G20
WASHINGTON DECLARATION], available at
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Washington_Declaration_0.pdf. On
the domestic front, national supervisors were established to address threats from systemic risks.
For example, in the United States, the FSOC was created under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act,
charged with responsibilities relating to systemic risks. Similarly, the UK Financial Policy
Committee at the Bank of England was established to address systemic risk issues.
84. Given space constraints and the extensive post-crisis reforms, this Article is focused on
hedge fund specific changes, with only cursory mention of the general post-crisis regulatory
landscape here. For an overview of hedge funds’ post-GFC regulatory environment, see infra Part
I.D.2. For a brief summary of financial regulatory reform progress and outstanding issues, see
Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the International
Monetary Conference: Regulatory Landscapes: A U.S. Perspective (June 2, 2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130602a.htm.
85. See G20 WASHINGTON DECLARATION, supra note 83 (setting out common principles for
financial market reforms, together with an action plan and the policies to be implemented
consistent with these principles). For more discussion on G20 and such post-crisis reforms, see
infra Part I.D.2 and Part II.A.2. The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors is a
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goals, the Dodd-Frank Act is the centerpiece of post-crisis regulatory
reforms in the United States.
The G20 has championed a coordinated international response to the
GFC. Since the first G20 Washington Summit on Financial Markets and
The World Economy on November 15, 2008 (Washington Summit),
substantial progress has been made pursuant to the G20’s reform agenda to
strengthen the financial system, notably in improving the resilience of
banks by fortifying their capital and liquidity under the new global regime
of Basel III and addressing the “too-big-to-fail” problem and moral hazard
risks posed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFI),86
including the designation of Global-SIFIs (G-SIFI).87
On the domestic front, the Dodd-Frank Act introduced sweeping
changes to the financial regulatory landscape in the United States to remedy
areas that exhibited failures with systemic effects. This includes, among
others, addressing potential systemic risks within the banking sector
through the Volcker Rule,88 and extending federal oversight in respect of
certain financial market utilities, market participants and products, like non-
bank financial institutions and swaps/derivatives.89 Systemic risk is
prominently addressed in Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, creating the
forum to facilitate dialogue and cooperation for industrial and emerging-market countries to
discuss key issues in the global economy, particularly in respect of global economic stability since
the GFC. See About G20, https://g20.org/about-g20/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
86. The FSB defines SIFIs as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure,
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant
disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity”. See Policy Measures to Address
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD. § 3 (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111104bb.pdf?page_moved=1. For
further outline of reforms regarding the FSB’s SIFI framework, see FSB, PROGRESS AND NEXT
STEPS TOWARDS ENDING “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” (TBTF): REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
BOARD TO THE G-20 (2013), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130902.pdf.
87. See G20 WASHINGTON DECLARATION, supra note 83. The G20 reform agenda also
included fortifying financial market infrastructure to reduce systemic risks by broadening the
scope of regulation and overhauling the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives markets to increase
transparency and standardization. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board
Publishes Reports on Implementation of OTC Derivatives Market Reforms (April 8, 2014),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_140408.pdf.
88. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (prescribing banking structural reforms to safeguard core banking
activities from the more risky wholesale and investment business, commonly referred to as the
“Volcker Rule”, and setting out prohibitions of short-term proprietary trading for the firm’s own
account and limitations on investments and other relationships with hedge funds and private
equity funds).
89. For general summary of reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act, see Dodd-Frank Resource
Center, DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL LLP, http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank/ (last visited
Jan. 3, 2015).
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Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)90 charged with the
monitoring and management of potential threats to the financial system,
among other mandates.91 A principal authority of the FSOC is the
designation of SIFIs.92 Such designation entails supervision by the Federal
Reserve and is subject to enhanced prudential standards,93 such as leverage
and capital requirements. The FSOC and FSB’s ongoing work on the
assessment methodologies for identifying non-bank, non-insurer G-SIFI
(NBNI G-SIFI) will be particularly relevant to future hedge fund
regulation,94 and provides a possible application for the proposed RCM.95
Much consideration remains on how to identify such systemically important
entities and what prudential requirements should apply.96
With the completion of new prudential standards under Basel III,
attention is now focused on the potential dangers outstanding, and likely
heightened as a result, in the lesser-regulated parallel banking system.97
Systemic risk mitigation continues to be a primary goal of the financial
reforms in progress with the focus shifted to risks from non-bank entities,
90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Title I, Subtitle A, §
111(a).
91. Id. § 112(a). The FSOC is also mandated to promote market discipline and respond to
emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system. Note that the Office of Financial
Research (OFR) was also created under Section 152 to support the FSOC by providing financial
data and research.
92. For general information on SIFI designations by the FSOC, see Financial Stability
Oversight Council: Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 21,
2015).
93. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 113. See also FSOC
2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 129 (noting the three-stage process for the determination
of non-bank SIFIs).
94. See FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9 (describing NBNI financial
sector-specific methodologies, including hedge funds as part of the investment fund sector in
Section 6). Assessment methodologies have been established for global systemically important
banks (G-SIBs) and insurers (G-SIIs). See e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: UPDATED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE HIGHER
LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENTS (2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf;
INT’L ASSOC. OF INS. SUPERVISORS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSURERS: INITIAL
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY (2013), available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/iai/20130719/05.pdf.
95. See infra Part IV.A (considering RCM’s potential use for categorization). For example,
using RCM to categorize hedge funds with similar or highly correlated strategies to monitor
potential “crowded trade” phenomenon, which may result in self-reinforcing spirals as observed in
the “Quant Crisis” of August 2007. See FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9,
at 31, 31 n.40.
96. As hedge funds are unlikely to be “systemically important” on size alone, it will involve a
more textured examination in terms of its interconnections with other financial institutions, or if
they are “systemic as part of a herd.” See, e.g., GENEVA REPORTS, THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, at 26.
97. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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markets and transactions in shadow banking.98 At this juncture, it is useful
to examine the subjects of “systemic risk” and “shadow banking” as they
underpin the reforms discussed herein.
2. Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds
The GFC elevated the concept of systemic risk and interconnectedness
into new buzzwords beyond the remit of banking regulation. Traditionally,
systemic risk is focused on micro-level financial banking institutions, as the
risk that the failure of one large institution would cause other institutions to
fail.99 Such dangers were painfully played out in the aftermath of the
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The GFC also demonstrated that the shift to
market-based finance requires more attention to potential systemic risks
arising from capital market linkages.100 This can be seen from IOSCO’s
increased focus and involvement in systemic risk regulatory issues in the
post-crisis soft law regime.101
98. Financial Regulation, G20AUSTRALIA.ORG,
http://www.g20australia.org/g20_priorities/g20_2014_agenda/financial_regulation (including
“address shadow banking risks” as one of the four core areas on the G20 2014 agenda for financial
regulation). See also FSB, TRANSFORMING SHADOW BANKING INTO RESILIENT MARKET-BASED
FINANCING—AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS AND A ROADMAP FOR 2015 (2014) [hereinafter FSB,
SHADOW BANKING ROADMAP], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/Progress-Report-on-Transforming-Shadow-Banking-into-Resilient-Market-
Based-Financing.pdf (reiterating the regulatory focus on shadow banking); G20 LEADERS, G20
LEADERS’ COMMUNIQUÉ: BRISBANE SUMMIT ¶ 12 (2014) [hereinafter G20 BRISBANE
COMMUNIQUÉ], available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1116-communique.html.
99. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 35 (noting that since the GFC,
systemic risk has shifted from a micro-level to a macro-level definition).
100. See Schwarcz, supra note 67, at 200.
101. IOSCO has actively participated in the post-GFC reform process under the auspices of the
G-20, including addressing potential systemic risk in securities markets (such as the IOSCO Risk
Dashboard and the annual IOSCO Securities Market Risk Outlooks). See Mitigating Systemic
Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators 61–62 (Technical Committee of IOSCO, Discussion Paper,
2011) [hereinafter IOSCO, Mitigating Systemic Risk], available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ioscopd347.pdf; see also IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2010) [hereinafter IOSCO REVISED OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.compliance-
exchange.com/governance/library/ioscoprinciples2010.pdf (updating the revised principles to
further address systemic risks in Principles 6 and 7); IOSCO, RISK IDENTIFICATION AND
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR SECURITIES REGULATORS (2014) [hereinafter IOSCO, RISK
IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT] (setting out the methods, approaches and tools for risk
identification and assessment); Werner Bijkerk et al., Systemic Risk Identification in Securities
Markets, (IOSCO Research Department, Staff Working Paper 2012/1, 2012) [hereinafter IOSCO,
Systemic Risk Identification], available at
http://www.iosco.org/research/pdf/swp/Option%20for%20Systemic%20Risk%20Identification%2
0System.pdf?v=1 (outlining its systematic approach to identify and monitor systemic risks in
securities markets); IOSCO, 2014-15 RISK OUTLOOK, supra note 27 (reporting on its second
yearly overview of financial market trends and highlighting potential systemic risks in securities
markets). For more discussion on IOSCO’s role in systemic risk regulation and increased policy-
making profile, see Mary Condon, Products, Perimeters and Politics: Systemic Risk and
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Notwithstanding its frequent usage in recent regulatory discourse, there
is no precise definition for systemic risk.102 Its use can be nuanced and
range widely in the dialogue of domestic and international policy makers,103
and in academic scholarship.104 Consideration of systemic risk in its
simplest term, with added qualifications in respect of its various sources, is
appropriate for the thought experiment proposed herein. A good starting
point is the definition of “systemic risk” in The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report as, “[i]n financial terms, that which poses a threat to the financial
system.”105 The GFC demonstrated that systemic threat to financial stability
can derive from the failure of a large financial institution like Lehman, as
well as through market risks that ripple through the credit intermediation
chain via runs and fire sales. By incorporating potential sources of systemic
risk as highlighted by Schwarcz,106 a general definition of “systemic risk”
for purposes of this Article can be formulated as follows: the risk that poses
a threat to the entire financial system, either (i) directly through failure
of, or significant losses in assets or liquidity to, one or more institutions,
or (ii) indirectly through the effects of such events via the operation of
financial markets.107 This concept is consistent with the G20’s approach to
post-crisis reforms pertaining to systemically important financial
institutions and markets whose failure or severe distress may contribute to,
or transmit, systemic risk.108
Securities Regulation, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND
FINANCE CAPITALISM 440, 440–458 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011).
102. E.g., Eugenio Cerutti et al., Systemic Risks in Global Banking: What Can Available Data
Tell Us and What More Data Are Needed? 1 n.2 (IMF Working Paper, No. 376, 2012), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/work376.pdf (referencing literature survey on the topic). See also infra
notes 103 and 104, and accompanying text, for various definitions of “systemic risk”.
103. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: OLD RISKS,
NEW CHALLENGES 140 (2013), available at
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf (discussing systemic risks in
the global financial system); INT’L MONETARY FUND, ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE
SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL
CONSIDERATIONS 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter FSB, GUIDANCE TO ASSESS SIFI], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf (assessing what constitutes a “systemic event”). For a
summary of commonly used definition of “systemic risk”, see IOSCO, RISK IDENTIFICATION AND
ASSESSMENT, supra note 101, at 7–9.
104. Condon, supra note 101, at 444 n.17 ( (discussing the diverse definitions of “systemic
risk” in emerging literature).
105. FCIC REPORT, supra note 49, app. A at 543.
106. See Schwarcz, supra note 67, at 204 (defining systemic risk to include risk triggering chain
effects in markets and institutions).
107. This definition also draws on the analysis of channels of systemic risk transmission; see
infra notes 113 and 114 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Hedge Funds’ potential for systemic risk became evident with the near
failure of LTCM in 1998.109 The recent crisis further illustrated the broad
connection between hedge funds and systemic risk.110 Although there is
acknowledgement that hedge funds did not cause the financial crisis,111 it is
also generally agreed that their multidimensional roles in the global
financial markets give rise to potential systemic risks that warrant
monitoring and continued assessment.112
According to the the Joint Forum Report, hedge funds can transmit
systemic risks, either separately or together, through two main channels: (i)
“credit risk”, deriving directly from financial institutions’ exposure to
hedge funds as counterparties or prime brokers;113 and (ii) “market risk”,
deriving indirectly from hedge fund failures or actions in unwinding
109. FCIC REPORT, supra note 49, at 48. See also HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE
LESSONS OF LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 17–22 (1999), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf.
110. See, e.g., Reint Gropp, How Important Are Hedge Funds in a Crisis?, FRBSF ECONOMIC
LETTER, Apr. 14, 2014, at 1–2 (citation omitted), available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/publications/economic-letter/2014/april/hedge-fund-risk-measurement-spillover-
economic-crisis/ (reporting that the study suggests “hedge funds may be the most important
transmitters of shocks during crises, more important than commercial banks or investment
banks”). Note that there are varying arguments regarding the extent of hedge funds’ contribution
to systemic risk relating to the GFC, the evaluation of which is outside the scope of this Article.
111. See IOSCO HEDGE FUNDSOVERSIGHT FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7; Piwowar supra
note 12 (noting that “the recent financial crisis is not actually a ‘hedge fund crisis’”, with
reference to FCIC’s examination of the causes of the financial crisis). See also SCOTT, supra note
48, at 15 (“While hedge funds and their investors suffered large losses, no hedge fund failures
presented risk to the system.”).
112. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ASSESSING THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK
FROM HEDGE FUNDS 4 (2012) [hereinafter FSA, AUGUST 2012 ASSESSMENT], available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/hedge-fund-report-aug2012.pdf (noting that “they have
the potential to pose systemic risks to financial stability if they are individually very large or
leveraged”); TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 72 (highlighting the significant procyclical
systemic effect from hedge fund activities in the aggregate through their simultaneous
deleveraging, which depresses securities prices); IOSCO, HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT
CONSULTATION REPORT 19–20 (2009) [hereinafter IOSCO HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT
CONSULTATION REPORT], available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf (noting possible risks that can arise
from the amplifying effects of hedge funds’ market behavior and trading/investment strategies);
LLOYD DIXON ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 61, 63 (2012), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1236.pdf. Dixon et. al.
found that while hedge funds have the potential to contribute to systemic risk, they “did not play a
pivotal role in the financial crisis”. Id. at xviii. They concluded, therefore, that hedge funds should
not be a “primary concern of regulators” in respect of global financial stability, but better
understanding and monitoring of the systemic risk they pose is needed. Id. at 101.
113. THE JOINT FORUM, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENTIATED NATURE AND SCOPE OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION—KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 56 (2010) [hereinafter JOINT FORUM
REPORT], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint24.pdf (report by working group of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), IOSCO and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors finding that counterparty risks increase when a hedge fund has multiple
prime brokers, impeding a complete picture of leverage or other risk exposures).
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positions that depress asset prices, fuel market illiquidity and create
contagion across unrelated asset classes.114 Such market risk also increases
with the complexity of hedge funds’ trading positions, as well as the range
of markets involved.115 The reach of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy
demonstrated the transmission of systemic risks from its sudden and
disorderly wind-down as a result of its interconnections with the market
participants.116 Such risks can be amplified by certain characteristics of
hedge funds: (i) by their use of leverage, making them more vulnerable to
market shocks; (ii) by the complex derivatives used in their trading
strategies, which often carry higher risks and involve illiquid positions that
make it difficult to measure the risks; (iii) high transaction volume/fund
turnover, which magnifies their market impact; and (iv) the concentration in
specialized or less liquid markets, thereby increasing liquidity risks.117
Recent UK data indicate limited systemic risks from hedge funds
through the “market” and “credit” channels, with the aggregate footprint of
surveyed funds remaining modest in most markets and relatively low
leverage for most funds.118 However, such findings are subject to potential
risks from sudden withdrawal of funding necessitating hedge funds to
engage in forced asset sales, especially if such funds have significant
footprints or are highly leveraged.119
Current deliberations on the methodologies for identification of NBNI
G-SIFI include hedge funds as potential SIFIs, which by combination of
114. Id. at 56. See also FIN. STABILITY FORUM, UPDATE OF THE FSF REPORT ON HIGHLY
LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS 2 (2007), available at
http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0705.pdf?noframes=1; FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYINGNBNI
G-SIFI, supra note 9, at 3, 29–30; OFR ASSET MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 21–23
(identifying similar channels of systemic risk transmission by asset managers).
115. See FCAHEDGE FUND SURVEY 2014, supra note 32, at 4.
116. FCIC REPORT, supra note 49, at 324–43.
117. See JOINT FORUM REPORT, supra note 113, at 57 n.67 (referencing implications of hedge
funds’ characteristics on their market impact noted in the FSA June 2005 Discussion Paper
DP05/4).
118. FSA, AUGUST 2012 ASSESSMENT, supra note 112, at 22. Note that these survey results are
also subject to the general caveat that it is voluntary and represents a limited UK sample that may
not be representative of the global picture. The most recent UK FCA Hedge Fund Survey found
that the majority of the sample hedge funds “exhibit low levels of leverage”, although the data
also indicated that “most funds have raised their total gross leverage”. FCAHEDGE FUND SURVEY
2014, supra note 32, at 5. See also infra Part III.A. (evaluating the shadow banking risks posed by
hedge funds, including their use of leverage).
119. FSA, AUGUST 2012 ASSESSMENT, supra note 112, at 22. See also FCA HEDGE FUND
SURVEY 2014, supra note 32, at 5–6 (suggesting that continuing monitoring is needed, and that
“[o]f the total leverage, 98% is obtained using derivatives to gain market exposure, driven by a
few larger funds”, but it was also found that their portfolios remain fairly liquid and easily valued
in the aggregate, though the larger funds surveyed specialized in illiquid investments). See also
IOSCO, 2014-15 RISKOUTLOOK, supra note 27, at 66–67, 96–97, (discussing hedge funds’ use of
leverage and the resulting financial vulnerabilities created by the interconnections, particularly via
synthetic leverage, and noting that “synthetic exposure explained the largest share of overall gross
leverage of hedge funds in aggregate”).
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their size, leverage, and interconnectedness could pose a threat to financial
stability if they failed.120 It is a pertinent topic for ongoing discourse on
hedge fund regulation. While individual hedge funds have not generally
reached the level of systemic risk concerns by these measures,121 their
collective impact, based on factors like the nature of their investment
strategies and use of leverage, has systemic risk potentials.122 Likewise,
hedge funds’ interconnections in the financial system could elevate their
counterparty risks to be systemic. Such dangers are further compounded in
a market where a few instruments or participants dominate the trades or the
provision of liquidity. This was the case in the GFC when the repo market
supplied short-term funding, and when Lehman Brothers was a significant
provider of liquidity in the credit default swap market.123 The extensive use
of repos by hedge funds increases the likelihood for systemic risk
transmission through fire sales triggered by distress or default of a dealer or
other large borrower in tri-party repo arrangements. These repo markets
continue to be an area of concern as highlighted by the FSOC in its 2014
Annual Report.124
In addition, the effects of systemic risk are exacerbated by leverage and
opacity. Deleveraging could have a downward effect on asset pricing, and
trigger a spread of fire sales across other sectors in the securities market,
causing market illiquidity to ripple into the rest of the financial system.
Lack of transparency increases the likelihood of such domino effect by
impairing market participants’ ability to assess risks and deterring proper
price formation. It also limits the regulators’ power to monitor potential
systemic risks through information on trading activities and/or positions to
identify contributing factors to fire sales, such as market concentration and
herding.125 Therefore, even if individual hedge funds are unlikely to pose
systemic risks, continuous monitoring of the industry on the collective
effects of their investment strategies and positions, along with their
interconnectedness to the overall global markets, is necessary to safeguard
financial stability. From the foregoing analysis, this exercise should focus
120. FSB, GUIDANCE TO ASSESS SIFI, supra note 103, at 2–3 (setting out considerations for the
assessment of systemic importance). See also FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra
note 9. Consideration of proposals by both the FSB and the OFR are ongoing and subject to
further developments. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
121. E.g., according to the materiality threshold for assessment as NBNI G-SIFI. See FSB &
IOSCO, IDENTIFYINGNBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9, at 9.
122. See IOSCO, Mitigating Systemic Risk, supra note 101, at 16–21 (discussing factors with
collective systemic risk potential, including size, interconnectedness, lack of substitutes and
concentration, lack of transparency, leverage, market participant behavior, information asymmetry
and moral hazard).
123. Id. at 18–19.
124. FSOC 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 113 (reiterating the potentially
destabilizing effects from fire sale vulnerabilities associated with tri-party repo markets).
125. See OFRASSETMANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 22.
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on the shadow banking sector as a primary location where systemic risks
can build up and be transmitted into the wider financial system.
3. Shadow Banking and Hedge Funds
The shadow banking system exemplifies the innovative and ever-
changing nature of the modern financial system. It transformed the original
function of a single banking entity into an intricate, multi-step chain,
involving specialized financial institutions with novel services and
products, and developing new market sectors at the same time.126 Its
evolution over the past few decades illustrates how the transformation in
credit intermediation developed through complex interconnections between
the traditional banking system and the non-banking financial sector.127 A
snapshot of this parallel banking follows to provide a perspective on its
connections to systemic risk and hedge funds, in support of the regulatory
objective stated in Part I.D.3.128
“Credit intermediation”, the function of connecting savers to borrowers,
was traditionally conducted within a single financial entity, usually the
bank.129 At the onset of the GFC, market-based institutions replaced many
banks, with the capital markets providing a significant supply of credit.130 In
such credit creation, the bank/shadow bank may conduct credit, maturity
and liquidity transformation,131 with maturity transformation being the most
pertinent for regulatory attention. “Maturity transformation refers to the use
of short-term deposits to fund long-term loans, which creates liquidity for
126. For more details on the evolution of shadow banking, see generally ADRIAN&ASHCRAFT,
supra note 52, at 3–5.
127. Adair Turner, Address at Cass Business School: Shadow Banking and Financial Instability
6–7 (March 14, 2012) [hereinafter Turner, Shadow Banking], available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/speeches/0314-at.pdf.
128. Given the purpose and space constraints herein, it is not feasible to describe the inner
workings of the shadow banking system in this Article. The complexity of the shadow banking
system has been said to “defy complete understanding”. Id. at 36; Adair Turner, Shadow Banking
and Financial Instability (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/120307/004-CASS-LECTURE-
20120308.pdf [hereinafter Turner, Shadow Banking Slides]. See also ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL.,
SHADOW BANKING app. 1–8 (2012) [hereinafter POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING], available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (setting out shadow banking maps
depicting the complex interconnectivity of shadow banking entities and activities).
129. POZSAR ET AL., SHADOWBANKING, supra note 128, at 4.
130. TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS
FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter ADRIAN & SHIN, SHADOW BANKING
SYSTEM], available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf (noting that at the
end of the 2nd quarter of 2007 the market-based assets were substantially larger than the bank
assets).
131. ADRIAN & ASHCRAFT, supra note 52, at 2 (“Credit transformation refers to the
enhancement of the credit quality of debt issued by the intermediary through the use of priority of
claims.”). Liquidity transformation occurs when liquid instruments are used to fund illiquid assets,
such as the process of creating a liquid-rated security secured by a pool of illiquid loans. Id.
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the saver but exposes the intermediary to rollover and duration risks.”132
Accordingly, Morgan Ricks identified the resulting maturity mismatch as
connected to a demonstrated market failure that merits government
intervention and argued it is the central problem for financial regulatory
policy.133 Such rationale would apply to regulating the same functions
performed in the shadow banking system. As seen from the run on prime
brokers and MMFs in the GFC, short-term deposit-like funding of non-bank
entities can lead to bank-like “runs” from the loss of “depositor” confidence
under stressed market conditions.134
Since the coining of the term “shadow banking,”135 regulatory and
academic attention have shed some light on this parallel banking system as
interests gained momentum in the aftermath of the GFC.136 Nevertheless, it
is widely agreed that there is no universal definition for shadow banking137
and the scope of this sector varies depending on the purpose of the
discussion and the use for the data in question.138 The boundaries of shadow
banking can expand to cover all non-bank credit intermediation in the
financial system or contract to only a subset of the broader definition.139
132. Id. at 2.
133. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation 13 (Columbia Law
and Economics Working Paper No. 370, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571290
(noting the inference from historical events that “maturity transformation in the absence of a
government safety net is inherently prone to periodic run-behavior.”).
134. See supra Part I.B (discussing the bank-like runs that took place during the GFC) and infra
note 170 and accompanying text (characterizing the GFC as a “run on repo”).
135. Coined in 2007 by Paul McCulley, former managing director of PIMCO.
136. Voluminous literature on this topic can be found from the economic, legal and industry
perspectives. See generally ADRIAN & ASHCRAFT, supra note 52; POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW
BANKING, supra note 128; Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking
System, 41 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, no. 2, Fall 2010, at 261–312
[hereinafter Gorton & Metrick, Regulating Shadow Banking], available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall%202010/2010b_bpea_gorton.PDF;
Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619 (2012); Ricks,
supra note 133; INST. OF INT'L FIN., “SHADOW BANKING”: A FORWARD-LOOKING FRAMEWORK
FOR EFFECTIVE POLICY (2012) [hereinafter IIF, SHADOW BANKING], available at
https://www.iif.com/system/files/IIF_ShadowBankingPaper_06012012.pdf.
137. Compare, e.g., FSB’s definition, infra note 140, with the definition of “all financial
activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate”. Stijn
Claessens & Lev Ratnovski, What is Shadow Banking? 4 (IMF Working Paper, WP/14/25, 2014),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1425.pdf (considering the spectrum
of financial activities involving intermediation). For a literature summary of the definition of
“shadow banking”, see IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 91–92, ann. 2.
138. See, e.g., IIF, SHADOWBANKING, supra note 136, at 12.
139. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., SHADOW BANKING: STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND
REGULATION—RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD 3–4 (2011)
[hereinafter FSB 2011 SHADOW BANKING RECOMMENDATIONS], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf (setting out a 2 step definition
process, broadly defined for the purposes of surveillance and narrowed for regulatory policy
purposes to focus on such credit intermediation activities with potential to pose (i) systemic risks;
and/or (ii) regulatory arbitrage concerns).
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As this Article proposes a conceptual policy paradigm to monitor and
manage potential systemic risk posed by hedge funds, a more
comprehensive definition is better suited at the initial stage. Therefore, I
propose using a broad functional approach largely based on the FSB’s
definition to cover “credit intermediation involving entities and activities
(fully or partially) outside the regular banking system,”140 but narrowing its
coverage for specific regulatory analysis in respect of hedge funds.
References to the “shadow banking system” here encompass the financial
participants, markets, activities, and instruments involved in the various
steps of the non-bank credit intermediation chain.141 However, a more
nuanced interpretation is needed for the evaluation of hedge funds’ “shadow
banking” risks in Part III.A.142 In making such assessment, I adopt, for the
most part, the FSB’s approach to shadow banking risks by focusing on
hedge funds’ activities in the shadow banking system that pose (i) potential
systemic risks with indicators of maturity transformation and leverage,
and/or (ii) regulatory arbitrage concerns.143 Accordingly, the Shadow
Banking Risk Continuum (SBRC) analysis applies the FSB’s two-step
definition process and incorporates additional considerations of the context,
scale, and degree of the activity in question to evaluate if it is akin to
banking functions.144
The issue of whether hedge funds are shadow banks to be captured in
FSB’s current shadow banking reform initiatives is hotly contested. On one
hand, the GFC revealed hedge funds’ significant market footprint through
their broad and varied roles in the shadow banking system. Hedge funds
140. FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW
BANKING—AN OVERVIEW OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS iv (2013) [hereinafter FSB 2013
RECOMMENDATIONS—OVERVIEW], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829a.pdf.
141. Schwarcz, supra note 136, at 622–623 (including, in the definition, shadow banks’
provision of financial products and services and the markets used to do so).
142. Regulatory analysis needs to focus on relevant areas of systemic risk concerns as the
shadow banking system evolves. See ADRIAN&ASHCRAFT, supra note 52, at 5–9.
143. FSB 2011 SHADOW BANKING RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 139, at 4 (narrowing the
definition of the shadow banking system for policy purposes, the FSB lists four key risk factors to
identify the subset of non-bank credit intermediation with potential to pose systemic risks: (i)
maturity transformation; (ii) liquidity transformation; (iii) imperfect credit risk transfer; and/or (iv)
leverage). For the proposed hedge fund regulatory analysis herein, the scope is further narrowed to
center on the risk factors of maturity transformation and leverage, as they are most applicable to
hedge funds. Highlighting these two systemic risk indicators is consistent with similar emphasis
found in other literature. See Turner, Shadow Banking, supra note 127, at 5. See also OFF. OF FIN.
RESEARCH, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2012) [hereinafter OFR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT], available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFR_Annual_Report_071912_Final.pdf
(citing to the definition of “credit intermediation” in ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING
(2012)).
144. See infra Part III.A, notes 330–332 and accompanying text (setting out the fine-tuning
process for the evaluation of “shadow banking” risks).
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were active traders of complex financial instruments in the shadow banking
system, like collateralized debt obligations,145 and also acted as credit risk
repository in the credit intermediation chain.146 Their connection with banks
and broker-dealers via repo and securities lending transactions, as well as
margin lending by their prime broker, created multiple routes for market
stresses to spread and intensify.147 Adrian and Shin argued that the
amplified shock resulting from linkages through hedge funds’ role as
liquidity provider for financial intermediaries, such as Lehman Brothers,
proved to be an important source of funding instability.148 In this way, the
need to monitor hedge funds for transmission of systemic risks in the
shadow banking system is irrefutable. In addition, the credit hedge fund
segment has garnered attention regarding its activities in the non-banking
financial system, such as engaging in corporate lending similar to banks.149
On the other hand, industry groups have forcefully disputed
categorizing hedge funds as shadow banks on the grounds that they are
already regulated and that asset managers do not sufficiently perform bank-
like activities.150 The industry argued that hedge funds do not warrant
regulation because: (i) they are relatively small compared to the rest of the
financial system,151 particularly in respect of credit hedge funds alone;152
145. OFR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 104.
146. ADRIAN&ASHCRAFT, supra note 52, at 19.
147. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (describing the role of hedge funds as a source
of funding in the shadow banking system).
148. Compare ADRIAN& SHIN, SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 130, at 7 (commenting
that hedge fund customers’ “deposits” are subject to withdrawal on demand, which generates
funding instability), with arguments made by Alternative Investment Management Association
(AIMA) and Managed Funds Association (MFA) infra note 155 and accompanying text
(regarding hedge funds’ ability to utilize redemption restrictions to avoid asset/liability mismatch).
149. See Letter from Richard H. Baker, President and CEO of Managed Funds Ass’n, to the
European Commission (June 1, 2012) ann. 2 at 18 [hereinafter MFA June 2012 Letter], available
at https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/MFA_response_to_EuropeanCommission_greenpaper_on_shadowbanki
ng.pdf (acknowledging that a small segment of credit hedge funds are involved in direct
commercial loans to small and medium-sized enterprises). See also infra note 345 (noting the need
to monitor trends in hedge funds’ participation in leveraged lending).
150. See, e.g., HEDGE FUND STANDARDS BD., RESPONSE TO THE FSB CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT “STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING” 8 (2013)
[hereinafter HFSB JANUARY 2013 RESPONSE], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/c_130129ao.pdf (examining the
activities of asset management against categories of bank-like features); AIMA, THE ROLE OF
CREDIT HEDGE FUNDS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: ASSET MANAGERS, NOT SHADOW BANKS 18
(2012) [hereinafter AIMA MARCH 2012 PAPER], available at http://www.aima.org/en/document-
summary/index.cfm/docid/129E55F5-AF6C-471F-B30DA4A33B40A8EB.
151. MFA June 2012 Letter, supra note 149, ann. 2 at 6 (comparing the global hedge fund
industry’s approximately $2.08 trillion in net assets with the approximately $14.4 trillion in assets
from the top 50 U.S. bank holding companies). See also HFSB JANUARY 2013 RESPONSE, supra
note 150, at 3 (referring to the credit hedge fund sector’s marginal share of assets under
management compared to the size of the banking sector).
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(ii) they do not perform a significant credit intermediation function153
because of the ability to avoid asset and liabilities mismatch154 through
contractual liquidity protections with their investors;155 (iii) they generally
utilize low levels of leverage;156 and (iv) they are not “too big to fail” and
did not require government support in the GFC.157 However, while this line
of argument may address systemic risk concerns arising directly from the
failure of a hedge fund, it does not adequately deal with the more intricate
dangers resulting from the web of interconnections facilitated by hedge
funds.158
The shadow banking system involves multiple entities and activities
across various market segments along the credit intermediation chain, many
of which exhibited failures in the GFC.159 Hedge funds’ systemic risk
potential in such parallel banking sector lies in their numerous
interconnections in key markets, most notably the secured funding
markets.160 This is because the shadow banking system offers a source of
152. See AIMA MARCH 2012 PAPER, supra note 150, at 12 (citing FSA findings that direct
lending and ABS activities of hedge funds only account for a small subset of credit hedge funds’
already small 1% size within non-bank credit intermediaries).
153. Id. at 4, 13.
154. See MFA June 2012 Letter, supra note 149, ann. 2 at 8 n.11 (citing evidence from UK
FSA’s hedge fund surveys showing that their portfolios can generally be liquidated more quickly
than their liabilities fall due).
155. See AIMA, AIMA’S RESPONSE TO THE FSB’S INITIAL INTEGRATED SET OF
RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING 1
(2013), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/c_130129a.pdf.
See also AIMA MARCH 2012 PAPER, supra note 150, ann. 2 (discussing potential redemption
strategies).
156. See AIMAMARCH 2012 PAPER, supra note 150, at 11 (discussing the approximate level of
leverage for the various types of credit hedge funds, which are generally at low levels, but
acknowledging that for fundamental credit managers potentially high term funding lines of 50% of
equity may be utilized in lower interest rate environments). See also MANAGED FUND ASS'N, RE:
MANAGED FUNDS ASSOCIATION RESPONSE TO SHADOW BANKING: SCOPING THE ISSUES 8
(2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/c_110901m.pdf
(noting the significantly lower peak leverage ratio of 2.6:1 during December 2004 to October
2009 compared with that of LTCM, which was leveraged more than 25:1 as of January 1, 1998).
157. See, e.g., AIMA MARCH 2012 PAPER, supra note 150, at 17 n.21. They also contend that
the diverse universe of investment strategies utilized by hedge funds, along with the dispersion of
assets among different managers, funds and investors, avoids concentration of trades in asset
classes. SeeMFA June 2012 Letter, supra note 149, ann. 2 at 7.
158. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing hedge funds as potential SIFIs).
159. See, e.g., FSB 2011 SHADOW BANKING RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 139, at 22
(noting the close relationship between secured lending markets with securitization and money
markets through the use of collateral). See also Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible
Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, 14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2009 Fin. Mkts.
Conference, Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401882 (explaining that securitization and
repo markets are connected because securitization provides the “informationally-insensitive debt”
needed as collateral in the repo markets).
160. Other major markets in the shadow banking system include securitization and MMFs.
Traditional credit intermediation (deposit-funded, hold to maturity lending) is broken down into
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financing for hedge funds “via market-based securities lending and repo
transactions, and through margin lending as part of the prime broker
relationship.”161
As key components of the short-term funding markets,162 repos and
securities lending are similar in that they involve the use of securities not
owned by a party. In the securities lending segment, institutional investors
lend securities to banks and broker dealers, against collaterals of cash or
securities.163 Prime brokers then use the borrowed securities to on-lend to
hedge funds.164 “Repo,” in general terms, refers to a sale-and-repurchase
agreement whereby the bank, or other financial entity, takes money from an
investor for a short period and gives in exchange physical possession of
collateral valued at market prices for it, as well as interest. The contract
provides for simultaneous repurchase of the collateral by the bank at a
specified price at the end of its term.165 Hedge funds are large users of repo
and secured lending markets and, in doing so, connect multiple market
participants across market segments.166 Further, in these transactions, prime
brokers’ rehypothecation of the collateral for the borrowed securities can
the multi-step chain for an “originate-and-distribute” model through securitization in the shadow
banking system. See POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING, supra note 128, at 11. Hedge funds’
participation and provision of risk capital in the first-loss positions of loan pools has been
attributed to the growth of the asset-backed securities market. See OFR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 143, at 104. MMFs have a large presence in the shadow banking system both as a
means for direct investment in a deposit-like manner, as well as a source of short-term funding for
the regular banking system and for other non-banks via the credit intermediation chain. See FSB
2013 RECOMMENDATIONS—OVERVIEW, supra note 140, at 3. Hedge funds and MMFs are
interconnected through repo transactions and all share in the potential effects of systemic risks
from vulnerabilities of such short-term funding markets.
161. See FIN. STABILITY BD., SECURITIES LENDING AND REPOS: MARKET OVERVIEW AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY ISSUES—INTERIM REPORT OF THE FSB WORKSTREAM ON SECURITIES
LENDING AND REPOS 24 (2012) [hereinafter FSB INTERIM REPORT ON REPOS], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120427.pdf. The FSB WS5 examined the
hedge fund and prime broker relationship in such financing arrangements in the securities lending
and repo network.
162. See id. ann. 3, 4 (listing sources of literature on securities financing transactions). See also
OFR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 100 (noting that repos and securities lending are
key components of the short-term funding markets).
163. FSB INTERIM REPORT ON REPOS, supra note 161, at 2.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Gorton & Metrick, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 136, app. at 291.
166. Repos can be used for a number of trading position purposes and serve as “an important
mechanism for obtaining leverage, especially for hedge funds”. Id. at 279. As users of repos,
hedge funds connect dealer banks as intermediaries in repo financing. Hedge funds use the
securities lending market for temporary ownership of the securities to pursue their investment
strategies, such as shorting. See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING
REPORT ann. 5 at 16, 18 (2012) [hereinafter FSB, 2012 SHADOW BANKING REPORT], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_121118c.pdf?page_moved=1. See
also supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text discussing the interconnections between
markets and participants in the shadow banking system.
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create additional market risks and deepen the interconnections between the
various participants in the shadow banking system.167
The secured funding market can generate benefits to the overall
economy by facilitating effective market making, injecting liquidity and
increasing market efficiency. However, the GFC revealed two hidden
dangers in the form of haircuts168 and collateral rehypothecation.169 In fact,
the GFC has been characterized as a “run on repo” by authors Gorton and
Metrick, in that repos, as a short-term debt perceived to be safe and money-
like, suffered a bank run through the increase of repo haircuts.170These runs
on the repo markets also caused forced deleveraging with severe ripple
effects.171 Accordingly, these issues are part of the shadow banking reforms
currently under consideration.172
Finally, the growth of shadow banking, including hedge funds’ role in
it, needs to be monitored. Due to the lack of clear definition and consistent
data, there is no exact figure for the size of the global shadow banking
system.173 According to FSB’s 2014 Global Shadow Banking Monitoring
Report, the global shadow banking assets are estimated, on the conservative
side, at $75.2 trillion in 2013—a 7% increase of $4.8 trillion from 2012.174
167. See Turner, Shadow Banking, supra note 127; Turner, Shadow Banking Slides, supra note
128, at 34 Exhibit 44 (highlighting how securities financing transactions connect a variety of
financial entities, such as commercial banks, broker dealers, asset managers, money market funds
and hedge funds).
168. FSB INTERIM REPORT ON REPOS, supra note 161, at 15–16 (referring to “haircuts” as the
degree of over-collateralization). See also Gorton & Metrick, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra
note 136, at 279–280 (explaining that “[a]n increase in a repo haircut is tantamount to a
withdrawal from the issuing bank”).
169. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, Shadow Banking Regulation, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.
99, 112 (2012) [hereinafter Adrian & Ashcraft, Shadow Banking Regulation] (explaining this as
the re-use of client collateral, frequently utilized by prime brokers using collateral posted by hedge
funds as collateral for its own funding purposes).
170. See Gorton & Metrick, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 136, at 279. But see
comments by Andrei Shleifer questioning this view. Id. at 300–302.
171. Gorton, supra note 159, at 33 (discussing the “run on repo”). See also Adrian & Ashcraft,
Shadow Banking Regulation, supra note 169, at 102 (referencing the analysis of market sector
collapses in the shadow banking system in Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the
Shadow Banking System, 41 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMICACTIVITY, no. 2, Fall 2010).
172. See e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF
SHADOW BANKING: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR HAIRCUTS ON NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED
SECURITIES FINANCING TRANSACTIONS (2014), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141013a.pdf.
173. In addition to data constraints, variations in the definition of shadow banking can result in
conceptual differences in its measurement and produce inconsistencies in the estimated size of the
sector. For example, non-MMF funds are included in the broad FSB measures, but they are
excluded in estimates using the flow of funds and the noncore measures. See IMF, OCTOBER 2014
REPORT, supra note 6, at 72, 73, tbl.2.1 (tabling comparison of shadow banking measures).
174. FIN. STABILITY BD., 2014 GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 5–7, 8, 12
(2013) [hereinafter FSB, 2014 SHADOW BANKING REPORT], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141030.pdf. This broad measure of
global shadow banking assets is determined using data of 20 individual jurisdictions and the Euro
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Applying the FSB’s narrow definition of shadow banking substantially
lowers these estimates down to $34.0 trillion in 2012 and $34.9 trillion in
2013—exhibiting only a 2.4% increase in 2013.175 Notably, shadow
banking’s share of the total financial system assets continued to grow in
2013, reaching 25%, while the banking sector experienced decline for a
second consecutive year, dropping to 46%.176 Based on these FSB findings,
hedge funds remain the smallest sub-sector of shadow banking, at $0.1
trillion, representing less than 0.2% of the assets of non-bank financial
intermediaries in 2013.177 However, this breakdown is not an accurate
representation of hedge funds’ size relative to the entire shadow banking
system. Citing industry size data from national hedge fund surveys and
private sector sources, the FSB report acknowledges that such figures are
significantly understated due to data gaps from macro-mapping.178
As of 2013, the United States and the Euro area have the largest non-
bank financial intermediation sectors, each with a third of the global
shadow banking assets.179 The global trend for average growth of the
shadow banking system presents a wide variation across countries, ranging
from negative 6% to 50%.180 It indicates a shift in growth to emerging
market jurisdictions, marked in particular by the rapid increase in China’s
shadow banking sector.181 Looking ahead, this development is a critical one
Area aggregate. Id. at 7–8. It covers non-bank financial intermediation using the “total financial
assets held by Other Financial Intermediaries (OFIs), which include all non-bank financial
intermediaries with the exception of insurance companies, pension funds and public financial
institutions.” Id. at 5–6. Applying the same broad measure but using 25 individual jurisdictions
instead provides a lower estimate of the global shadow banking assets at $63.8 trillion. Id. at 7.
175. Id. at 6–7, 19, 22–23. For a description of FSB’s narrowing down process from the broad
measure see id. at 6–7. This refines the broader estimate based on prescribed criteria and utilizes
more granular data provided by 23 jurisdictions, as opposed to the data samples used for the
broader measure of shadow banking. Id. at 19, 22–23. This also generates a different growth rate
than the one for shadow banking in broad terms, at 6.6% for 2013 instead of the 7% noted above.
Id. at 23. It illustrates the difficulties in attaining comprehensive and comparable shadow banking
data.
176. Id. at 8 (applying the broad measures of shadow banking).
177. Id. at 13–14 (noting the lack of data from IOSCO’s hedge fund survey to supplement the
2013 statistics). See also FIN. STABILITY BD., 2013 GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING
REPORT 14–15, 15 Exhibit 4-1 (2013) [hereinafter FSB, 2013 GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING
REPORT], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131114.pdf (noting
that hedge funds’ 0.2% share based on the 2012 flow of funds data would increase to 3% when
incorporating results from the 2013 IOSCO Hedge Fund Survey Report and the numbers reported
by participating jurisdictions in the FSB exercise).
178. FSB, 2014 SHADOW BANKING REPORT, supra note 174, at 13–14.
179. Id. at 9–10, 10 Exhibit 2-3 (estimates based on the broad measure of shadow banking
assets, with the United Kingdom in third place at a 12% share).
180. Id. at 3.
181. FSB, 2013 GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING REPORT, supra note 177, at 12 (exhibiting the
largest growth at over 42% in 2012). FSB, 2014 SHADOW BANKING REPORT, supra note 174, at
10 Exhibit 2-3 (noting an increase in China’s share of the global shadow banking assets from 1%
in 2007 to 4% at 2013 year end, coming in fifth place after Japan at 5%).
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to monitor as shadow banking risks shift to the emerging markets,182
possibly elevating the dangers of cross-border spillover risks to advanced
economies.183 Such regulatory concerns are particularly alarming in China
given the continuing rapid expansion of its shadow banking sector,184
accompanied by possible dangers from its scale of growth in debt.185 The
worrisome growth of this sector in China is compounded by the fact that it
is fueled by regulatory arbitrage and propelled by a strong demand
premised on potentially false expectation of government back-stop.186 The
multitude of issues raised by this topic is beyond the scope of this Article,
but further research and consideration are imperative to address their global
financial stability implications.
The shadow banking system brought together risks inherent in banking
in a concealed form and a potentially more combustible combination. The
interdependence of market participants through assets and liabilities held
among them in the multi-step credit intermediation chain magnified the
vulnerabilities from maturity and liquidity transformations, as well as
procyclicality.187 Such interdependence underscores hedge funds’ potential
for system risk merely as a key player in the credit intermediation chain,
182. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Bank of England’s Mark Carney Sees Shadow Banking in
Emerging Markets as Biggest Global Risk, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/mark-carney/10516661/Bank-of-Englands-Mark-Carney-sees-
shadow-banking-in-emerging-markets-as-biggest-global-risk.html. See also FSB, SHADOW
BANKING ROADMAP, supra note 98 (identifying the assessment and mitigation of systemic risks
posed by shadow banking as a regulatory reform priority in 2015).
183. See IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that “[t]he risk of direct
spillovers to advanced economies from elevated stress in China’s financial system continues to
rise with the growth in cross-border bank lending”).
184. See IOSCO 2014-15 RISK OUTLOOK, supra note 27, at 26–27 (highlighting the systemic
risk potential of Chinese wealth management products); Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
Shadow Banking in China: Expanding Scale, Evolving Structure, ASIA FOCUS, Apr. 2013, at 1
[hereinafter FRBSF], http://www.frbsf.org/banking-supervision/publications/asia-
focus/2013/april/shadow-banking-china-scale-structure/asia-focus-shadow-banking-in-china.pdf;
Michael Schuman, Why You Need to Worry About China’s Shadow Banking, TIME (Feb. 19,
2014), http://time.com/8671/why-you-need-to-worry-about-chinas-shadow-banking//.
185. See A Question of Trust, THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 2014, at 13–15 (noting concerns
sparked by a series of troubled shadow banks and trust product defaults).
186. See JOE ZHANG, INSIDE CHINA’S SHADOW BANKING—THE NEXT SUBPRIME
CRISIS (2013) (describing the origins, makeup and concerns relating to this sector in China). See
also FRBSF, supra note 184, at 1 (discussing the differences in “composition, players and drivers”
of the shadow banking systems between China and the U.S.). Note also that the present limited
role of hedge funds, which is frequently tied to trust firms, may be expanded in the future with the
pilot program allowing foreign hedge funds to operate in China.
187. Turner, Shadow Banking, supra note 127, at 13. See also FIN. STABILITY BD.,
STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING: A POLICY FRAMEWORK
FOR ADDRESSING SHADOW BANKING RISKS IN SECURITIES LENDING AND REPOS 3 (2012)
[hereinafter FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REPOS],
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118b.pdf (highlighting this as a potential
risk from repo and securities lending).
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without being classified as a “shadow bank” per se.188 In addition, market
shocks are amplified in the shadow banking system that incorporate
negative market information quickly. These shocks, coupled with greater
reliance on market confidence, result in sensitivity to volatility in the capital
markets.189 Accordingly, the shadow banking system serves as “an
international systemic risk transmitter in times of crisis.”190
Furthermore, hedge funds’ facilitation of credit intermediation in the
shadow banking system also amplifies their negative economic trade-offs.
Hedge funds’ multiple roles in shadow banking’s network of
interconnections exacerbate the existing complexity and non-transparency
involved in hedge fund activities.191 These conditions heighten potential
dangers from the use of leverage in hedge fund investment strategies and
instruments. The GFC also demonstrated that vulnerabilities in the
relationship between hedge funds and their prime brokers are significant
and run both ways.192
Shadow banking poses a conundrum for financial regulatory policy.
“Properly structured, shadow banking can increase efficiency, provide
diversification, and spur competition and innovation.”193 Non-bank credit
intermediation offers alternative funding sources for the real economy and
provides economic benefits in lowering the costs of credit for borrowers
and expanding the investment portfolio for savers. However, it also
generates run risks that are unregulated and unsupported by government
back-stop. Therefore, finding the regulatory balance to preserve benefits of
the parallel banking system, while safeguarding stability of the global
financial system, is a critical challenge to the completion of post-GFC
reforms.194
188. See, e.g., FSB, 2012 SHADOW BANKING REPORT, supra note 166, ann. 5 at 18 (noting that
AIG’s securities lending operation created “unexpected connections among disparate market
players, such as insurance companies and hedge funds”).
189. Adrian & Ashcraft, Shadow Banking Regulation, supra note 169, at 102 (citing Dang,
Gorton & Holmstrom (2009) regarding synthetic credit derivatives as a mechanism for rapid
incorporation of negative information); ADRIAN & SHIN, SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM, supra note
130, at 6 (noting greater market shock sensitivity).
190. ADRIAN & ASHCRAFT, supra note 52, at 10. See also IMF COUNTRY REPORT No. 14/234
47–52 (2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14234.pdf (considering
the repo market as a channel for stress transmission from global shadow banks to UK banks).
191. See, e.g., FSB, 2012 SHADOW BANKING REPORT, supra note 166, ann. 5 at 18 (using the
AIG experience to illustrate the unpredictable effects of contagion arising from its securities
lending operations).
192. See supraPart I.B (describing the ripple effects of Lehman’s bankruptcy).
193. Mark Carney, former Governor of the Bank of Canada, Address to the Institute of
International Finance 3 (Sept. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r110927a.pdf?frames=0.
194. For a global overview of shadow banking regulatory reforms and implementation thereof,
see IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, ch. 2, ann. 2.4 at 99–101.
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D. HEDGE FUNDREGULATORY LANDSCAPE: THEN ANDNOW
The foregoing discussion highlights systemic risk concerns associated
with hedge funds’ role in the shadow banking system. It is essential to
identify and respond to trends that may shift the hedge fund regulatory
analysis of the trade-offs between their economic benefits and the dangers
of potential systemic risk.195 Having considered the areas of such regulatory
concerns in the preceding analyses, at this juncture, it is useful to examine
the extent these issues have been addressed by post-GFC reforms in order
to determine the outstanding fault lines in the hedge fund regulatory
landscape.
1. Pre-GFC Hedge Fund Regulatory Environment
Hedge funds’ freedom from regulation before the GFC reflects the
evaluation of trade-offs in favor of preserving their positive economic
contributions towards liquidity and innovation in the financial system.196
The contrarian investment strategies taken by many hedge funds also
provide the benefit of investment diversification opportunities to deliver
“alpha” in down markets. On these grounds, the industry managed to fend
off periodic calls for regulation prompted by failures of large hedge funds,
like LTCM in 1998 and Amaranth in 2006, as well as general concerns
from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. By and large, the policy
approach has been for unofficial monitoring of the industry and its effects
on the capital markets, and relying on market discipline through improved
counterparty risk management.
Before the GFC, hedge funds operated in a largely unregulated arena.197
Advisers to hedge funds in the United States were able to avoid regulation
pursuant to the “private advisers exemption” under Section 203(b)(3) of the
195. For example, signs of troubling trends reminiscent of certain market conditions in 2007,
such as the continued low interest rates generating “search for yield” risk appetite, accompanied
by economic recovery and a constrained banking sector incentivizing regulatory arbitrage. For a
summary of financial market risks and trends identified by IOSCO, IMF, BIS, FSOC, and the
European Securities and Markets Authority, see IOSCO, 2014-15 RISK OUTLOOK, supra note 27,
at 11 tbl.1.
196. See Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, 30 REGULATION 36,
36 (2007) (“Academics, industry professionals, and regulatory authorities overwhelmingly agree
that hedge funds benefit the economy by mitigating price downturns, bearing risks that others will
not, making securities more liquid, and ferreting out inefficiencies. Those benefits are possible
because hedge funds are subject to much less regulation than most investment companies.”);
DAVIES&GREEN, supra note 61, at 231–232.
197. IOSCO HEDGE FUNDSOVERSIGHT CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 112, ann. 5 at 51–
69 (summarizing hedge fund regulatory approaches in various jurisdictions, including Canada, the
E.U., the U.K. and the U.S.). Hedge funds operated without disclosure requirements or restrictions
on their activities, but were still subject to SEC regulations applicable to all securities market
participants, such as prohibitions against fraud.
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Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act).198 In the absence of
statutory regulation, there are substantial best practices established for the
hedge fund industry, largely impelled by the collapse of LTCM. The most
prominent in the United States is the principles-based guidance for
regulators and market participants set out in the Agreement Among PWG
and U.S. Agency Principals on Principles and Guidelines Regarding
Private Pools of Capital (the PWG Principles) by the President’s Working
Group (PWG)199 on Financial Markets.200 International organizations have
also issued their own standards and guidelines for the hedge fund
industry.201 In addition, the hedge fund industry’s own associations have
attempted to provide self-regulation through their guides of sound practices
in areas such as governance, disclosure, risk management, operations and
valuation.
Like shadow banking, hedge funds pose a dilemma for their regulation.
This is because “[a]n efficient capital market requires transparency and
liquidity.”202 What hedge funds lack in transparency is countered by the
liquidity they provide to the markets. Granted, however, the absolute merit
of market liquidity is in question post-crisis, likely altering this balance of
cost and benefit analysis.203 The GFC underscored the dangers of systemic
risk, and the potential cost to the real economy that accompanied the
positive attributes of hedge funds. Such impetus ushered in a new
regulatory landscape for hedge funds to provide oversight and to increase
transparency.
198. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–21 (2006) (exempting advisers of
fewer than 15 clients, which treats each fund as a client rather than the individual investors in a
fund). Despite the weak rationale for such an exemption, attempts to remove it have not (until
now) succeeded. In 2004, SEC adopted an amendment to Rule 203(b)(3)-1 that required most
hedge fund advisors to register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. However, in 2006, this
rule was overturned by the D.C. Circuit of Appeals in Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 451
F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). See also Anita K. Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor for "Hedge Fund
Regulation": A Reconsideration of "Client" Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 55 VILL.
L. REV. 661, 663 (2010) (critiquing the treatment of “client” under the exemption, which resulted
in under-regulation of private fund investment advisers).
199. The PWG is made up of the heads of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, the SEC
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
200. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S.
AGENCY PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL
(2007) [hereinafter PWG PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-
mkts/Documents/hp272_principles.pdf.
201. See, e.g., the BCBS and IOSCO promulgated sets of “sound practices” in dealing with the
provision of liquidity and leverage to hedge funds. IOSCO has subsequently issued additional
principles and best practices relating to hedge funds.
202. Tafara & Peterson, supra note 79, at 46.
203. See commentary supra Part I.B, on Lesson 2 and infra Part III.B (dispelling assumptions
about liquidity).
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2. Post-GFC Hedge Fund Regulatory Environment
Fortified with lessons of the GFC, numerous proposals for financial
reforms, including hedge fund regulation, were put forward by national
governments, international bodies, private institutions, and academia.204
Industry bodies, such as the UK-based, Alternative Investment
Management Association (AIMA)205 and U.S.-based Managed Funds
Association (MFA),206 have also been quick to act in order to minimize the
glare of regulation by establishing best practices for its members and
actively participating in the policy discussions.207 In examining the progress
of post-crisis reforms, the international developments that steered the
reshaping of hedge fund regulation can aid in understanding the context for
future reform initiatives.
It was evident that hedge funds would be under scrutiny for their lack of
regulation at the first G20 Washington Summit.208 The G20 London
Summit in 2009 named oversight of hedge funds among the goals for
financial sector reforms, stating “hedge funds or their managers will be
registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information on an
204. See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009) [hereinafter, U.S. TREASURY, A
NEW FOUNDATION]; UK, HERMAJESTY’S TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIALMARKETS (2009);
JOINT FORUM REPORT, supra note 113; IOSCO HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT CONSULTATION
REPORT, supra note 112; IOSCO HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT FINAL REPORT, supra note 16; THE
DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU (2009)
[hereinafter DE LAROSIÈRE REPORT], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (advising on the
future of European financial regulation and supervision); GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM:
A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY PLAN],
available at http://www.group30.org/rpt_03.shtml; CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 73 (setting
out a private sector response to the GFC); G20 WORKING GROUP 1, supra note 1; COMM. ON
CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS—A PLAN FOR REGULATORY
REFORM (2009); CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY
REFORM—MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING
STABILITY (2009).
205. About AIMA, AIMA, http://www.aima.org/en/about/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
206. MFA, http://www.managedfunds.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
207. See, e.g., AIMA ROADMAP, supra note 22, app. 2 at 137–38 (citing various sound
practices guides); Press Release, Managed Funds Assoc., Managed Funds Association Takes
Steps to Restore Investor Confidence with Enhanced Best Practices & Investor Due Diligence
Recommendations (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090331006134/en/Managed-Funds-Association-
Takes-Steps-Restore-InvestorVKyU8Th0y70 (noting its updated Sound Practices for hedge fund
managers and due diligence questionnaire for investors); HEDGE FUND STANDARDS BD., HEDGE
FUND STANDARDS (2012), available at
http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10377/files/hedge_fund_standards_-_as_at_february_2012.pdf.
208. G20WASHINGTONDECLARATION, supra note 83, at 3 ¶ 9.
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ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators.”209 In the G20 summits that
followed, commitments on national and international fronts were reiterated
to close the gaps in unregulated products and entities, including the recent
focus on the oversight and regulation of the shadow banking sector.210 This
internationally coordinated process of financial reforms is characterized by
the broad regulatory goals set by the G20, which are then tasked to the FSB
and applicable standard-setters to establish overarching principles and
reform proposals. They are generally subject to a public consultation
process and G20 endorsement before the final detailed recommendations
are issued, with the national implementation schedule outlined for
subsequent peer review. IOSCO’s Hedge Fund Oversight Final Report,211
together with the subsequent template of systemic risk data requirements,212
are examples of soft law developments spurring on national reforms.213 In
addition, the monitoring and information sharing process continues under
the coordination of these international financial organizations.214 For hedge
funds, two notable areas of financial reforms are underway in the
international soft law process. The FSB is currently heading the reform
efforts with respect to strengthening shadow banking oversight and
regulation,215 as well as working with IOSCO on the assessment of NBNI
G-SIFI, potentially including asset management funds.216
209. G20 LEADERS, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 3 (2009),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/london_summit_declaration_on_str_financial_system.pdf. For an update on the
progress of such hedge fund reforms, see FSB, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY
29–30 (2014) [hereinafter FSB, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS 2014], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/Overview-of-Progress-in-the-
Implementation-of-the-G20-Recommendations-for-Strengthening-Financial-Stability.pdf.
210. At the most recent G20 Summit held in Brisbane on November 15-16, 2014, the Leaders
reiterated their focus on shadow banking and their commitment towards building a “stronger,
more resilient global economy”. See G20 BRISBANECOMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 98, ¶ 12.
211. See IOSCO HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT FINAL REPORT, supra note 16 (setting six high
level principles on hedge fund regulation). See also corresponding changes in IOSCO REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 101.
212. See Press Release, IOSCO, International Regulators Publish Systemic Risk Data
Requirements for Hedge Funds (Feb. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS179.pdf; Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Publishes
Updated Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds (Mar. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS229.pdf (amending 2010 data template).
213. See, e.g., hedge fund regulation implemented under the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and, in
the E.U., the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD). The reforms under
AIFMD have significant regulatory implications for the global hedge fund industry, but is not
covered herein due to space constraints.
214. See, e.g., SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY, supra note 16.
215. See supra Part I.C and infra note 254 and accompanying text (relating to FSB’s work on
shadow banking reforms); FSB, SHADOWBANKING ROADMAP, supra note 98.
216. See FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9. See also FSB 2015 Agenda
Letter, supra note 8, at 4.
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As discussed in Part I.C.1, post-crisis financial reforms in the U.S. were
largely implemented under the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. Title IV of the
Dodd-Frank Act marked the beginning of hedge fund regulation by
eliminating the private adviser exemption,217 and creating certain new
exemptions, including one for advisers solely to private funds with less than
$150 million in assets under management in the United States.218 The
dangers associated with hedge funds’ opacity and unregulated state are
addressed by extending the perimeters of regulation through registration
and disclosure requirements. All requisite registrations were completed by
March 30, 2012, upon which the hedge advisers are subject to obligations
under the Advisers Act, including disclosure on the amended Form ADV,219
record keeping and examination by the SEC, and other business conduct
requirements.220 Except for “Exempt Reporting Advisers”, registered
advisers to hedge funds with at least $150 million in RAUM are subject to
additional systemic risk data collection requirements set out in Form PF.
The deadlines for filing the initial and on-going Form PFs, along with the
required disclosure, are determined by the size and type of funds.
In addition, a variety of other financial reforms will impact hedge
funds’ operations, such as regulation on bank counter-parties via Basel III,
as well as those relating to the shadow banking activities and products
involved in hedge fund strategies, such as over-the-counter derivatives
reforms and the removal of the advertising ban pursuant to the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act).221 The Volcker Rule will also
have significant implications for the hedge fund industry as banks divest
their in-house proprietary trading desks.222
217. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
403, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
218. See id. § 403 (other exemptions are extended to venture capital fund advisers and certain
foreign advisers without a place of business in the U.S.).
219. The amended Form ADV prescribes required disclosure from private fund advisers,
comprising general information about the manager and the funds. See SEC, OMB NO. 3235-0049,
FORM ADV: UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION AND REPORT
FORM BY EXEMPT REPORTINGADVISERS (2011).
220. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. IA-3221, 76 FR 42950-01 (July 19, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3221.pdf (final rules and rule amendments under the
Advisers Act to implement Title IV were adopted by the SEC on June 22, 2011). See generally
Kenneth W. Muller, Jay G. Baris & Seth Chertok, The SEC’s New Dodd-Frank Advisers Act
Rulemaking: An Analysis of the SEC’s Implementation of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 57 (2012) (summarizing new hedge fund regulatory obligations).
221. Removing the ban on general solicitation and advertising for private offerings under
Regulation D.
222. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. See also OFR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 23, at 72 (noting the resulting migration of banking activities to asset managers and pension
funds).
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3. Hedge Fund Regulatory Objective and Agenda
Although post-GFC reforms have been made pertaining to the lack of
transparency and oversight of hedge funds, work remains outstanding to
adequately monitor and manage systemic risk issues in a number of
respects. To determine the focus for further reforms, a brief regulatory
agenda follows, outlining informational and substantive concerns, and the
potential challenges ahead reflecting current developments. Together with
the preceding discussion on GFC causes and responses, a regulatory
objective for hedge fund policy is developed as follows: To establish an
evolving regulatory framework that supports a more transparent and
resilient global shadow banking system as a “sustainable source of
market-based finance.”223
a. Informational
Further improvements in data and understanding of hedge funds’
leverage practices are required to better assess their potential systemic
risks.224 It remains to be seen to what extent information collected from the
recent hedge fund disclosure requirements remedy data gaps to enable
effective systemic risk monitoring and management.225 More granularity is
needed to evaluate assumptions underpinning the position that hedge funds
currently do not pose significant shadow banking risk, such as leverage,
redemption restrictions,226 and the potential collective systemic impact of
funds involved in crowded trades.227 Such evaluation should also take into
account changes in hedge funds’ internal operations regarding information
management in response to evolving investor demands or business needs as
it may alter the cost and benefit analysis for regulatory compliance. The
volume and complexity of data collected may also merit reconsideration of
223. See infra Part I.D.3 and note 254 (developing the reform policy to address identified
dangers to financial stability).
224. See IOSCO, 2014-15 RISKOUTLOOK, supra note 27, at 67.
225. See, e.g., supra Part I.D.2 (on hedge funds’ reporting obligations under Form PF); OFR,
2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 112–13 (noting the SEC rule issued in July 2014 to
amend reporting requirements regarding liquidity on Form PF, made to align with money market
fund reporting for improvement of data comparability). See also OFR ASSET MANAGEMENT
REPORT, supra note 9, at 24–26 (describing data gaps for macroprudential analysis, oversight and
monitoring of the asset management sector).
226. For example, relaxing trends in redemption restrictions increases the potential for maturity
mismatch. See CITI REPORT, PART 1, supra note 44, at 21 Chart 12 (finding hedge funds’
redemption notice period of 30 days or less accounts for 65% in 2014, up from 50% in 2008, thus
reducing fund managers’ ability to stem an investor run).
227. See OFR ASSETMANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 22 (listing crowded trades as one
of the factors that can increase the probability and gravity of fire sales).
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the suitability of a disclosure-based regulatory approach in achieving
effective information utilization.228
b. Substantive
Beyond informational requisites for systemic risk mitigation, two
substantive concerns of particular relevance to hedge funds are currently the
focus of ongoing regulatory reforms. As previously noted, the first is the
oversight and regulation of shadow banking. The second is the designation
methodology and analysis for NBNI G-SIFIs. As described below, the
propensity for increased systemic risks is greater in resurgent markets and
heightened by new arbitrage opportunities in the banking sector’s more
constrained regulatory environment.229 This may result in shifting levels of
portfolio liquidity and leverage for hedge funds, with corresponding
changes in their potential systemic risk. As such, regulatory policy and tools
may need to extend beyond supervisory conduct regulation to include
prudential-type requirements for certain hedge funds. Part III explores the
RCM’s potential as an evolving regulatory mechanism to supplement the
evaluation of potential systemic risks posed by hedge funds.
c. Practical and Political Challenges
The GFC demonstrated the sway of industry influence over political
agenda and the impact of boom time mentality limiting regulation. This
experience also underlined inherent tension between the need for
internationally coordinated financial regulation and the goal of national
competitiveness in the global capital markets. Four practical and political
challenges are evident from the GFC lessons discussed in Part I.B: (i)
political economy of regulation; (ii) regulatory capacity asymmetry;230 (iii)
incentive for excessive risk-taking;231 and (iv) global regulatory
coordination and cooperation.232 The political economy of regulation
deserves elaboration here, particularly against the backdrop of reform
exhaustion and current financial market trends. It is critical for the
necessary regulatory reforms to be made within the window of opportunity
228. The utility of more disclosure needs to be balanced with diminishing marginal gains from
the data collected, given the costs of processing such information. See Udo Braedle & Juergen
Noll, A Fig Leaf for the Naked Corporation, 9 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 79, 97 (2005).
229. For example, liquidity and leverage considerations are particularly pertinent amid concerns
regarding the trends and resurgence in leveraged financing, particularly in the high yield bond
markets. See, e.g., Jonathan Wheatley, Corporate Bonds: Emerging Bubble, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
15, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d31fe990-b2a4-11e4-b234-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3VKH0TIHv. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting
certain market developments with potential systemic risk concerns).
230. See supra Part I.B (Lesson 4, discussing the challenges of regulatory capacity).
231. See id. (Lesson 3, relating to human fragilities and incentives).
232. See id. (Lesson 6, discussing the challenges for international regulatory cooperation).
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opened by the GFC in the “Regulatory Sine Curve” highlighted by John
Coffee.233 While there is debate on the merits of regulatory changes born
out of market crisis, this phenomenon is a pertinent reminder of the need to
avoid complacency as the economy continues to recover.234
According to Coffee, the Regulatory Sine Curve drives the intensity of
financial regulatory oversight, which rises following market crisis and falls
as the markets and society regain normalcy resulting from waning public
support for regulation needed to counter powerful interest groups.235 This is
especially relevant to hedge fund regulatory reforms, given the information
asymmetry arising from the complex investment strategies, and its powerful
industry organizations.236 Opposing forces to further regulatory initiatives
can be expected to build as public calls for regulation quiets.237
The foreseeable waning support for reform is particularly troublesome
juxtaposed against growing risk-appetite in the financial markets. Evidence
of the return to boom-era high yield corporate and other debt instruments,
such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs), along with resurgent asset-backed securities, like
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), have continued to sound
alarms.238 The more constrained banking sector also creates incentives for
233. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 COR. L. REV. 1019, 1029–37 (2012).
234. See id. at 1029 (addressing opposing views on reforms born out of crisis). Cf. Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521 (2005); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper
No. 442, 2012). The debate on the merits and circumstances surrounding crisis-driven reforms,
and the appropriate measures to address them, are outside of the scope of this Article.
235. See Coffee, supra note 233, at 1029–30 (“The standard cyclical progression along the
Regulatory Sine Curve from intense to lax enforcement is driven by a basic asymmetry between
the power, resources, and organization of the latent group (i.e., investors) and the interest groups
affected by the specific legislation.”). See also Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 4
UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1936–40 (2012) (considering the problem and implications of the sine curve
of financial regulation).
236. This is evidenced by their active participation throughout the recent regulatory reform
process. See Susan Pulliam & Tom McGinty, Hedge Funds Boost Profile in Lobbying, WALL ST.
J. (June 22, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124562579691335609 (noting the
increased involvement of the hedge fund industry in the regulatory process since the onset of the
crisis, with its lobbying expenditure rising to $6.1 million in 2008, 7 times the average spending of
$897,000 between 2003 and 2006, according to figures from the Center for Responsive Politics).
237. See, e.g., Kathleen Casey, REGULATION: Regulatory Changes in Key Markets, HEDGE
FUND INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 12, 2013),
http://www.hedgefundintelligence.com/Article/3189491/REGULATION-Regulatory-changes-in-
key-markets.html (arguing against including hedge funds in the shadow banking regulatory
efforts).
238. Such developments in the financial markets underline the importance of continued
monitoring and analysis to assess the return to leverage in the financial system. See, e.g., IOSCO,
SECURITIES MARKETS RISK OUTLOOK, supra note 26, at 44–45, 44 n.55, 45 fig.26 (noting a rise
in the issuances of CDOs and that issuances of high yield corporate bonds reached record levels
globally in 2012); IOSCO, 2014-15 RISK OUTLOOK, supra note 27, at 55–57, 62–64 (highlighting
a resurgence of high yielding products over the last few years); Tracy Alloway, Bundled Debt
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new financial activities and products to meet investors’ “search for yield” in
the prolonged low interest rate environment.239 With the vacuum created by
banks exiting business segments due to newly implemented restrictions,
such as the Volcker Rule, regulation of non-banks filling that gap takes on
greater importance.240 Sustaining public engagement will be crucial to
combat complacency, which requires keeping the dialogue open and
comprehensible. Alan Blinder prescribed a “Seven-Step Rehab Program”
for policy makers based on the lessons from the crisis which includes
communication in plain and understandable language.241 The proposed
paradigm has potential to fill this much-needed prescription.
As financial headlines suggest, hedge funds are among the non-bank
entities to assume businesses rendered too risky or costly to banks by higher
prudential requirements.242 These areas include: lending activities to
middle-market companies,243 which contribute to the growth of the credit
hedge fund segment; activities involving non-qualified mortgages under the
new rules;244 and market-making and trading activities from the exit of sell-
side proprietary traders in the banks.245 Accordingly, such expanding
opportunities in the shadow banking system may alter the systemic impact
Demand Reaching Levels of Height of Crisis, FIN. TIMES (May 18, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63ca5748-daea-11e3-9a27-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BBjHqf2H;
Eliot Brown, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Make Comeback WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/commercial-mortgage-backed-securities-make-comeback-
1421175548.
239. See, e.g., CITI REPORT, PART 1, supra note 44, at 26–27, 45–47 (describing post-crisis
development of investment strategies and financial products to meet demand from institutional
and retail investors).
240. See, e.g., Tom Stabile, Hedge Fund Frontier Likes New Regulation Landscape, FIN. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/87552838-73d3-11e3-a0c0-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BZ4hsFiI.
241. BLINDER, supra note 45, at 438–41 (“Say It in Language That Ordinary People Can
Understand”).
242. Lisa Abramowicz et. al., Hedge Funds Rush Into Debt Trading with $108 Billion,
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/hedge-funds-rush-to-
debt-trading-where-wall-street-tread.html (pointing to shadow-banking firms filling in as lenders
and highlighting the rapid growth of debt-focused hedge funds).
243. See Tracy Alloway, Competition for Banking Business Lurks in the Shadows, FIN. TIMES
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/19a3ee84-7ed0-11e3-8642-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3O6NqLyaX (reporting that gaps left by commercial lenders retreating
from middle-market companies is being filled by hedge funds, among others).
244. See Tracy Alloway, US Lenders Return to Securitized Mortgages, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e41cae-97e9-11e3-ab60-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3O6NqLyaX (highlighting opportunities for entities like hedge funds in
the non-qualified mortgage space).
245. See CITI INVESTOR SERVS., OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR HEDGE FUNDS IN THE
COMING ERA OF OPTIMIZATION—PART 2: CHANGES DRIVEN BY REGULATION 57 (2014),
available at https://www.citibank.com/mss/docs/citi_2014_spring_survey_part_2.pdf.
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of hedge funds and require re-evaluation for further regulation.246 Other
trends in the hedge fund industry also deserve a closer look, including
expansions in investment strategies,247 shifts in investor base,248 and
growing concentration in large funds.249 For example, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) recently identified “brand risks” resulting from the
concentration of investment assets—whereby sharp drawdowns in one fund
can propagate redemptions across funds managed by the same firm based
on investors’ perception of brand quality of the asset management firm—to
be a financial stability risk amplifying feature of asset management
funds.250 The foregoing developments warrant continuous close monitoring
to assess hedge funds’ systemic risk potential as market conditions evolve.
Having identified outstanding issues for hedge fund regulation in the
above broad regulatory agenda, a policy focus going forward can be
formulated. In furtherance of the international soft law reform process, the
overarching goal is guided by the G20’s “Framework for Strong,
Sustainable and Balanced Growth.”251 To achieve this, regulation should
ensure appropriate trade-offs between shadow banking’s economic benefits
246. See Sam Fleming & Patrick Jenkins, BoE’s Tucker Warns on Shadow Banking Risk, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/38763856-3747-11e3-9603-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3O6NqLyaX.
247. See, e.g., Sam Jones, Credit Hedge Fund CQS Moves into Equities, FIN. TIMES (June 4,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aff3f970-cd31-11e2-9efe-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3O6NqLyaX (reporting on the move into equities by CQS, Europe’s
biggest credit hedge fund by AUM).
248. See AIMA, BEYOND 60/40: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF HEDGE FUNDS IN INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR PORTFOLIOS 4, 6 (2013), available at
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/sites/default/files/aima-beyond-60-40-report.pdf (noting
continued strong growth of hedge funds’ institutional investors); CITI REPORT, PART 1, supra note
44 (noting hedge funds’ diversification to new segments of investors through the retail market via
multi-alternative mutual funds or single-manager “closed-end interval funds”). Such expansion
into more retail-focused markets may also prompt reconsideration of hedge fund regulation on the
basis of investor protection.
249. See Eric Uhlfelder & Jonathan Kanterman, Hedge Funds: Mediocre Performance Fails to
Stop Gush of New Money, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2014), available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8c9204ca-67d9-11e3-a905-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3O6NqLyaX
(citing findings by HedgeFund Intelligence that, as of the first half of 2013, 11 US-based firms are
each managing more than $20 billion and that more than two-thirds of all hedge fund assets are
controlled by the group of 287 managers with assets over $1 billion). See also supra notes 41–44
and accompanying text (noting trend for growth concentration in large firms). A similar trend
towards concentration of holdings in big firms is also found in the greater asset management
industry. See IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 33, 33 n.32.
250. See IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 33 (identifying features of funds
investing in credit instruments that could result in elevated financial stability risks—“[t]hese
features could exacerbate the feedback loop between negative fund performance and outflows
from the sector, leading to further pressure on prices and the risk of runs on funds . . . .”).
251. G20 LEADERS, LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT
(2009)[hereinafter G20 PITTSBURGH DECLARATION], available at
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Pittsburgh_Declaration.pdf
(launching this policy framework at the Summit).
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and its potential systemic risks for a positive contribution to the real
economy. It requires improvement in the transparency and resilience of this
parallel banking sector, including hedge funds’ role in it.252 Therefore, the
regulatory objective for hedge fund policy can be conceived as follows: To
establish an evolving regulatory framework that supports a more
transparent and resilient global shadow banking system as a
“sustainable source of market-based finance.”253 As stated, this
regulatory objective is consistent with the G20’s goal for shadow banking
reform and the proposed paradigm complements the current reform process
addressing systemic risk in this parallel banking realm.254
II. HEDGE FUND POLICY PARADIGM: A POST-CRISIS
SYNTHESIS
A. NORMATIVE BASIS
The preceding discussion provides a backdrop for the regulatory task to
safeguard global financial stability and its implications for hedge funds.
This Article does not purport to be a comprehensive review of scholarship
and data in developing the hedge fund regulatory proposal.255 Instead, it
presents a thought experiment to meet the regulatory policy objective
established above by addressing the informational, substantive, practical
and political challenges that remain for hedge funds in the shadow banking
space. Towards this end, I propose a targeted and balanced policy paradigm
for hedge funds, which facilitates the analysis of a spectrum of potential
risks and responses along continuums using the RCM.256 This approach
reframes the multi-layered and complex issues of hedge fund regulation
into basic concepts of trade-offs for ongoing regulatory dialogue.
252. See Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the FSB, Taking Shadow
Banking out of the Shadows to Create Sustainable Market-Based Finance 3 (June 16, 2014),
available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech740.pdf (setting
the goal of replacing “a shadow banking system prone to excess and collapse with one that
contributes to strong, sustainable balanced growth of the world economy”).
253. Id. at 2.
254. See id. (stating that the aim of shadow banking reform has been to “deliver a transparent,
resilient, sustainable source of market-based financing for real economies”); see also FSB,
SHADOW BANKING ROADMAP, supra note 98, at 1 (“Transforming shadow banking into resilient
market-based financing has been one of the core elements of the FSB’s regulatory reform agenda .
. . [as well as] build[ing] safer, more sustainable sources of financing for the real economy”).
255. Consistent with the stated position on leveraging and complementing developments in the
current international soft law system, this Article places greater emphasis on work by national and
international bodies involved in such reform processes, such as the FSB and the FSOC in the
United States. See also qualification in supra note 9.
256. See infra Part IV (setting out the premises, structure and functions for the RCM).
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Although the underpinning concepts of trade-offs and continuums are
not novel, their use in the proposal aligns with the goal of reducing
complexity and increasing accessibility. I draw on the often-used notion of
continuums where a spectrum of intervention may be appropriate depending
on the circumstances and resource constraints.257 As the proposed paradigm
is based on continual trade-offs necessitated by regulation, it can be
conceptualized as two continuums of regulation in terms of the level of
government intervention and the extent of their prescriptiveness. Each of
these aspects of regulation can be represented graphically by a Regulatory
Intensity Continuum (RIC) and a Regulatory Approach Continuum (RAC),
respectively, combined to form the RCM.
The normative basis for this thought experiment is a synthesis of certain
post-crisis experiences. In formulating a forward-looking policy to address
hedge funds’ regulatory challenges, I incorporate lessons learned from the
GFC and argue that the interplay of ideals underpinning some prevalent
developments and concepts around the recent crisis can be synthesized to
make the case for the proposed paradigm—one that is evolving, responsive,
inclusive, and consistent with existing international regulatory landscape in
meeting the stated regulatory objective for hedge funds. The following
discussion expands on these four elements: GFC lessons, the international
soft law system, PBR, and inclusive capitalism.
1. GFC Lessons
Bearing in mind the regulatory objective and the outstanding issues for
reform, the proposed paradigm builds on three basic concepts gleaned from
the lessons of the GFC:258 (i) regulation necessitates making trade-offs
among regulatory objectives; (ii) we cannot regulate what we do not
understand; and (iii) “A global crisis requires a global solution.” 259 The
first premise reflects the fundamental economic principle that “people face
trade-offs,”260 which extends to government policy-making.261 Since there is
257. This is evident in various aspects of society, such as addressing the range of student needs
in public education within staffing and budgetary constraints.
258. See supra Part I.B (discussing lessons of the GFC).
259. G20 LEADERS, LONDON SUMMIT—LEADERS’ STATEMENT ¶ 2 (2009), available at
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/London_Declaration_0.pdf
(emphasis added). Note, however, that while this statement appears simple and logical, whether
and how a “global solution” can be achieved is complex and controversial, as demonstrated by
differences in the United States’ and United Kingdom’s handling of big bank failures. See, e.g.,
Gillian Tett, Regulators Should Say Who Calls the Shots, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d49b72f2-9ee7-11e3-8663-00144feab7de.html#axzz3QKZkMj48.
260. GREGORYMANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 4 (7th ed. 2014) (listing this as the first of
ten principles of economics).
261. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM—RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 130 (2012) (stating that “[f]inancial regulation involves various
trade-offs . . . .”).
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“no regulatory free lunch,” policy decisions involve balancing trade-offs on
regulatory goals.262 In hindsight, many of the choices made between
conflicting goals contributed to the GFC.263 The second assertion is another
truism that is underscored by the opaque and complex financial products
and markets exposed in the GFC. Specifically, the convoluted and ever-
changing layers in the shadow banking system require an adaptive
regulatory approach. The final contention is borrowed from the Leaders’
Declaration at the 2009 G20 London Summit to highlight the need for
international cooperation and coordination in financial regulations.264
Domestic hedge fund regulatory reform will need to account for the
interplay with the international soft law system.265
2. International Soft Law System
The presence of global governance tied together by government
networks came to prominence over the course of the 1990s.266 In the
financial sector, these networks were formed in response to market
conditions and filled the need for international coordination and regulatory
gaps on a global level, such that their standards and principles developed
into a form of international financial governance.267 Due to space
constraints, below is a cursory view of the role of such soft law regime in
guiding the global financial system through the recent financial crisis.268
262. See MANKIW, supra note 260 (noting that “[m]aking decisions require trading off one goal
against another”).
263. See supra Part I.B (discussing lessons of the GFC and the trade-offs made leading up to
the crisis).
264. See supra note 259. See also JOSEPH STIGLITZ ET AL., THE STIGLITZ REPORT: REFRAMING
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN THE WAKE OF THE GLOBAL
CRISIS 195–97 (2010) [hereinafter STIGLITZ REPORT] (stressing the importance of collective
global response to the crisis and highlighting the shortcomings of the existing political institutions
to do so); IOSCO HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7–8; GROUP OF
THIRTY PLAN, supra note 204, at 37–38; DE LAROSIÈRE REPORT, supra note 204, at 59 (all
expressing agreement on the importance of international coordination and cooperation).
265. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the soft law development through the international post-
GFC reform efforts).
266. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies,
and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1042–45 (2003) (examining the
phenomenon of global governance through government networks and the issues and concerns
connected with their rising importance in the shift from “government” to “governance”). See
generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEWWORLDORDER (2004).
267. For example, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), predecessor to the FSB, was created by
the Group of Seven industrial countries to address the threats of financial instability following the
Asian crisis of 1997-1998. See FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ (last
visited Jan. 3, 2015). FSB’s structure continues to be refined in a review of its framework of
representation reported at the 2014 G20 Brisbane Summit. See FSB, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS
2014, supra note 209, at 43–44. See also DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 61, ch. 3 (discussing
significant financial regulatory organizations).
268. For insightful and comprehensive coverage on this system of international financial law,
see BRUMMER, supra note 261.
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The soft law system facilitated post-GFC reforms led by the G20 in
coordinating high-level principles and tasking international organizations
(e.g., the FSB) and standard setters to follow through with the assessment,
recommendation, and national implementation of these initiatives. This
globalized regulatory landscape is of particular importance to hedge funds
since their organization and activities span across borders. As discussed
later, the rising role of soft law in financial regulation will also impact the
balance between principles and rules in regulatory approaches.269
Since the initial 2008 G20 Washington Summit, numerous initiatives
have been coordinated and undertaken in such international networks, with
the G20 designated as the premier forum for international economic
cooperation in this global architecture.270 The G20 also launched a
“Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth” to develop a
coordinated process for setting policy objectives, submitting proposed
domestic policies and plans to achieve these objectives and collectively
assess the progress.271
The reform initiatives steered by such transnational networks set the
direction and guided the course to monitor, supervise and mitigate systemic
risks in various aspects of the global financial system, including the shadow
banking sector.272 At the request of the G20 Leaders at the Seoul Summit in
2010,273 the FSB took the lead in examining shadow bank systemic risk
concerns and developing recommendations to bolster the supervision and
regulation of the industry.274 Since then, the FSB has (i) established task
forces and workstreams to analyze these issues,275 (ii) collaborated with
applicable international standard-setters, like IOSCO, (iii) generated
preliminary reports, (iv) invited and incorporated comments through public
consultations, and (v) issued final recommendations on the shadow banking
framework.276 Most recently, FSB’s Roadmap for further work to
269. See infra Parts II.A.3 and III.C (discussing principles based regulation and the
considerations for the RAC).
270. See G20 PITTSBURGH DECLARATION, supra note 251, ¶ 19, 10–13 (providing the re-
established FSB with a broadened mandate to coordinate and monitor the reform efforts
underway, along with more legitimate and effective roles for the IMF and World Bank). See also
supra Part I.D.2 (describing the role of soft law in the recent financial reform process).
271. G20 PITTSBURGHDECLARATION, supra note 251, at 2, 5–7, 22–23.
272. See BRUMMER, supra note 261, at 236–38 (describing the post-GFC global regulatory
system relating to shadow banking).
273. G20 LEADERS, THE SEOUL SUMMIT DOCUMENT ¶ 41 (2010), available at
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Seoul_Summit_Document.pdf.
274. See FSB, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS 2014, supra note 209 (reporting to the G20 regarding
progress on global policy development and reform implementation).
275. FSB 2011 SHADOWBANKING RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 139, at 1.
276. These final recommendations were endorsed at the 2013 Saint Petersburg Summit. See
G20 LEADERS, LEADERS’ DECLARATION—SAINT PETERSBURG SUMMIT ¶ 76 (2013),
available at
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG
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strengthen oversight and regulation of shadow banking was endorsed by the
G20 at the November 2014 Brisbane Summit.277 Going forward, the FSB is
centrally placed in this soft law regime for the international coordination
and oversight functions necessary to address systemic risk.278
The progression in the soft law system can also provide channels for the
law to harden. In many cases, international financial standards have
crystalized to have the same effect as law through market forces or by their
explicit adoption into national laws. The adoption of Basel II, Basel 2.5,
and Basel III is a prominent example.279 Compliance with these standards is
made more transparent and enhanced by the peer review processes of
members in the transnational networks, such as IMF’s Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP).280 As illustrated in Part III.D, the RCM can
_0.pdf; FSB, SHADOW BANKING ROADMAP, supra note 98, ann. (setting out the agreed course of
action for outstanding issues in shadow banking reforms). For the series of works published by the
FSB in this regard, see generally FIN. STABILITY BD., SHADOW BANKING: SCOPING THE ISSUES—
A BACKGROUND NOTE OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf; FSB 2011 SHADOW BANKING
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 139; FSB INTERIM REPORT ON REPOS, supra note 161; FSB
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REPOS, supra note 187; FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING
OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING—A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR
STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES (2012),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118a.pdf; FIN. STABILITY
BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING—AN INTEGRATED
OVERVIEW OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (2012) [hereinafter FSB CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT—OVERVIEW], available at,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118.pdf; FSB 2013
RECOMMENDATIONS—OVERVIEW, supra note 140; FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING
OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING—POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING
SHADOW BANKING RISKS IN SECURITIES LENDING AND REPOS (2013) [hereinafter FSB 2013
RECOMMENDATIONS—REPOS], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829b.pdf; FSB 2013
RECOMMENDATIONS: SHADOWBANKING ENTITIES, supra note 15.
277. See FSB, SHADOW BANKING ROADMAP, supra note 98; G20 BRISBANE COMMUNIQUÉ,
supra note 98, ¶ 12.
278. For an overview of the FSB’s ongoing reform work in the global financial sector, see FIN.
STABILITY BD., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (2015), available at www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/First-FSB-Annual-Report.pdf. The FSB can continue to establish policy
implementation timetables and oversee the review and reporting process under its Coordination
Framework for Monitoring the Implementation of Agreed G20/FSB Financial Reforms. See FIN.
STABILITY BD., A COORDINATION FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
AGREED G20/FSB FINANCIAL REFORMS (2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111017.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS




279. Julia Black & David Rouch, The Development of the Global Markets as Rule-Makers:
Engagement and Legitimacy, 2 L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 218, 224 (2008).
280. BRUMMER, supra note 261, at 278 (positing that soft law can evoke hard law under the
right circumstances and citing examples of reforms in the international surveillance and
monitoring process).
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capture the position of hedge fund regulatory approach in broad terms,
which offers a national overview, facilitates comparisons and complements
such soft law developments.
The current international soft law regime also provides important
perspective for the appropriate balance on the RAC. As between principles
and rules, a more principles-based regulatory approach would be
complementary and conducive to the development of international financial
regulation governance,281 as well as support progress for mutual recognition
and harmonization. It is easier to compare and adopt broad principles than
specific rules, as seen from the financial reform process under the G20,
which began with five common principles for financial reform.282
National regulatory policy for hedge funds should utilize the soft law
system to maximize its effectiveness in safeguarding global financial
stability. The brief account above illustrates the importance of the
international governance system in curtailing and repairing the damages of
the GFC,283 as well as the role of soft law guiding post-crisis regulatory
reforms on the domestic front. However, notwithstanding the significance
of these international reform efforts, they are subject to the precarious and
voluntary nature of an informal soft law system.
The globalized financial markets necessitate trade-offs between
regulatory cooperation, to function with stability, and national competitive
advantage, to ensure thriving domestic economies. The international soft
law system may be able to bridge the divides and straddle the fluctuations
of priorities over time—a potentiality subject to further study.
3. Principles-Based Regulation
Conceptualizing regulation in the form of a continuum is widely used in
the context of principles and rules-based discourse, and the extensive
academic scholarship on the topic forms the foundation for the RAC
proposed here.284 The traditional debate has come to recognize that
281. See Cristie Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 46 AM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2008) (arguing that the new governance approach is a
necessary complement to effective principles-based securities regulation).
282. See G20 WASHINGTON DECLARATION, supra note 83, at 2–3 (committing to common
principles for financial reform).
283. See DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SYSTEM WORKED: HOW THE WORLD STOPPED ANOTHER
GREAT DEPRESSION ch. 2 (2014) (discussing the positive contributions made by these global
economic governance institutions).
284. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of
“Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 1411, 1492 (2007) (“Rules and principles are imperfect categories to describe individual
legal or accounting provisions. While some provisions may fit neatly into such categories, rational
systems of law or accounting partake of both types, resulting in hybrids located along a
continuum.”); Ford, supra note 281, at 8–9; Coffee & Sale, supra note 72, at 752–53 (arguing that
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principles and rules are not separate and distinct, but rather may overlap and
function on a continuum.285 Even the former U.K. Financial Services
Authority (FSA),286 a principles-based financial regulator, acknowledged
that its 11 core principles of only 194 words are supplemented by a very
large rulebook of 8,500 pages.287 This supports the view taken here that
rules are derived from principles. In this way, the concept of a continuum
facilitates the decision on how many rules are necessary to supplement the
principles in each case. The application of this view can be represented as
points on the RAC. For example, the PWG Principles on systemic risk
provide broad principles for appropriate and effective counterparty risk-
management, which are more on the principles end of the continuum.288 On
the other hand, the new disclosure requirements prescribing the reporting of
RAUM under Form PF289 fall more on the rules end of the RAC.
From this perspective, the formulation of a regulatory approach is not
one of principles-based versus rules-based, but more of a re-balancing of
principles and rules to best achieve the regulatory objectives in the specific
context.290 Therefore, from the extreme ends of the spectrum of the RAC,
adjustments for the balance of principles and rules along the continuum are
made as appropriate for the circumstances and application. By
conceptualizing such mix of regulatory approaches as points on the
continuum, its classification transcends what Lawrence Cunningham refers
to as false dichotomies of binary labels.291 Using the RAC for this exercise
involves a combination of trade-offs in a multi-factored evaluation as
illustrated in Part III.C.
“most systems are really combinations of the two, with the major difference being the location of
the system’s center of gravity in one or the other system”).
285. See Cristie L. Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global
Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257, 266 (2010) (asserting that “[r]ules and principles are also
best understood as points on a continuum rather than discrete concepts, and there is a good deal of
overlap and convergence among them”).
286. Under the post-crisis regulatory structural reforms in the United Kingdom, the FSA has
now become two separate regulatory authorities, The Financial Conduct Authority and The
Prudential Regulation Authority.
287. See Callum McCarthy, Chairman, FSA, Speech Delivered at the British American
Business London Insight Series and Financial Services Forum: Financial Regulation: Myth and
Reality 1–2 (Feb. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0213_cm.shtml.
288. See, e.g., PWG PRINCIPLES, supra note 200, ¶ 7.1 (“Creditors and counterparties should
undertake appropriate and effective due diligence before extending credit to a private pool of
capital and on an ongoing basis thereafter.”).
289. See Form PF, supra note 17 (setting out provisions for RAUM calculation).
290. See Cunningham, supra note 284, at 1470 (“The issue is . . . whether a rule or principle is
superior for a given situation, an outcome that depends on trade-offs (such as certainty versus
context), how rules and principles are applied, and how they interact.”). See also Ford, supra note
285, at 266–267 (referencing the examination of precision in statutory drafting and the balance
between rules and principles based on decisions about priorities and concerns).
291. See Cunningham, supra note 284, at 1492–1493.
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While there is general agreement on the strengths and weaknesses of
each approach in the rich literature on the subject, the application of such
features to determine their relative superiority is far less obvious due to
internal conflicts and contextual dependency.292 Consequently, the choice
between rules and principles entails trade-offs in both effectiveness and
implementation costs.293 Rules provide for precision and certainty, which
improve transparency, but by design can only cover known or anticipated
circumstances. Therefore, the rules-based approach is ill-equipped to adapt
to changing market conditions and may quickly become outdated. In
comparison, broad principles can be interpreted to incorporate the
applicable context and better stand the test of time. The flexibility and
responsiveness to evolving markets and products offered by a principles-
based approach are the primary reasons for endorsing its use in securities
regulation.
Another reason for the ascendance of a principles-based approach is its
effects on the mind-set of the regulated to foster a “culture of
compliance.”294 By placing the onus on the regulated entities to determine
how to achieve the outcomes set out by principles, they also become more
accountable for the compliance decisions made. However, flexibility and
discretion come at the price of inconsistency and unpredictability, which are
undesirable for market operations. Finally, as seen in the GFC, principles
can be more susceptible to manipulation in its interpretation, thereby
increasing the difficulties and costs of enforcement.
292. See, e.g., Julia Black et al., Making a Success of Principles Based Regulation, 1 L. & FIN.
MARKETS REV.191, 193–96, 200–04 (2007) (addressing the benefits and drawbacks of principles-
based regulatory approach and identifying eight “critical success factors”); Cristie Ford,
PRINCIPLES-BASED SECURITIES REGULATION 27–30 (2009), available at
http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
studies/Principles%20Based%20Securities%20Regulation%20-%20Ford.English.pdf (considering
the balance between rules and principles in statutory drafting); Ford, supra note 281, at 8
(referencing literature on various aspects of the principles versus rules debate in footnotes 25–32).
See also Cunningham, supra note 284, at 1423–1425, 1425 n.41 (observing the lack of agreement
on the relative trade-offs of each approach in literature: “Indeed, rules may provide more certainty
for contexts that are simple, stable, and involve small stakes, but less certainty when addressed to
complex, dynamic, high-stakes contexts”).
293. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 284, at 1424 n.34; (“In general, rules are more costly
than principles to create, while principles can impose higher compliance costs.”).
294. See, e.g., Erinn B. Broshko. & Kai Li, Corporate Governance Requirements in Canada
and the United States: A Legal and Empirical Comparison of the Principles-Based and Rules-
Based Approaches 10 (Sauder Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892708. Authors Broshko and Li conducted a
comparison of the “principles-based” versus “rules-based” corporate governance regimes in
Canada and the U.S. and noted this conclusion from the debates of legal literature.
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4. Inclusive Capitalism
The proposed paradigm also draws inspiration from the ideals of
“inclusive capitalism” as spearheaded by the Inclusive Capitalism Initiative
(ICI). This initiative began as a post-GFC response to build a case for
capitalism that is inclusive in providing economic opportunities and shared
prosperity.295 The envisioned paragon serves as a unifying theme for the
preceding three rationales of the proposed paradigm. To begin, its inception
resulted from disillusionment in capitalism and breakdown of public trust
following the events of the GFC. The crisis also underscored the
interdependence of global economies and raised the stature of the soft law
system. Finally, remedies to the malaises of pre-crisis style capitalism
require a renewal that includes “broad participation over narrow
patronage”296 and fosters a sense of individual responsibility for systemic
ramifications of their actions. Such goals recommend a more principles-
based regulatory approach where appropriate.
The above discussion highlights aspects of inclusive capitalism relevant
to the formulation of the proposed paradigm. First, it represents a
rebalancing of market fundamentalism and government intervention in the
financial system, which takes us back to the premise of trade-offs for the
proposal herein. Second, the basis for inclusive capitalism is consistent with
the G20 goals under its “Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced
Growth.”297 By recognizing the extent of global interdependence, we can
better evaluate trade-offs entailed by political policy and regulation.298 Such
evaluation is further aided by open and continued dialogue with the
stakeholders.
The proposed paradigm seeks to reframe the analysis of hedge funds’
systemic risk potential through the use of the RCM and expanded
295. McKinsey & Co., TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM (2012), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/global_locations/europe_and_middleeast/united_kingdom/en/latest_thi
nking/renewing_capitalism (setting out the blueprint for the initiative to address societal
inequalities and “promote a debate about the benefits of capitalism and how to share those benefits
with as many people as possible.”). See also Conference on Inclusive Capitalism: Building Value,
Renewing Trust, May 27, 2014, London, hosted by the Lord Mayor of the City of London and
E.L. Rothschild and organized by The Inclusive Capitalism Initiative and the Financial Times,
http://www.inc-cap.com/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). Note that the initiative is subject to critics
who question its motives and intended goals. However, further consideration of the concept of,
and scholarship on, “inclusive capitalism” is outside the scope of this Article.
296. See Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, IMF, Economic Inclusion and Financial
Integrity—an Address to the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism 2 (May 27, 2014), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/052714.htm.
297. See id. at 2 (speaking of inclusion in economic growth and integrity in the financial system
as two dimensions of the quest for inclusive capitalism).
298. See Conference on Inclusive Capitalism, supra note 295. President Clinton spoke about
defining the terms of interdependence and the connection to the success of cooperative societies.
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participation in building a “financial interpretive community.”299 This
paradigm suggests a new way to view complexity and how to deal with its
implications. Further, the broader constituents in this widened “financial
interpretive community”—bridging the viewpoints of industry, market
participants, regulators, experts and other stakeholders300—can also reframe
the assessment of inherent risk-reward trade-offs of finance in the context
of the broader system. Accomplishing these possibly lofty, but imperative
aspirations, can help rebuild public trust in a financial system that supports
businesses benefiting the real economy. For example, where shadow
banking fills funding gaps left by banks to finance projects that serve a
public good, it furthers the function of inclusive capitalism towards the goal
of building a “sustainable source of market-based finance.”301
The Article takes the position that international cooperation under the
current soft law system, as well as the regulatory aims of PBR and inclusive
capitalism, are desirable underpinnings for financial reforms to address the
lessons of the GFC.302 Together, the synthesis of aspects of these ideologies
and GFC lessons forms the normative basis of the proposed paradigm for
hedge fund regulation. The shift to a more effective version of capitalism
can begin by reducing complexity to (i) improve knowledge and
understanding of systemic risk, and (ii) facilitate broader participation in the
regulatory and market discipline process. An effectual “interpretive
community”303 envisioned under PBR can foster greater social
consciousness for the financial world. As aptly stated by Mark Carney, the
Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the FSB, “[a] sense of self
must be accompanied by a sense of the systemic.”304
B. HEDGE FUND POLICY PARADIGM
Based on the analyses set out above, I present a thought experiment
using the proposed policy paradigm to supplement the current financial
reform agenda. This proposal is developed in four steps: (1) establish
policy goals and identify regulatory deficiencies in the shadow banking
system; (2) target regulation as needed; (3) determine appropriate balance
299. Modifying the reference to “interpretive community” in PBR by highlighting the inclusion
of experts in finance across disciplines, such as law and economics. See infra note 404 and
accompanying text describing the original term.
300. See id.
301. Consistent with the regulatory objective set out in Part I.D.3. See supra note 253 and
accompanying text.
302. See supra Part I.B (highlighting GFC lessons addressed by the proposed paradigm).
303. See infra note 404 and accompanying text (noting the role of an “interpretive community”
in PBR).
304. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, Speech at the Conference on Inclusive
Capitalism: Creating a Sense of the Systemic 5 (May 27, 2014), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech731.pdf.
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of regulatory intensity and approach in meeting the established objectives;
and (4) construct a process for ongoing evaluation and adjustment of
regulation.
Step 1. Establish policy goals and identify areas in need of
regulation: systemic risk mitigation in the shadow banking
system
The first step in simplifying the complex task of hedge fund regulation
is to go to the core of the matter: the role of regulation.305 As noted earlier,
the prolonged debate over whether to regulate hedge funds reflects the
inherent tension between market fundamentalism and regulation.
Regulatory intervention is needed to correct demonstrated failures from the
GFC and rebalance market predominance in the pre-crisis period.
Greenwald and Stiglitz established that the markets cannot be pareto
efficient when there is always imperfect information or incomplete
markets.306 The scope and depth of financial turmoil exhibited in the last
crisis underscored the pervasiveness of externalities307 that renders
inefficient or unstable results left solely to market operations.308 The
problem of the “tragedy of the commons”309 also distorts individual
decisions on risk and return trade-offs, resulting in suboptimal systemic
consequences. According to Nobel laureate, Joseph Stiglitz, addressing
externalities and agency problems undermining the efficiency of markets is
one of the rationales for financial market regulation.310
Accordingly, two principal justifications for regulatory intervention in
this case are to: (i) guard against systemic risks;311 and (ii) correct
information asymmetries in the markets.312 The new adviser registration
requirements address some concerns with information asymmetries arising
from the industry’s opacity and complexity, although efficacy of the
reforms remains to be seen. Consistent with the regulatory objective
formulated above,313 this leaves systemic risk concerns as the current
305. Pan, supra note 235, at 1902–18 (reviewing academic literature on regulation and
describing basic components of financial regulation).
306. Stiglitz, supra note 60, at 16.
307. See STIGLITZ, supra note 49, at 15 (explaining that, in economics, “externality refers to
situations where a market exchange imposes costs or benefits on others who aren’t party to the
exchange”).
308. STIGLITZ REPORT, supra note 264, at 197.
309. See Schwarcz, supra note 67 and accompanying text.
310. STIGLITZ, supra note 49, at 15.
311. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the sources, transmission and detrimental effects of
systemic risk on global financial stability).
312. DAVIES&GREEN, supra note 61, at 15–24.
313. See supra Part I.D.3.
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regulatory focus, specifically those deriving from the shadow banking
system. 314
Step 2. Target regulation as needed: the SRBC
This step is the “targeted” aspect of the paradigm by limiting hedge
fund regulation to the identified areas from Step 1 above. The multifaceted
question of whether hedge funds pose shadow banking risks requiring
further regulation will be considered along the SBRC in Part III.A.
Step 3. Balance competing interests in calibrating the
regulatory intensity and approach to best meet regulatory
objectives: the RIC and the RAC
This step is the “balanced” feature of the paradigm in evaluating the
economic benefits of hedge funds against the systemic risks they may
entail, as well as the merits of the principles versus rules regulatory
approaches. The RIC and RAC are tools to represent the balance struck
among the respective trade-offs involved. For hedge funds, the pre-crisis
desired balance favored their economic value over mitigating the apparently
contained systemic risk. The post-crisis balance of trade-offs in meeting the
established regulatory objective315 is considered in Part III.B using the RIC,
which extends from an unregulated state, dominated by market discipline,
to the other end of a heavily regulated regime.316
The mix of regulatory approach is determined by the RAC, involving a
balance of principles and rules in the context of the global financial system.
In the run up to the GFC, globalization made international competitiveness
a major policy focus, which hailed the more flexible and responsive
principles-based approach as the preferable choice.317 The post-crisis
balance will need to recalibrate the traditional market discipline-based
regulatory approach to hedge funds.
314. See supra Part I.C.3 (examining hedge funds’ potential for systemic risk in the shadow
banking system). Note, however, that while the primary focus of hedge fund regulation at present
is to address systemic risk, investor protection and market integrity concerns can also be
monitored for changes that may require further intervention in those areas by adding to the RIC
factors of consideration.
315. See supra Part I.D.3 and note 253 and accompanying text (outlining the regulatory
objective towards making shadow banking a “sustainable source of market-based finance”).
316. Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States: A
Historian’s View from the Early Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNMENT ANDMARKETS TOWARD
A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 449 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (noting
that “[t]he regulatory experience of the past two generations reinforces the longstanding reality
that regulatory options exist on a continuum between intensive governmental oversight and the
inclination to maintain a much more hands-off approach”).
317. The success of London against the traditionally dominant New York financial center
garnered much praise and support for a principles-based regulatory approach, both in the U.S. and
Canada.
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Step 4. Incorporate process for evaluation and adjustments of
regulation: the RCM
The RIC and RAC are helpful conceptual instruments in determining
the intensity and approach of hedge fund regulation. However, separately,
they are of limited value in delivering a complete assessment of ongoing
regulatory needs. The RCM provides a frame of reference for the findings
on the RIC and RAC. In doing so, it presents a simple visual two-
dimensional representation of hedge fund regulatory analysis.318
The two continuums of regulatory intensity and regulatory approach are
combined to create a matrix of four quadrants in the RCM set out in Figure
1.319 The quadrants are numbered 1 to 4 and capture varying combinations
of the level and prescriptiveness of regulation. Quadrant 1 (Q1)
encompasses a regulatory environment that relies primarily on market
discipline and takes a more principles-based approach.320 Quadrant 2 (Q2)
shares the same level of regulatory intervention as Q1, but shifts towards
the rules-based end of the spectrum. Quadrant 3 (Q3) is subject to greater
regulation compared to the previous two quadrants and exhibits a
principles-dominant regulatory approach.321 Quadrant 4 (Q4) covers the
same environment of regulatory intensity as Q3, but is further governed by
prescriptive rules.
318. The RCM can operate as a visual tool to reveal relationships and trade-offs involved in
hedge fund regulation to provide a valuable supplement to ongoing research on financial stability.
See OFR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 78–83 (discussing visual tools for
understanding financial stability as part of its research agenda).
319. Note that Julia Black also used a four quadrant construction to represent variations of PBR.
Although it shares similarity with the RCM in that they both deal with the role of principles in
regulation, Black’s model is focused on the categorization of the forms of PBR. See Julia Black,
The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles-Based Regulation, in LAW REFORM AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 6–7 (Kern Alexander & Niamh Moloney eds., 2011).
320. This represents the pre-GFC position, where the hedge fund industry faces relatively low
levels of regulation and retains discretion in how to meet the stated best practices/regulatory
objectives.
321. Although government intervention in Q3 is greater than Q1 and Q2, the overall ability of
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III. REGULATORY MECHANISM: THE REGULATORY
CONTINUUMMATRIX
This Article proposes, in broad stroke, a paradigm focused on the big
picture trade-offs involved in regulation and adaptable to changes in the
globalized financial markets. The SBRC, RIC, RAC and RCM are
components of the regulatory mechanism offered to detect, monitor and
manage potential systemic risk. To explicate, the proposed regulatory
mechanism is applied in this Part III to consider systemic risks associated
with CIVs,325 which is part of the FSB’s policy framework for the oversight
and regulation of shadow banking entities.326
Regulatory concerns arise from CIVs’ susceptibility to bank-like runs
from large scale redemption requests, which can lead to contagious fire
sales that spread to other CIVs and possibly to the wider markets with
systemic effects.327 Hedge funds are CIVs as defined in the FSB policy
framework. The question is whether they have features that make them
susceptible to runs, thus displaying shadow banking risks and necessitating
further regulation as recommended therein.
Consistent with a targeted and balanced approach, the RCM is applied
to assess hedge funds’ potential systemic risks as CIVs and uses FSB’s
recommendations to mitigate such runs in the shadow banking system.328
To be sure, this thought experiment is intended to be illustrative, rather than
conclusive, in that the analyses conducted are high-level and the positions
on the continuums and matrix are rudimentary approximations due to their
preliminary nature. Also, the list of considerations concerning the
underlying analysis of the SBRC, RIC and RAC are not exhaustive, nor
have specific metrics and calibration methodology been developed for the
positions thereon. However, substantial work on systemic risk factors has
been done in the current reform process, which can be leveraged for
application in the proposed continuums and matrix, such as those outlined
by IOSCO in “Systemic Risk Identification in Securities Markets.”329 Given
325. For definition of “CIV”, see supra note 15.
326. FSB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS: SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES, supra note 15, at 3–4, 6–7
(recommending a policy framework for the category of “other shadow banking entities”, which
are non-banking financial entities other than MMFs, based on five economic functions, including
CIVs with features that make them susceptible to runs). See also id. at 5 exhibit 1 (providing a
schematic policy framework overview for assessment of CIVs (based on their economic
functions), adoption of policy tools, and sharing of information).
327. Id. at 6–7.
328. Id. at 11–17 (describing overarching principles for the recommended policy toolkits and
such tools within).
329. See IOSCO, Systemic Risk Identification, supra note 101, at 4–7, 9, apps. 1, 2. IOSCO
outlines thirteen categories of systemic risk factors derived from a comparison of the then existing
literature on systemic risk (summarized in Table 4 thereof) to provide a ‘skeleton’ for systemic
risk identification in different jurisdictions and for various markets. In particular, IOSCO applies
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space constraints and the nascent stage of the paradigm, elaboration on the
continuum factors are limited to relevant themes herein. For the same
reasons, applications of the SBRC, RIC and RAC herein are presented as
examples of the trade-off assessments, and not definitive findings regarding
whether hedge funds’ potential systemic risk merits further regulation. The
discussion that follows is, therefore, a view of the forest rather than its
trees—trading in-depth assessment for general understanding to promote
broader open dialogue.
A. SHADOW BANKINGRISKCONTINUUM (SBRC)
The SBRC uses a fine-tuned meaning of “shadow banking” from the
FSB’s two-step definition process330 and incorporates aspects of the
Institute of International Finance’s (IIF) proposal on shadow banking
entities.331 The analysis of “shadow banking” in this narrow sense looks at
what credit intermediation functions are being performed, how closely its
performance mimics the banks’ functions and how it differs, and whether it
is of a scale sufficiently large to be of concern for systemic risk,332 while
taking into consideration its level of leverage.
Applying the paradigm in this example, the analysis for hedge funds
would start with the position that they perform a deposit-taking role in
managing investment assets, and consider whether they can be
differentiated in their performance of credit intermediation. The argument
that hedge funds do not conduct shadow banking functions is often made on
the grounds that they are generally not redeemable on demand and do not
usually carry a guarantee of return on capital at or above par. The issue in
this example is whether the extended regulatory perimeters should include
hedge funds with respect to their potential “run” risk as CIVs. It is
determined by finding the level of such risks on the SBRC and transposing
it onto the RIC to establish the commensurate degree of regulatory
specific thematic indicators relevant to hedge funds from this list to examine the systemic risks of
LTCM as Case Study 1 in Appendix 1. Id. app. 1.
330. The role of international soft law has been significant in focusing the reform efforts, and is
likely to continue to guide the course of further work in strengthening the oversight and regulation
of shadow banking. The proposed paradigm leverages and works within this context for hedge
fund reform. Accordingly, this Article follows the FSB’s approach and analysis of the shadow
banking system in considering hedge funds’ role in this sector. See FSB 2011 SHADOW BANKING
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 139, at 3 and supra notes 139 and 143 and accompanying text
(describing the first step as the broader definition for monitoring purposes and the second step as
the narrowed definition limited to credit intermediation that may increase systemic risk and/or
with indications of regulatory arbitrage).
331. IIF, SHADOW BANKING, supra note 136, at 4, 11–13 (considering whether the extent of
involvement in shadow banking activities is sufficiently significant to be included in the scope of
shadow banking regulation).
332. Id. at 12–13 (setting out the analysis of “shadow banking” in context and with
consideration of the scale and degree of the activity).
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response. Both the analysis and the SBRC risk indicators in Box 1 below
are largely built upon FSB’s substantial work on this subject.333
A facts-based evaluation is required because the diversity in hedge
funds’ industry makeup and investment strategies will have varied
corresponding levels of potential systemic risks. Additionally, hedge funds’
risk profile is dependent on the extent of leverage, investment horizon and
investor liquidity. Such systemic risk variations are replicated in hedge
funds’ role in the shadow banking system, with a broad range of activities
that entail varying resemblance to banking functions across a risk
spectrum.334 For example, credit hedge funds engaged in direct corporate
lending are performing functions more akin to the banking sector than the
industry average.
From this perspective, there is in essence a continuum of shadow
banking risks on which non-bank entities, including hedge funds, may fall
depending on the scale and extent of bank-like functions performed,
together with the degree of potential systemic risk involved.335 This forms
the continuum, SBRC, proposed in the paradigm (see Figure 2).
In this way, assessment of their potential shadow banking risk is better
described as finding the applicable point on the SBRC, which can be
approximated in respect of the entire industry, a specific hedge fund sector,
or an individual hedge fund. Such determination allows regulation to be
implemented only when the industry, sector, or fund, rises to the level of
shadow banking risks meriting intervention. Based on the analysis in Parts I
and II, a non-exhaustive list of shadow banking risk indicators for the
application of SBRC is set out in Box 1.336
333. See supra Part I.C.3 and note 276 (noting FSB’s series of work on shadow banking
reforms).
334. See, e.g., AIMA MARCH 2012 PAPER, supra note 150, at 6–11 (discussing credit hedge
funds in four general investment types of Relative Value Credit, Long-short Credit, Macro Credit,
and Fundamental Credit, with the last category being the most likely to execute near bank
activities through direct lending).
335. See supra notes 139 and 143 and accompanying text (discussing the 2-tiered approach to
defining shadow banks).
336. The extensive body of work regarding systemic risk indicators cannot be covered within
the constraints of this Article, but they provide ample consideration for additional evaluation
factors in refining the SBRC. See, e.g., IOSCO, Systemic Risk Identification, supra note 101, at 4–
7, 5 tbl.3, 6 tbl.4, apps. 1, 2 (summarizing and comparing systemic risk factors and applying the
IOSCO risk identification proposal in the LTCM case study); TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at
39, 47–49; FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9; OFR ASSETMANAGEMENT
REPORT, supra note 9.
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Box 1
1. Bank-like functions without government safety net (credit
intermediation that may increase systemic risk—involving maturity
transformation, leverage; and/or regulatory arbitrage concerns) 337
2. Size338




7. Risks of activity343
On the first risk indicator, hedge funds have argued that they generally
do not play a significant role in the credit intermediation process because
they can avoid mismatched asset and liabilities through contractual liquidity
protections with their investors. However, the level of shadow banking
risks posed by hedge funds may be greater for those hedge funds that
deviate from the average, or if shifts in industry norm occur that reduce
their ability to restrict redemption or structure loans to avoid maturity
337. See supra Part I.C.3, notes 330–332 and accompanying text (referencing the more nuanced
definition of shadow banking for policy purposes).
338. See FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9, at 33 (including size as one
of the indicators for systemic importance); supra note 120 and accompanying text. At present, the
hedge fund industry remains relatively small compared to the banking industry and the rest of the
financial system, especially for the credit hedge fund sub-sector alone.
339. See FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9, at 33–34 (including
interconnectedness as one of the indicators for systemic importance).
340. See FSB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS: SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES, supra note 15, at 6–7
(including CIVs’ investor base as one of the factors of evaluation for their exposure to run risk).
See also TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 72 (naming this as one of three factors of
determination for “bank-like” activity). The institutionalization of hedge funds’ investor base, as
well as the growth of retail focused strategies involving hedge funds, will require continuing
evaluation of the industry’s link to the retail market and the real economy. See , e.g., Joe Morris,
Retail Rush into Alternatives Sounds Alarm, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1099b614-c5c2-11e3-97e4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BBjHqf2H.
341. See FSB & IOSCO, IDENTIFYING NBNI G-SIFI, supra note 9, at 35–36 (including
complexity as an indicator of systemic importance).
342. See supra Part I.B and I.C.3 (discussing systemic risks in the shadow banking sector as a
result of opacity).
343. See FSB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS: SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES, supra note 15, at 6–7
(stating that CIVs’ susceptibility to runs depends on a combination of their business operation
factors).
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mismatch.344 In addition, credit hedge funds involved in direct lending
activities will require closer monitoring.345
As noted previously, on average, hedge funds generally utilize low
levels of leverage, but the degree of utilization varies with their respective
investment strategy and is subject changes in the markets.346 Continued
evaluation of such claim against findings from Form PF disclosure is
necessary.347 Regulators should also monitor the development of hedge
fund instruments and activities to determine if they derive mostly from
efficiencies gained through specialization and expertise rather than the
pursuit of regulatory arbitrage.348 This is especially important in the current
“search for yield” environment set against the backdrop of a constrained
banking sector.
Finally, the existence and extent of potential “bank run” and fire sale
risks from CIVs in the shadow banking system will vary depending on the
nature of their activities and the markets in which they operate, including
the following: the regulatory setting; the CIV’s investor base; the structure
of the CIV; the investment portfolio’s complexity and liquidity; the degree
of leverage; the concentration of the CIV in market segments or
counterparties; and the correlation of assets between those affected by the
run and those held by other CIVs and investors.349 For example, a hedge
fund engaging in an investment strategy or asset class that dominates a
344. For example, the greater presence and negotiating power of institutional investors in the
industry may alter the extent of maturity transformation function performed. But see AIMA
MARCH 2012 PAPER, supra note 150, at 4 (claiming that “direct lending by credit hedge funds is
now done primarily through long lock-up private equity style vehicles”).
345. The general rising trend of non-bank entities engaged in direct lending signals caution to
monitor such shifts in hedge fund investment activities. See IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT, supra
note 6, at 76 Box 2.2 (identifying new shadow banking developments, including increasing direct
corporate lending by non-bank entities, such as investment funds in the United States: “the
nonbank share of leveraged lending rose from about 20 percent in 2000 to 80 percent in 2013, and
loan funds expanded from $80 billion to $160 billion between 2010 and 2013”). The OFR also
noted financial stability risk concerns over the significant migration of leveraged lending—
“lending to corporations that already carry considerable debt”—to asset management products,
including hedge funds. See OFR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 70–71.
346. See supra Part I.C.2, note 117, 156 and accompanying text. Note that such high-level
views are tentative and subject to rapid changes depending on market conditions. See OFR, 2014
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 115 (“Hedge fund strategies can change rapidly in response to
market factors. Leverage levels, even within hedge fund strategy types, can vary significantly over
time, depending on individual funds’ investment decisions.”).
347. See OFR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 114–15 (noting caution on the
interpretation of new data collections, including information from Form PF on which its analysis
of hedge fund leverage and strategy is based).
348. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2010)
(positing that hedge funds are more efficient in minimizing agency costs through their
organizational structure, which in turn increases their competitiveness against traditional
intermediaries).
349. See FSB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS: SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES, supra note 15, at 6–7
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desired goals. For present purposes, this involves balancing the need for
economic efficiency with mitigation of systemic risks to best preserve
stable global financial markets and promote economic growth. The theme
of trade-offs between innovation and stability continues here in finding the
balance between “unrestrained innovation and overregulation.”355 A level of
acceptable risk lies within the balance of such trade-offs,356 incorporating
what we have learned about the relative value of some long held market
goals relating to innovation and liquidity.
Arguments against regulation are often directed at its stifling effects on
innovation, which found staunch support in the pre-crisis era of market
fundamentalism. However, the GFC has dispelled the assumption that all
financial innovation is necessarily good, like those designed to circumvent
regulation or lacking in true economic benefits.357 The value of financial
innovation and enhancements of the markets needs to be judged against the
new risks they pose. For example, the shift from banks to market-based
financing generated funding alternatives, increased competition and
deepened the markets. However, the use of such innovations was not
tempered with adequate caution for the accompanying new risks as
financial institutions came to rely on the illusion of market liquidity.358
The Turner Review challenges the traditional view that maximizing
liquidity is always a worthy market goal — a benefit that is often attributed
to the function of hedge funds in the financial markets. The trade-offs in
heightened risks from the pursuit of ever-greater liquidity need to be
considered in the context of the applicable market conditions.359
The RIC can be a mechanism to calibrate the extent of government
intervention. The range of regulatory intensity can be conceptualized as a
continuum from an unregulated state dominated by market fundamentalism
to a heavily regulated, command and control environment. While the latter
approach is incompatible with hedge funds since they were born out of the
freedom from regulatory constraints, in light of the GFC, the other end of
the continuum is equally undesirable.
355. IOSCO, Mitigating Systemic Risk, supra note 101, at 4.
356. BRUMMER, supra note 261, at 130 n.34 (citing economist Dani Rodrik's statement that “the
more you value financial stability, the more you [may] have to sacrifice financial innovation”).
See also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing this lesson learned from the GFC).
357. In fact, it is said that some financial innovations created “economic rent extraction” instead
of real economic benefits. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 39, 47–49 (noting the fallacy
that “[f]inancial innovation can be assumed to be beneficial since market competition would
winnow out any innovations which did not deliver value added”).
358. See CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 73, at 6.
359. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 112 (giving the example of short-selling in stressed
markets as contributing to a “self-fulfilling downward cycle of falling confidence”).
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Continuing with the case study of hedge funds’ systemic risk as CIVs, a
preliminary list of factors in Box 2 can help evaluate the appropriate range
of regulatory intervention on the RIC to meet the regulatory objective
established in Part I.D.3. Certain factors are selected for further discussion
below.
Box 2
1. Level of shadow banking systemic risk360 (transpose findings from
SBRC)






8. Cost and benefit analysis366
360. Note that, although this factor is limited to shadow banking risks for the purposes of this
CIVs example, it can be extended to systemic risks generally for a broader application of the RIC.
361. See supra note 117 and accompanying text discussing hedge fund industry characteristics
with the potential to amplify systemic risk. Compare with other industry characteristics of hedge
funds which may serve to enhance risk management and mitigate their contribution to systemic
risk. See DIXON, supra note 112, at 29.
362. Allowing regulatory gaps provides an incentive for market participants to develop
financial innovations of regulatory arbitrage. See Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 23 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). The new banking
regulatory regime creates incentive for migration of activities to areas of finance not subject to the
same prudential restrictions, and therefore heightens the potential for regulatory arbitrage, which
requires more supervisory vigilance.
363. The GFC has illustrated that competitive pressures can set the stage for regulatory
philosophy that favors less government intervention, creating tension with the need for
international regulatory cooperation. See supra Part I.B. (Lesson 6) and infra note 415
(commenting on the implications of international competition). With the increasing sophistication
of capital markets in other nations, ensuring the United States’ position in the global financial
system will likely continue to be a top policy focus. Challenges to regulation will arise from the
inevitable trade-offs between international competitiveness and international regulatory
cooperation.
364. The crisis experience underscored the need to consider and address the shortcomings in
regulatory capacity and regulatory capture in redesigning regulation. In that regard, a robust
interpretative community that incorporates different views could serve as a failsafe mechanism
against regulatory capture.
365. On this point, so long as hedge funds are limited to sophisticated investors, their regulation
should be premised on prevention of systemic risks since U.S. securities regulation is focused on
the protection of retail investors. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:
The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style and Mission, U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 998–99 (2006).
366. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the trade-offs between hedge funds’ beneficial and
negative economic potentials). See also DIXON, supra note 112, at xxvi (noting that hedge fund
regulation “should weigh any reduction in systemic risk due to increased regulation against the
reduction in the hedge funds’ ability to provide value to their investors and the economy more
generally, as well as the costs of overseeing numerous medium-sized financial institutions”).
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Applying a balanced and targeted regulatory approach, the RIC
evaluation takes into account non-government regulation derived from
industry environment and market discipline.367 This is consistent with the
traditional focus for hedge fund regulation to strengthen market discipline
through counterparties368 and institutional investors.369 Industry body
standards and involvement, including self-regulatory organizations (SROs),
can reduce the need for statutory provisions.370 The requisite for regulation
also corresponds inversely to the level of alignment of incentives and
“culture of compliance”, although the voluntary nature of market discipline
limits their effectiveness in curbing risk-taking in a highly competitive
marketplace.371
Market-based discipline is more compatible with the dynamic nature of
hedge funds and their use of innovative strategies and products. Evaluations
on the RIC also need to account for the regulatory implications of hedge
funds’ industry makeup, including its business structure, diversity in
investment strategies, and fund composition. As noted earlier, adopting a
risk-based approach and proportionate regulation could aid in problem
detection and prevention, regulatory resource allocation, and ease
compliance burden on smaller funds. This approach can focus on higher
risk hedge fund sectors, such as those funds with strategies that require
substantial leverage to be effective, as well as those engaged in large
positions of a particular market.372
367. Balleisen, supra note 316, at 446–49 (conceptualizing private regulation in the last 3
decades through in-house “ethics and compliance” departments and trade organizations).
368. PWG PRINCIPLES, supra note 200, ¶¶ 6–7 (setting out systemic risk principles for indirect
regulation through hedge fund counterparties).
369. Impetus for improvements in industry risk management may be found in investors,
especially with the increasing institutionalization of the investor base, and possibly through
private litigation. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Wall Street Beware: The Lawyers Are Coming, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2010), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2af9178-4b1f-11df-a7ff-
00144feab49a.html.
370. The potential role for self-regulatory organizations relating to hedge funds has been
considered in the mandated GAO report on the feasibility and implications of a SRO to provide
primary oversight of private fund advisers. The finding was inconclusive. See U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-623, PRIVATE FUND ADVISERS: ALTHOUGH A SELF-
REGULATORY ORGANIZATION COULD SUPPLEMENT SEC OVERSIGHT, IT WOULD PRESENT
CHALLENGES AND TRADE OFFS (2011) [hereinafter GAO PRIVATE FUNDADVISERS], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11623.pdf.
371. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 72, at 744–745 (pointing to competitive pressure as a factor
in the investment banks’ rush to increase leverage) (referencing Michiyo Nakamoto & David
Wighton, Bullish Citigroup Is ‘Still Dancing’ to the Beat of the Buy-Out Boom, FIN. TIMES, Jul.
10, 2007 (quoting the then-CEO of Citigroup, Charles Prince, about the need to keep up: “When
the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing”).
372. The large market positions can create a crowded space danger for systemic risk. Higher
use of leverage, particularly from derivatives, also increases the potential for systemic risk.
However, data challenges remain for the effectiveness of this proposed approach to systemic risk
monitoring. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. For example, compare AIMA RESPONSE
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A key lesson from the GFC is that regulatory capacity needs to be
commensurate with the level of regulation to avoid failures in oversight,
such as the case of the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE)
Program.373 The diverse and complex nature of hedge funds, the volume
and pace of their investment activities, combined with the vast industry
resources and specialized expertise, intensify the challenge of adequate
regulatory capacity.374 Before the GFC, there was support for self-
regulation in the securities law area.375 However, the debacle of the CSE
Program provided a cautionary tale for reliance on the discretion of industry
participants.376 Although the crisis has put the theoretical premise of self-
regulation in doubt, its potential benefits in supplementing shortfalls in
public oversight functions makes the use of SROs worthy of
reconsideration.377
To the extent market discipline is inadequate, the balance of regulatory
intervention should begin with the least intrusive regulation necessary to
achieve its objectives. The flexibility of hedge funds to pursue investment
strategies unavailable to mutual funds is characteristic of their business
model and responsible for their benefits to the markets. Therefore, the costs
to their regulation, aspects of which are explored above, need to be
measured against their economic value in assessing the trade-offs along the
RIC on an evolving basis. One example is hedge funds’ diversification
benefit from their absolute-return strategy — one that provides a positive
return irrespective of market conditions. This is possible because of their
freedom from regulation to pursue diverse and complex investment
strategies. To the extent that hedge funds exhibit correlation in their returns
LETTER TO THE IOSCO HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT CONSULTATION REPORT app. 1 (2009),
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293_AnnexB.pdf (noting that
fixed income, convertible arbitrage and mortgage-backed securities type strategies are said to
employ higher levels of leverage, but account for a modest percentage of the overall hedge fund
industry) with the OFR’s findings based on 2014 Form PF data (noting relative-value funds at the
highest leverage level, followed by macro- and multi-strategy funds). See OFR, 2014 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 23, at 114–115.
373. The CSE Program was a voluntary consolidated supervision regime for companies that
own an SEC-registered securities broker or dealer adopted by the SEC in 2004 (designed for the
largest securities firms). The five big investment banks all opted into the CSE Program in order to
be subject to consolidated supervision by a U.S. federal regulator to satisfy exemption
requirements from EU regulation. It was abandoned by the SEC in the fall of 2008 in light of the
GFC events. See U.S. TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 204, at 36–37.
374. See IOSCO HEDGE FUNDSOVERSIGHT FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8.
375. See Lori Richards, Dir., SEC, Remarks at the NRS Fall 2000 Compliance Conference:
Self-Regulation in the New Era (Sept. 11, 2000), available at
http://edgar.sec.gov/news/speech/spch398.htm.
376. See Balleisen, supra note 316, at 461 (identifying the CSE Program as a form of
“management self-regulation” because of the devolution of responsibility to the investment banks
on their capital requirements).
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given the arguments on each side remain much the same and the consensus
that both approaches are blended in law.382 However, the fault lines exposed
by the crisis are instructive for a re-evaluation of the trade-offs involved in
the regulatory approach choice. Articles by scholars well-versed in the
discourse of PBR provide insightful examinations of the post-GFC state of
PBR and its variants.383 While many principles-based areas exhibited
failures in the GFC,384 the more rule-intensive regulatory approach of the
SEC also failed to deter the events in the crisis. In particular, the failure of
financial regulation to prevent the GFC brings to the fore two noteworthy
observations: (i) the inherent tensions and paradoxes385 of each approach in
serving the ex ante oversight function and ex post enforcement process; and
(ii) the regulatory relationships in the implementation of regulation is
critical to its effectiveness.386
On the first point, the paradoxes of PBR are identified and examined by
Julia Black in her articles, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based
Regulation,387 and Paradoxes and Failures: “New Governance”
Techniques and the Financial Crisis.388 Precisely for the diametrically
opposed features of principles and rules applied in the dual supervision and
enforcement functions of regulation, the benefit of one approach often
corresponds to the flaw in the other. For instance, principles offer flexibility
to the regulated in meeting their compliance obligations, but may result in
unpredictability in their enforcement. On the other hand, rules provide
certainty on what is permissible ex ante, but anything beyond their
perimeters is out of reach of enforcement, as in the case of shadow banking.
Such internal conflicts in each approach necessitate trade-offs in
achieving the desired regulatory results. For instance, flexibility required
for oversight needs to be balanced with the certainty necessary in
enforcement. To do so, the existing principles (including industry
standards) regulating hedge funds should be examined to identify areas
where rules are desirable to specify, ex ante, permissible conduct, while
382. See supra Part II.A.3. (considering the principles- and rules-based discourse).
383. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 285; Black, supra note 379.
384. Ford, supra note 285 (describing the failures of PBR by FSA in respect of Northern Rock).
385. See Black, supra note 379 (observing the regulatory paradoxes and failures in the financial
context, and examining examples of such related to new governance in light of the GFC); Julia
Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 425, 425–27
(2008) [hereinafter Black, Forms and Paradoxes].
386. Ford, supra note 285, at 307 (“To be effective, principles-based regulation must increase
regulatory resources, develop a thoughtful response to complexity (including a place for
prophylactic rules), and consciously incorporate a broader and more independent range of
perspectives into the regulatory discussion.”).
387. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 385 (identifying seven paradoxes of principles-
based-regulation, relating to “interpretation, communication, compliance, supervision and
enforcement, internal management, ethics and trust”).
388. Black, supra note 379.
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allowing for effective supervision and enforcement by regulators.389 In
addition, the “supervisory and enforcement paradox” identified by Black
would require a delicate balance in the level of enforcement, enough to give
credibility to the principles, but not in excess that can lead to their
demise.390
The problem of excessive industry discretion was exemplified by the
fate of Northern Rock in the GFC.391 However, Ford posits that this is more
an implementation issue in the devolution to industry than an inherent
danger in the principles-based approach.392 She distinguishes PBR from the
predominant role of self-regulation in the financial system preceding the
GFC, to which many of the causes of the crisis have been attributed. Ford
further concludes that the downfalls are avoidable with meaningful
regulatory oversight.393 The challenge remains, however, that in order for
PBR to succeed, a regulatory relationship of trust394 and what Black refers
to as “shared understanding”395 must be developed between the regulator
and the regulated to establish their respective roles.
In truth, the regulatory effectiveness of principles versus rules is
predicated on a multitude of factors that is far more complex than a
collection of their respective pros and cons. The context in which each
approach operates has significant implications on its success. Just as “a
principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no
principles,”396 a rules-based approach cannot be effective with individuals
who circumvent rules. A regulatory environment that provides checks and
balances for such deficiencies is needed to address the fault lines exposed in
the GFC.397 Similarly, even if the adaptability of principles creates a
flexible perimeter for ex ante supervision, the regulator may not be
politically inclined to act.398 While there is truth in the incompatibility of
389. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 72, at 749–50 (discussing the difference between “the ex
ante decision under a rules-based regime and the ex post decision under a principles-based system
. . . .”).
390. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 385, at 450–52.
391. See infra note 427 (referencing discussion of post-mortem of Northern Rock).
392. Ford, supra note 285, at 280, 300–01 (noting Northern Rock and the CSE Programs as
examples).
393. Id. at 287 (finding accountability to be missing in the GFC experience).
394. Black et al., supra note 292, at 200 (noting that a relationship characterized by mistrust on
both sides leads to a high chance of failure for principles-based regulation). See also Black, Forms
and Paradoxes, supra note 385, at 456 (explaining the “trust paradox” and its role in the
regulatory relationship).
395. Black et al., supra note 292, at 203–204 (explaining “shared understanding” means that all
parties applying the rule agree on what it means).
396. Hector Sants, Chief Executive, Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at the Reuters Newsmakers
Event: Delivering Intensive Supervision And Credible Deterrence (Mar. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml.
397. See supra Part I.B. (discussing Lessons 3 and 4 of the GFC).
398. See, e.g., the political environment for a “light touch” regulatory approach by UK’s FSA.
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rules to capture financial innovations, the growth of activities outside the
scope of regulation was also due to the competitive environment and
political philosophy against slowing the pace of financial innovations.399 An
example is the introduction of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000, which formalized the unregulated state of OTC derivatives,
notwithstanding efforts to curb their potential risks.400 Furthermore, clear
regulatory authority for supervision and enforcement is not meaningful if
the rules-based regulator lacks the capacity to carry out its remit. The RAC
offers a mechanism to reflect the interplay of various trade-offs for the
optimal principles-rules balance.
In evaluating the suitability of principles and rules, guidance on what
conditions are conducive to a more principles-based approach can be
gleaned from the lessons of the GFC and the rich, critical literature on the
debate between PBR and rules-based regulation (RBR).401 The conditions to
consider PBR include areas:
(i) subject to constant change and innovation;402
(ii) where great variations exist between different regulated entities and
discretion for case-by-case review is important; 403
(iii)where the risks of abuse of broad principles are tempered by a
functional and effective “interpretive community,” one that “collectively
develops, on a rolling basis, the detailed content of statutory principles,”404
along with oversight by industry associations, and appropriate incentives
for compliance;405
399. See, e.g., instances of such influence contributing to the transformation of the bank-based
to market-based financial system.
400. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000). See Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: Hearing Before the Joint
Economic Comm., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Brooksley Born, Former Chairperson,
CFTC) (noting the failed attempt to call for oversight of over-the-counter derivatives).
401. See supra Part I.B (discussing lessons of the GFC); Black et al., supra note 292.
402. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Principles and Rules in Public and Professional
Securities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S.—Canada Inquiry, 6 CANADA STEPS UP 253,
277 (2006), available at http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(5A)%20Cunningham.pdf (“The use of
broad principles-based enforcement appears to be most common—and legitimate—when
confronting novel or changing characteristics of the securities industry.”).
403. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 292, at 202 (listing “[m]eeting the needs of different
firms” as the third “critical success factor”).
404. Ford, supra note 285, at 277 (referencing additional articles on the concept of “interpretive
community” in note 73 therein). Note that such a community can allow the industry participants,
regulators, and possibly experts and other stakeholders to engage in ongoing communication
around the content of regulatory principles. Id. at 261.
405. See Black et al., supra note 292, at 203 (listing “[d]eveloping and maintaining a
constructive dialogue between regulator and regulated firm as to the expectations and
responsibilities of each interpreting and applying the Principles” as the eighth “critical success
factor”).
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(iv) where there is sufficient regulatory capacity to provide effective
oversight, taking into consideration the level of the regulated entities’
resources; 406 and
(v) where soft law plays a large role and/or international coordination
and cross-border enforcement is necessary or desirable.407
A more principles-based approach is the appropriate one, for the most
part, to regulate hedge funds based on the list of factors above. It is a
dynamic industry that greatly values its freedom and flexibility. Hedge
funds are also restricted, for the most part, to wealthy individual and
institutional investors who do not require the same level of investor
protection as retail investors. The wide range of investment strategies and
diversity across the industry call for a more case-by-case approach,
recommending principles over rules. Allowing hedge funds to meet the
regulatory objectives in a way that best fit their structure will also provide a
competitive advantage in the global markets. The existing body of industry
best practices form a solid foundation for an “interpretative community.”408
Most proposals for hedge fund regulation have also supported a more
principles-based approach, with IOSCO’s high level principles for hedge
fund regulation as a prominent example.409 However, the merits of a
principles-dominant balance are in question, having witnessed the
multitudes of implementation errors, notably ill-matched regulatory
capacity, which may be the Achilles heel in the implementation of PBR.
In the proposed paradigm, the RAC facilitates calibration of the
principles-rules balance with a set of factors to evaluate trade-offs against
the regulatory objective.410 In this case, principles and rules are assessed in
the applicable context for their respective suitability to meeting the
regulatory objective of systemic risk mitigation established in Part I.D.3.
The preliminary list in Box 3 is extracted from the forgoing analysis of
PBR, together with the lessons of the GFC. Accordingly, this list shares
many of the same factors in Box 2 for the RIC.411
406. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 72, at 752 (noting that “[t]hose with ample resources have
greater incentive to contest the principle’s application to them”). See also Black et al., supra note
292, at 203.
407. See supra Part I.C.1 and Part II.A.2.
408. See supra Part I.D.1 and Part I.D.2 (discussing the standards and guidelines for the hedge
fund industry) and supra notes 200–201.
409. See IOSCO HEDGE FUNDSOVERSIGHT FINAL REPORT, supra note 16.
410. See Black et al., supra note 292, at 200 (“Developing criteria to identify the appropriate
balance between Principles and other types of rules” is listed as the first “critical success factor”.).
See also Cunningham, supra note 284, at 1423–26 (considering trade-offs between principles and
rules); Cunningham, supra note 402, at 269 (noting that the superiority of each approach depends
on the context and the objective).
411. As in the case of Boxes 1 and 2, this list is preliminary and non-exhaustive for illustrative
purposes of the example.
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Box 3
1. Certainty versus flexibility






8. International soft law system416
9. Cost and benefit analysis417
The breadth of the above-listed factors entails extensive analysis
beyond the scope of this Article. In applying the analysis of the RAC, I will
focus on three factors relating to the principles-rules debate most
prominently featured in the lessons of the GFC: certainty versus flexibility;
regulatory relationship; and regulatory capacity.
1. Certainty versus Flexibility
The fundamental trade-offs involved here are between flexibility and
predictability in respect of principles, and certainty and rigidness for rules.
412. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 285, at 268 (identifying factors in the regulatory design process
to include the “[n]ature of the industry being regulated, the roles of the various players in it, and
the risks associated with that area of conduct . . . .”).
413. See Black et al., supra note 292, at 202 (listing “meeting the needs of different firms” as
one of the critical success factors).
414. This includes the ability and the will to regulate. Commensurate regulatory capacity to
industry resources is critical under PBR, as illustrated by the downfall of the FSA. See Black,
supra note 379, at 1058.
415. The implications of international competitiveness for the RIC are relevant to the
formulation of the regulatory approach. For example, during the pre-crisis boom markets, the
rhetoric of principles-based regulation was often embraced in policy discussions in respect of its
flexibility and competitive advantage. See Black, supra note 319, at 17.
416. The prominent role of the global governance network in the post-crisis reforms and in the
continuing work ahead makes facilitation of a financial soft law system a consideration in
domestic regulatory design. Evaluating trade-offs of PBR and RBR against this factor incorporates
the current regulatory landscape of the global financial system.
417. The costs and benefits of principles versus rules need to be evaluated in respect of their
functions for ex ante supervision and ex post enforcement. For example, the benefit of lower
legislative cost for more principles-based regulation may be surpassed by the greater
implementation time and cost because of its judgment-based process. See Pan, supra note 235, at
1918–44 (discussing regulatory strategies and considerations for the selection choices). Given the
heterogeneity of hedge fund industry makeup, this may also result in a disproportionately higher
compliance burden for smaller funds with limited resources. For now, according to an initial
hedge fund adviser survey conducted by Wulf Kaal et. al., the existing disclosure requirements
appear to be at a workable level across the industry, though with greater impact on smaller funds,
as expected. Wulf Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 243 (2013).
2015] Reframing Complexity: Hedge Fund Policy Paradigm 553
The pros and cons of each can be viewed from the ex ante supervision and
the ex post enforcement functions of regulation. For example, the
advantages of principles’ fluidity on the ex ante provisions come at the cost
of unpredictable enforcement actions for the regulated actors, along with
more difficult and resource intensive enforcement for the regulator.
However, these trade-offs inherent in PBR may not be as great as at
first glance, after accounting for certain paradoxes identified by Black. The
potential vagueness of principles may be abated by the “interpretive
paradox,” which provides that “principles can be general yet precise.”418
Conceptually, therefore, the lack of precision may be amended by
increasing “shared understanding” in the regulatory relationship through a
strong “interpretive community.”419 Interpretation of the principles can also
leverage the existing soft law system to fill in the contents of guiding
principles, such as the PWG Principles on systemic risks and IOSCO’s
principles of hedge fund regulation. On the regulator side, compliance
variances may not be as great as one would anticipate because the blurred
boundaries of principles keep firm behavior more conservative and/or
uniformed to avoid overzealous enforcement by the regulators.420 This
“principles paradox,” as termed by Schwarz, results in the regulated actors
behaving as if subject to a rule from taking the most conservative
interpretation of principles due to fear of liability.421 It would suggest that,
on balance, the perceived higher flexibility offered by principles is
tempered by the less customized compliance in practice, both reducing
somewhat the perceived benefit for the regulatees and the potential danger
of creative compliance for the regulator.
In the present example, the challenge is finding a regulatory approach
balance that meets the objective of global systemic mitigation. As Ford
pointed out, the choice of principles and rules needs to “consider the role
that particular regulatory requirements play in overall systemic stability and
efficiency” and identify those areas which should not “. . . necessarily be
subject to contestation, innovation and potential ‘creep’ through
collaborative regulatory practice.”422 For example, a more prescriptive
approach in setting rules and bright-line tests is better suited to the recent
418. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 385, at 446.
419. See supra note 404 (explaining the function of an interpretive community) and supra note
395 (explaining the term “shared understanding”). Also, Ford argues that the “clarity and
predictability” of a regulatory system is not dependent on whether it is principles-based or rules-
based. Instead, it is a question of “whether regulators and regulatees have a shared
understanding of what the regulations entail.” See Ford, supra note 285, at 264 n.17.
420. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 385, at 469 (highlighting this as the “compliance
paradox”, referencing the analysis by Schwarcz).
421. Steven L. Schwarcz, The ‘Principles’ Paradox, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 175–84, 176
(2009).
422. Ford, supra note 285, at 297.
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disclosure data requirements to facilitate collection of consistent and
comparable information for the goal of monitoring potential systemic risk.
Given the regulatory objective, and in the context of the fast paced,
innovative and heterogeneous nature of the hedge fund industry, broad
principles for the mitigation of systemic risk allow the regulator to keep up
with financial innovations that may generate such dangers.423 For present
purposes, the ex ante supervisory functions for timely detection of hedge
funds’ potential systemic risks also takes precedent over ex post
enforcement concerns. Therefore, on this factor of consideration, a more
principles-intensive regulatory approach is appropriate, except with respect
to disclosure or leverage requirements. In which case, rules-based
definitions, calculations and categorizations are better suited to provide data
consistency and comparability.424
2. Regulatory Relationship
The GFC dispelled what Black termed the “regulatory Utopia,”
envisioned as United Kingdom’s former FSA moved to a more principles-
based regime. This vision included a new regulatory relationship
characterized by “shared understanding” through open dialogue and a
“culture of compliance” in achieving better substantive compliance — it is
one of mutual trust justifying discretion on the part of the industry to meet,
and the regulator to enforce, the spirit of the law under broad principles.425
Unfortunately, in practice, this paragon of regulatory relationship is
vulnerable to potential downfalls from internal paradoxes, as well as
implementation failures in the context of the prevailing market
environment. 426
Just as trade-offs are needed between principles and rules in the
formulation of regulation discussed above, appropriate balance is also
required in the implementation stage. The benefits of principles are hinged
on the achievability of a well-functioning regulatory relationship envisaged
in PBR. However, the U.K.’s Northern Rock debacle illustrated
implementation failures associated with inadequate communication of
details on expected behavior from general principles and the lack of a
“culture of compliance” from within the firm to curtail undesirable risk
423. Principles also provide the discretion for hedge funds to structure their compliance as
suitable in their particular circumstances. However, such benefits are not achievable without
adequate oversight.
424. See Ford, supra note 285, at 269.
425. Black, supra note 319, at 17.
426. This is not surprising given the scope for implementation failures through the
“communicative paradox”, the “internal management paradox” and “ethical paradox” identified in
Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 385, at 447–48, 452–56.
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behavior.427 In theory, the role of industry in PBR should encourage a more
ethical approach to compliance. However, as Black pointed out, “when
compliance becomes a matter of risk management, non-compliance
becomes an option.”428
Another challenge with PBR rests in the paradox that the desired end
outcome is also one of the pre-conditions for its success. Black’s “internal
management paradox” and the “trust paradox” are examples of such circular
conundrum.429 She contends that although principles can facilitate
flexibility that allows for a more robust internal control system, it is
unlikely to materialize unless such a function is already strong within the
organization.430 This is further complicated by the corresponding need for
more expertise and resources on the part of the regulators. A similar
problem beset the transformation of a top-down, command-and-control
regulatory relationship to the envisioned one of “responsibility, mutuality
and trust.”431 Black contends that the latter relationship has to exist for
principles-based regulation to work.432 The issue of trust is, therefore, a
pivotal consideration in evaluating the balance of rules and principles on the
RAC.433 Trust is, unfortunately, something in short supply in the post-crisis
world.434
Even if the ultimate goal is to support a market driven regulatory
process by providing more industry discretion, reliance on broad principles
may not be feasible in light of the lack of public trust. It may be that,
initially, a preponderance of rules prescribing the desired behavior or result
is required to supplement the underpinning principles of systemic risk
mitigation. As better data and understanding of risk transmission are
developed, and trust within the markets and regulatory regime is
reestablished, the balance on the RAC may be adjusted accordingly. From
such perspective, the use of rules is prophylactic and not permanent as Ford
suggests.435 This approach would offer the benefit of time and experience
for a meaningful evaluation of the viability of the “shared understanding”
427. See Ford, supra note 285, at 290–291 (examining the post-mortem analysis of Northern
Rock).
428. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 385, at 454.
429. Id. at 452–53, 456.
430. Id. at 452–453.
431. Id. at 456.
432. Id.
433. Black, supra note 319, at 34 (noting that “[w]herever that trust is lacking there is little
scope for [principles-based regulation] to operate in any substantive way”).
434. See, e.g., Lagarde, supra note 296 (commenting on the lack of trust post-GFC).
435. Ford, supra note 285, at 298 (focusing on complexity, not with the issue of trust in
discussing the use of prophylactic rules).
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and “interpretative community” required to support an effective functioning
PBR.436
The benefits of principles’ flexibility over rules are also impacted by
hedge funds’ industry makeup. For one, its heterogeneity intensifies the
regulator engagement under PBR, requiring greater resources and expertise
to consider the context of a spectrum of funds in applying broad principles.
Additionally, the disparity between the large funds in the minority and the
average size of the industry majority creates concern of unequal voice in a
principles-heavy regulatory relationship—one that would likely be
dominated by funds with the highest AUM and superior resources to
participate in the regulatory conversation.437 This is a subject for further
research and analysis.
3. Regulatory Capacity
Closely related to the issue of regulatory relationship is the challenge of
regulatory capacity. This includes the ability to regulate, in terms of
authority, resources and expertise,438 as well as the disposition to regulate
since it may be diminished by regulatory capture of varying degrees.439
PBR has higher potential for regulatory capture440 as a fine line divides the
close collaborative relationship required to establish “shared understanding”
and the merging of perspectives over time that reflect industry interests.441
Regulatory capacity faces added hindrance from the diversity and
complexity of hedge funds’ investment strategies.442
A few brief points should be noted on the remaining RAC factors of
consideration. First, the effectiveness of principles and rules is greatly
determined by the context of the market environment in which the industry
operates443 and the market discipline that constrains its behavior, namely
436. See supra note 404 (explaining the function of an interpretive community); and supra note
395 (explaining the term “shared understanding”).
437. See supra Part I.A (discussing features of the hedge fund industry makeup). At present,
however, these concerns are less relevant as the disclosure requirements are more rules-based and
less reliant on regulatory communications to establish a “shared understanding”.
438. See Black, supra note 379, at 1058. See also Ford, supra note 285, at 289–290(noting the
fundamental need for adequate number of staff and access to information).
439. See Black, supra note 379, at 1058 (arguing that “[r]egulatory capacity is a composite
notion comprising both resources and disposition”).
440. See supra Part I.B., GFC Lesson 4 and supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text,
discussing regulatory capture phenomena like the industry “revolving-door” and “group think”.
441. See Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal, 5
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 313 (2010-2011) (identifying regulatory capture as a main
challenge to implementing PBR).
442. Limitations of regulatory capacity, such as funding, need to be reflected in assessing the
extent of benefits that can realistically be generated from the use of principles.
443. For example, the competitive nature of the hedge fund industry, by enhancing the natural
selection process in weeding out struggling funds, may generate some rigor in market discipline.
See Andrew Lo, The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, Clarendon Lectures in Finance, Said Business
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risk-taking in the example herein. This must be considered in the general
legal and political environment, which will have significant impact on the
implementation of each approach and ultimately determine its success.444
The challenge, it would follow, is finding a balance of rules in the
regulatory approach formula to explicitly address critical aspects of
systemic risk mitigation and safeguard them from future shifts in policy
agenda.
The need for a comprehensive and flexible regulatory system to reduce
regulatory arbitrage opportunities makes PBR more desirable over static
RBR that can be rendered obsolete by the next wave of financial
innovations.445 The ability to incorporate “country specific conditions,
regulations, and public perceptions” necessary in the evaluation of shadow
banking risks also facilitates a macroprudential regulatory approach.446 In
addition, the diversity in the funds’ investment strategies, culture, and
composition of sizes makes a prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach
impractical and inefficient. In theory, principles should be better at
addressing such differences through communications with the regulator,
utilizing an “interpretive community,” and fostering a “culture of
compliance” within the funds.447 As noted in the preceding discussion, the
internal tensions and paradoxes of PBR introduce practical complications to
the theoretical visions.
PBR is also preferable to RBR in facilitating the functioning of a soft
law system, as demonstrated by the process of the post-crisis reform efforts.
This is evident from the close relationship between PBR and the network of
international soft law, intertwined in many conceptual mechanisms of
School at the University of Oxford (June 12, 2013) (referring to hedge funds as the “Galapagos
Islands of Finance”).
444. Cristie Ford, Macro- and Micro-Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44
U.B.C. L. REV. 589, 610–13 (2011) (referencing the impact of “agenda-setting power” and the
failings of an agenda focused on financial innovation and reduction of regulatory burden at the
expense of regulating the increased risks seen in the FSA’s implementation of principles). On the
other hand, the GFC also revealed flaws in the United States’ more rules-based regime. The
dominance of market fundamentalism as a driver in the United States’ financial regulatory
philosophy allowed “irrational exuberance” to thrive, while new dangers from financial
innovations in OTC derivatives were granted freedom from regulation.
445. To the extent that harmonization is the desired method of addressing regulatory arbitrage,
the common goals and dialogue process under PBR can facilitate that process. Given the rising
role of soft law in the global financial system, this issue warrants further observation and can
impact the final tally of trade-offs between principles and rules. See Black, supra note 319, at 28
(noting that principles are used “[a]s part of the drive for harmonization of regulation across
jurisdictional boundaries”).
446. See IMF, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 69. See also supra Part I.B (GFC
Lesson 1), note 66 and accompanying text (recommending a macroprudential approach).
447. See, e.g., supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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regulation, such as “new governance”448 or as a form of PBR termed
“polycentric or network PBR” by Black.449 Given that building a more
transparent and resilient global shadow banking system via the development
of the international soft law system is a regulatory objective in this case, a
more principles-intensive blend of regulatory approach on the RAC would
be better suited to the task.
In summary, the above factors of consideration address trade-offs
involved in (i) the form of regulation, ranging from detailed, prescriptive
rules of conduct to broad principles of regulatory outcome; and (ii) the
regulatory relationship it creates, across a spectrum from the command-and-
control, top-down relationship to the collaborative relationship based on
“responsibility, mutuality and trust.”450 The implications of discretion is
especially pertinent for the PBR regulatory relationship, resting in the
industry on the ex ante supervision, and in the hands of the regulator on the
ex post enforcement process, both with potential for abuse. Therefore, such
reciprocal reliance makes trust and “shared understanding” critical to the
success of PBR. With recent history of grave market and regulatory
failures, it is also a potentially fatal downfall for the implementation of PBR
on a broad level at this time. However, even without formal adoption of
PBR, it is possible to strive towards the goal of a PBR-styled regulatory
relationship by using existing discretionary and rulemaking powers of the
securities regulators.451
In the post-crisis world, the opacity and complexity that blindsided
market participants and regulators alike made industry disclosure
imperative, the nature of which is better served by more rules in the mix.452
The preliminary assessment for the purposes of this example is consistent
with the current regulatory approach in maintaining hedge funds’ freedom
in their investment strategies, but subject to a more rules-intensive approach
under the new registration and related disclosure requirements. This
position is generally approximated by “” in Figure 4.
448. See Ford, supra note 281, at 27–28 (describing “new governance” as an approach that
emphasizes how change happens within complex real-life social systems instead of legal doctrine
or formal jurisprudence). See also Awrey, supra note 441, at 284 n.58 (describing PBR’s
relationship to “new governance”).
449. Black, supra note 319, at 13–15 (describing such functions at the international level, the
IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program being one such example).
450. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 385, at 456.
451. See Ford, supra note 281, at 60 (citing the example of British Columbia Securities
Commission’s shift towards PBR).
452. See Ford, supra note 292, at 46 (referring to disclosure requirements as an example where
rules make sense to provide consistency in form). But see Ford, supra note 285, at 298 (qualifying
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hedge funds in its four quadrants by the applicable combination of
regulatory intensity and approach.
1. RCM to Monitor and Track Regulatory Status
The RIC and RAC offer contextual adaptability to incorporate future
developments by making adjustments in the level and the principles-rules
balance of regulation accordingly. Rapid financial innovations in a
transformative regulatory environment make timely identification and
response to new trends and potential systemic risks in the financial system
imperative.454 The RCM provides a fluid framework to keep track of such
changes and engage in analysis of reform proposals. This matrix can reflect
rebalancing along the proposed regulatory continuums to assess and record
appropriate adjustments as the underlying factors evolve over time. For
instance, increased use of leverage or inadequate redemption restrictions
can heighten hedge funds’ susceptibility to runs, thereby shifting the SBRC
position, and entail further regulation along the RIC. As more regulatory
tools are added from the CIV Toolkit, the positions on the RIC moves up
higher from Q1 and Q2 into Q3 and Q4.
The example here begins with the current regulatory position in the
RCM, roughly approximated by Point “A” in Figure 6. This high-level
estimation is derived from the intersection of the points on the RIC and
RAC from Parts III.B and III.C.455 Next, consider two situations where in
one, leverage requirement is added, and in the other, both leverage and
redemption restrictions from the CIV Toolkit are introduced. Evaluation of
the need for such additional regulatory tools can be made using the list of
factors in Boxes 1 and 2 to determine the extent of upward movement along
the SBRC, and the RIC correspondingly. In doing so, such increase in
regulation can be reflected on the RIC axis of the matrix. For instance,
point “L” can approximate the addition of one tool on the RIC to manage
leverage and point “L&R” can approximate the use of multiple tools to
address leverage and redemption (see Figure 5). This process can be
similarly applied for other recommended tools in the CIV Toolkit.
454. See supra notes 195 and 243 and accompanying text (referencing financial market
developments with potential systemic risk concerns).
455. This tentative position on the RCM is constructed from the foregoing examples examining
CIVs’ shadow banking risks and the need for regulation on the basis of the considerations
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quadrant, the RCM envisions a wide array of combinations in degrees of
regulation and industry discretion.
As such, the proposed RCM may offer a framework for high-level
categorizations of hedge fund regulation. It may also be used to plot subsets
of hedge funds based on their particular characteristics and circumstances,
as well as to chart various national hedge fund regulatory regimes.
However, due to the exploratory stage of this thought experiment, the
feasibility and utility of such hypothetical functions are subject to further
consideration of the necessary specificity on definition, calibration, and
classification.
IV. POTENTIALS, CHALLENGES AND FURTHER RESEARCH
A. POTENTIALUSES
Beyond providing a framework for the categorization of hedge funds
and analysis for future reforms, the RCM has the potential as a tool in the
implementation of regulation. Positions in the RCM may be individualized
for a specific hedge fund, or based on a sub-sector of hedge funds, by
regenerating the intersecting point of the RIC and RAC. One possibility is
to group hedge fund sectors by investment strategies or size. For example,
if a hedge fund is designated as a NBNI G-SIFI, it would fall in Q4, the
highest category of regulatory intensity and prescriptiveness with prudential
type regulation. In this way, classification of the sectors and significant
outlier funds in the four quadrants can assist with the allocation of
regulatory resources in a risk-based and proportionate manner, alleviating
stress on limited regulatory capacity.
However, the preliminary stage of this proposal dictates a closer
examination of the operational challenges, as well as caution for potential
unintended effects. For example, such categorization may present moral
hazard in weakening risk management of counterparties and institutional
investors arising from reliance on such labels as risk ratings of the various
hedge fund sub-sectors or individual funds.458 The role of credit rating
agencies in the unravelling of structured mortgage-based securities during
the GFC is a sobering reminder of the dangers from misplaced reliance on
risk ratings.459
458. Careful consideration of the possibility that RCM categorizations are used as proxies for
risk ratings is necessary to avoid demonstrated dangers with the credit ratings based system. The
metrics for the proposed matrix are intended for regulatory purposes, and the resulting
determinations may be ineffective or misleading for other purposes. As we have seen, misplaced
confidence in the ratings as a predictor of future developments played an important role in the
origins of the GFC. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 10, at 76–77.
459. Credit rating agencies have been identified as an unregulated sector that contributed to the
GFC through their role in rating structured credit products. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 49, at
xxv (“The three credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown . . . . Their
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On the other hand, classification of hedge funds in the RCM may help
instill incentive to strengthen risk-management and enhance the functioning
of PBR with improved “shared understanding” and a more robust
“interpretive community.” In the same way that the possibility for inclusion
as a NBNI G-SIFI would discourage financial institutions from becoming
too big or too interconnected to exceed the materiality threshold, the RCM
designation may also incentivize hedge funds to avoid elevation onto the
next quadrant. Such inducement may be further aligned to international
standards by linking FSB’s policy tools to specific quadrants. Being
cognizant of the corresponding increase in regulatory costs as a result of the
use of higher leverage can serve as a cogent disincentive to excessive risk-
taking.
Simplifying regulatory issues to focus on trade-offs in hedge funds’
benefits and systemic risk potentials also addresses opacity. The underlying
analysis for RCM positions increases transparency of the risks that hedge
funds create or engage in, and the extent to which such risks may be
transferred to, the financial system. This process would also cultivate a
PBR-style regulatory environment by serving as a pragmatic evaluator
regarding movements in the RCM, thereby stimulating a forum for
discussion. Hedge fund regulatory issues reduced to big picture concepts
can reach a wider audience of invested citizens for a more robust
“interpretive community” envisioned under PBR in the application of
principles. In turn, this may offer a potential counterbalance to regulatory
capture and political inertia to reforms.
Assuming sufficient uniformity in hedge fund data and consistent
measurements for the continuums are feasible, the RCM may provide
global comparisons of national hedge fund regulatory regimes. Differences
in regulation by quadrant identify notable regulatory arbitrage
opportunities. The recent crisis illustrated that a meltdown in one market
can quickly spread to others and span across borders. In light of concerns
over the growth and safety of shadow banking in China,460 a framework of
reference to monitor changes in this regard can aid detection of financial
stability threats in a form accessible for public consumption. Such
comparative regulatory status could be designed to supplement FSB’s
review process and aid in rallying public support for political engagement.
ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across
markets and firms”). The post-crisis reforms on credit rating agencies are also instructive to the
potential downfalls of the RCM (such as effectiveness in categorizing hedge fund risks and who
will determine positions in the RCM) so as to avoid misplaced reliance and conflict of interests.
See TURNERREVIEW, supra note 10, at 78–79.
460. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing rising systemic risk concerns from the rapid growth of
shadow banking in China).
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Finally, the RCM can track changes in circumstances and economic
trade-offs through determinations of the RIC and RAC placement in its
applicable quadrants. In doing so, the proposed paradigm facilitates the
self-critical learning to modify future actions and decisions, which Black
identified as a key lesson from the experience of new governance
techniques in the GFC.461
While this preliminary proposal may not be a panacea for the causes of
the recent crisis, its theoretical potential makes an integral contribution to
the prodigious GFC literature. By streamlining hedge fund regulatory
concerns, the proposed paradigm can evolve with new developments and
foster policy conversation to support a PBR-style “interpretative
community.”With dialogue opened to a broader audience, it engages public
interest to probe the effects of shadow banking risks on the real economy,
which advances the goals of inclusive capitalism.
B. IMPLEMENTATIONCHALLENGES AND FURTHERRESEARCH
Despite potentially promising prospects, the inception stage of this
proposal leaves much room for further deliberations. To start, the paradigm
may be subject to criticism in that it is largely premised on idealized
operation of the normative basis. Concerns that utopian visions of laudable
ideologies may function differently in practice are understandable in light of
the GFC. However, this proposal opens the reform dialogue to filter key
issues for hedge fund regulation and explore possibilities to formulate its
post-crisis regulatory course.
The Article presents a conceptual experiment, operating on broad stroke
features of the SBRC, RIC, RAC, and RCM. As observed above, the
resulting placements on the continuums and the matrix are crude estimates
and may be arbitrary and tenuous in their current state. In particular, the
subjective judgment on trade-offs in the underlying factors renders
consistency in application inherently difficult, due to dependency on value
and philosophy of the decision maker.462
As such, the fundamental challenges of the paradigm’s design are
readily apparent, including definitional issues and measurement metrics, as
well as operational concerns, such as the calibration mechanism for
adjustments along the continuums. Importantly, development of the
underlying factors of consideration, together with their weight and rank in
the evaluation, remains to be defined. By focusing on the forest rather than
461. Black, supra note 379, at 1062 (prescribing regulators to “observe and adapt, to engage in
self-critical learning”). See also Ford, supra note 444, at 621 (asserting that “regulators failed to
manage change in conscious ways—by failing to record their own learning or to track movement
over time in the meaning of terms”).
462. BRUMMER, supra note 261, at 130–131 (noting that countries will weigh the trade-offs of
stability and innovation differently).
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its trees, the discussion herein is precursory and illustrative rather than
exhaustive and conclusive. This proposal’s end goal, among others, is
simply to reframe the hedge fund conversation and widen dialogue related
to charting a regulatory course for hedge funds in the post-GFC world—an
objective reliant on seeing above the trees.
Another potential downfall is the danger of oversimplification,
reflecting the conflict between the generalization needed to simplify issues
at a high-level and the meaningful analysis required for more nuanced
consideration of the facts and their context. However, focusing on the
broader goals and principles in this way enables the SBRC, RIC, RAC and
RCM to serve as visual tools to process the complexities of systemic risk
and hedge fund regulation.463 Whether the RCM can fulfill its intended
purposes is also subject to a number of unknowns, such as the availability
of hedge fund data, findings from the cost and benefit analysis, and
limitations on its implementation relating to regulatory capacity and
international cooperation.
Finally, one significant issue for the proposal remains unaddressed:
who is responsible for constructing the RCM and conducting the underlying
analysis for the SBRC, RIC and RAC? Even at a high-level basis, the data
and examinations involved would be another unwelcomed regulatory
burden for both the regulator and the market actors. The industry bodies
may be a possible candidate for this role, subject to effective regulatory
oversight. For one, they have better proximity and understanding of the
hedge fund markets, thus providing them with an informational advantage
over regulators. Hedge fund groups, like MFA and AIMA, have been
actively involved in related financial regulatory reforms to counter
perceptions of the industry’s threat to financial stability. Regulators may be
able to leverage these groups’ access to their member hedge fund managers,
depth of resources and self-professed eagerness to assist in a collective
effort to mitigate systemic risks.464 If such delegation of responsibilities
463. See OFR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 80 (“Visualizations that support
policymaking should focus viewers’ attention on the broader goals and principles that underlie
policy choices.”).
464. Cf. Saule T. Omarova, From Reaction to Prevention: Product Approval as a Model of
Derivative Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 98, 103-4 (2013). Omarova proposes a product
approval model for derivative regulation, placing the onus on the financial institution to apply and
maintain qualification for the approval of new financial products. She insightfully contends that
such a proposal would lessen informational asymmetries between industry and regulators and
correct existing sub-optimal risk taking incentives. By analogy, the proposed use herein would
also serve as a similar burden-shifting mechanism from the often out-matched regulator to well-
endowed industry actors. However, careful consideration is required in this case to address lessons
learned from the failed CSE Program in its devolution of regulatory discretion to industry. See
supra notes 373, 392 and accompanying text (discussing the CSE Program and its implementation
failures).
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proves effective, it would also have positive implications for an SRO in the
hedge fund regulatory landscape.
Academia may be another possible source of expertise in undertaking
the analysis envisaged by the RCM. As noted throughout, the topic of post-
crisis regulatory reform has garnered tremendous academic interest,
resulting in extensive expertise and rich supply of scholarship. As such, the
proposed project may appeal to future academic research, which could
advance in tandem regulatory efforts of systemic risk detection and
mitigation. For example, collaboration with outside scholars is sought after
as a valuable supplement to the research capabilities of the Office of
Financial Research.465 The collaborative connections in academia can
incorporate interdisciplinary and international perspectives in the financial
stability analysis and recommendations. Academic involvement can also
bolster objectivity of financial risk evaluation based on their specialized
knowledge and reputational capital.
Such arrangements with industry bodies and academics can help bridge
the public/private divide in the hedge fund sector466 and contribute to an
expert “financial interpretive community”467 for critical analysis to develop
regulation and mold industry best practices on an evolving basis. As this
process matures, a solid foundation for PBR may then be available to
support its envisioned regulatory relationship. Given the depth and
complexity of the relevant issues, this is a subject open for further research
and consideration.
CONCLUSION
The inevitability of market failure from maturity/liquidity
transformation, combined with recurrent asset price bubbles, warrant
regulatory intervention in the shadow banking system. Extensive issues
surround the goal of safeguarding the financial system from systemic risks
of non-bank entities performing banking functions. The Article considers
lessons from the GFC, together with hedge funds’ current regulatory
465. See Research Subcommittee: FR-14 Recommendations, FINANCIALRESEARCH.GOV (Aug.
1, 2013), http://financialresearch.gov/frac/2013/08/01/committee-meeting/recommendation/fr-14/.
The Financial Research Advisory Committee is intended to provide diverse perspectives in
advising on the OFR’s research and data agenda. See also Financial Research Advisory
Committee, FINANCIALRESEARCH.GOV, http://financialresearch.gov/frac/ (last visited Mar. 21,
2015).
466. In this way, academia’s role in undertaking the RCM analysis connects the “means” of
private hedge fund industry resources with the “ends” for public functions of the regulatory
bodies. Cf. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private" Means to “Public” Ends:
Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 53 (2014) (extending, as a possibility by
analogy in respect of public universities, its analysis of the government “market actor” role that
straddles the traditional public/private divide of government and markets).
467. For a discussion of the term “financial interpretive community”, see supra note 299 and
accompanying text.
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landscape, to formulate their post-crisis regulatory objective and a policy
paradigm for the prescribed tasks. The proposed RCM presents a simplified
visual representation of the status of hedge fund regulation, supported by
underlying analysis on regulatory intensity and approach. Therefore, the
matrix offers contextual adaptability to monitor systemic risks, sustains
visibility of such dangers lurking in the shadows, and promotes vigilance in
securing financial stability.
This policy paradigm offers a thought experiment to reduce complexity
through the perspective of regulatory trade-offs. The goal is to aid
understanding and facilitate widened dialogue, on pace with the dynamic
nature of hedge funds in the global markets. If achievable, it may help
support public policy debates beyond the peak of the Regulatory Sine Curve
and advance the ideals of inclusive capitalism. It must be observed that in
focusing on the big picture, there is a risk of oversimplification; weaving
yet another thread in the enduring theme of trade-offs presented here. Thus,
the Article ends as it began, resting on the delicate balance of accords and
concessions. While the RCM is conceptual rather than concrete, the
postulations put forth herein sow the seeds for a paradigm shift concerning
complexity in financial regulation and provides a mechanism to enable
broader policy dialogues—inviting some sunlight into the shadows of
finance.
